Because a trial judge in a bench trial may evaluate the evidence and dismiss a case at the end of a plaintiff's case under SCRA 1986, 1-041(B) (Repl. 1992), which ruling will then be reviewed under normal substantial evidence principles, White v. City of Lovington, 78 N.M. 628, 629, 435 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Ct.App. 1967), the question for us on review is whether it was rational for the judge to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of a finding of bad faith, see Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 1990). Worker points to a number of Employer's actions as indicative of bad faith.

In cases such as this, where the trial court found against the party with the burden of proof, we should affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of the contrary finding. Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 1990). See also State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Williams, 108 N.M. 332, 335, 772 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1989) ("Even in a case involving issues that must be established by clear and convincing evidence, it is for the finder of fact, and not for reviewing courts, to weigh conflicting evidence and decide where the truth lies.").

The trial court rationally found that the Bank did not exercise dominion or control over the proceeds, and the Bank's intent to assert a right in the proceeds was not inconsistent with any of Case's rights. See Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 1990) ("[W]hen a finding is made against the party with the burden of proof, we can affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support" of that burden.). I conclude that the evidence does not compel different findings and that the findings support judgment in favor of the Bank.

In the present case, our review of the whole record indicates that claimant satisfied his burden of showing bad faith on the part of respondent as defined in Section 52-1-54(C)(2). See Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 1990) ("It is claimant's burden to show the bad faith on the part of respondent."). As stated previously, the findings of fact reveal that respondent's alleged basis for the termination of benefits was claimant's failure to follow Dr. Babur's recommendation for a cervical myelogram and possible surgery, and his failure to follow Dr. Graham's recommendation for physical therapy and medication.

Section 52-1-54(I) also articulates another exception to the general rule on the allocation of attorney fees, in addition to that found in Section 52-1-54(F): "Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection J of this section, the party found to have acted in bad faith shall pay one hundred percent of the additional fees awarded for representation of the prevailing party in a bad faith action." Section 52-1-54(I); see also Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 8-9, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215 (stating that it is the worker's burden to show that the employer's conduct amounted to bad faith, relying on 52-1-54 (G) (1989), which was redesignated as 52-1-54(I) in 1990). {27} Worker argues that the WCJ erred by denying additional attorney fees in excess of the cap because of Employer's bad faith request for an IME.

Employer/Insurer argues that this Court should apply a rational basis standard of review, which requires a reviewing court to "affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact[-]finder to disbelieve evidence offered in support of the finding." Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, ¶ 8, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215. However, this Court is not assessing whether there were sufficient facts to support the WCJ finding.

{10} The party bringing a claim of unfair claims processing has the burden of proving such a claim. Cf. Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, ¶ 8, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215 (holding that the worker—in workers' compensation context—had the burden of proof to establish bad faith on the part of employer and insurer); Munoz v. Deming Truck Terminal, 1990-NMCA-084, ¶ 18, 110 N.M. 537, 797 P.2d 987 (holding that "a party seeking relief based upon disputed factual matters has the burden of proof of presenting sufficient evidence to support such contentions"); Wallace v. Wanek, 1970-NMCA-049, ¶ 9, 81 N.M. 478, 468 P.2d 879 ("He who alleges the affirmative must prove."). In this case, Worker has the burden.

Further, where "a finding is made against the party with the burden of proof, we can affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of that finding." Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, ¶ 8, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215. THEORIES OF EASEMENT CREATION

Further, “when a finding is made against the party with the burden of proof, [the appellate court may] affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of that finding.” Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct.App.1990). {15} In his petition for order of complete settlement, Duran stated that he individually claimed reimbursement in the amount of $3,967.35 for property taxes he paid on the Rinconada property from 2000 to 2008.

Further, "when a finding is made against the party with the burden of proof, [the appellate court may] affirm such a finding if it was rational for the fact finder to disbelieve the evidence offered in support of that finding." Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 1990). {15} In his petition for order of complete settlement, Duran stated that he individually claimed reimbursement in the amount of $3,967.35 for property taxes he paid on the Rinconada property from 2000 to 2008.