In his affirmation in support of the motion for summary judgment, Chartwells counsel contends that the plaintiff testified unambiguously that she intentionally stepped onto a piece of flat, dry cardboard and slipped on it causing her to fall on her back. Counsel asserts that case law holds that flattened cardboard on the floor, which is readily observable and is in fact observed, is not a dangerous condition which provides a basis of liability against a dedfendant charged with maintaing the proerty (citing Sosa v. RS 2001, Inc., 106 AD3d 720 [2d Dept.2013] [the piece of cardboard was not an inherently dangerous condition and was readily observable by the reasonable use of the plaintiff's senses]; Schoen v. King Kullen Grocery Co., 296 A.D.2d 486 [2d Dept.2002] [the flat cardboard on the floor did not constitute an inherently dangerous condition and was readily observable by the reasonable use of the injured plaintiff's senses]; Boehme v. Edgar Fabrics, 248 A.D.2d 344 [2d Dept.1998] [the injured plaintiff testified that he had actually seen the stack of cardboard cartons on which he stepped and that he purposely stepped on them] ). Counsel argues that here, plaintiff slipped on a flat, dry, piece of cardboard which was readily observable, that she saw the cardboard and consciously decided to step onto it.

New York Courts have consistently granted-and affirmed-summary judgment for defendants because cardboard on the floor is open and obvious, and is not inherently dangerous.... The cardboard box, like those in [Boyle v. Pottery Barn, 117 A.D.3d 665, 985 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2d Dep't 2014), Sosa v. RS 2001, Inc., 106 A.D.3d 720, 964 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't 2013), Schoen v. King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., 296 A.D.2d 486, 745 N.Y.S.2d 554 (2d Dep't 2002), and Boehme v. Edgar Fabrics, 248 A.D.2d 344, 669 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dep't 1998)], was open and obvious, and not inherently dangerous condition. It was a brown box against a white floor, about 11 by 14 with the edges folded up.

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the presence of the mat was open and obvious and visible to one reasonably using his or her senses, and not inherently dangerous (see Sprott v IKEA N.Y., LLC, 169 A.D.3d 851; Sosa v RS 2001, Inc., 106 A.D.3d 720; Leib v Silo Rest., Inc., 26 A.D.3d 359; Schoen v King Kullen Grocery Co., 296 A.D.2d 486).

The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and, in effect, denied the plaintiffs' cross motion.The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that neither the mat itself nor its placement on the deck of their house constituted an inherently dangerous condition (see Sosa v. RS 2001, Inc., 106 A.D.3d 720, 964 N.Y.S.2d 227 ; Leib v. Silo Rest., Inc., 26 A.D.3d 359, 360, 809 N.Y.S.2d 185 ; Rosa v. Southren, 8 A.D.3d 648, 778 N.Y.S.2d 897 ; Mansueto v. Worster, 1 A.D.3d 412, 413, 766 N.Y.S.2d 691 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.