Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC335057, Victor E. Chavez, Judge.
Stroud & Do and James T. Stroud for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
David E. Allen Jr. for Defendants and Respondents.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs and appellants are Sunthorn Sornchai, a Buddhist monk, and the Wat Buddhanubhavena Thai Buddhist Temple (Wat Buddhanubhavena) (collectively, plaintiffs). Defendants are The Council of Thai Bhikkhus In U.S.A., Inc. (Bhikkhus) and Phra Rajdharmavides, vice president of the Bhikkhus and abbot of the Wat Thai, a Buddhist temple in North Hollywood (collectively, defendants). A dispute arose between the parties over the disposition of $50,000 from the sale of a Buddhist temple in Visalia, California. During that dispute, Rajdharmavides publicly accused Sornchai, in effect, of financial misconduct and compromising his vows as a monk. After a bench trial, the trial court found for Sornchai on his claim for defamation and awarded him $20,000 in damages. The trial court found against plaintiffs on several other claims.
Defendants voluntarily abandoned their second amended cross-complaint at the conclusion of trial and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The cross-complaint is not at issue on this appeal.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by (1) finding against Sornchai on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) awarding the inadequate sum of $20,000 as damages on Sornchai’s defamation claim; and (3) relying on “demonstrably false or inherently improbable” evidence in finding against plaintiffs on their claim that defendants converted the $50,000. We conclude that none of these contentions has merit. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences to support the judgment. (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053, abrogated on another ground as stated in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 100.) To the extent the trial court’s findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, we accept the facts set forth in the trial court’s statement of decision. (See City of Merced v. American Motorists Ins. Co. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1322-1323.)
The Bhikkhus is a national organization that oversees Buddhist temples in the United States. As vice president of the Bhikkhus, Rajdharmavides was in charge of Thai Buddhist temples in the western United States, including the temple in Visalia, California.
A struggle for control of the Visalia temple broke out between factions of Thai and Laotian monks. The Laotian faction commenced litigation against the Thai faction. The Bhikkhus was a party to the lawsuit.
In April 2003, Rajdharmavides agreed on behalf of the Bhikkhus to settle the lawsuit by selling the temple’s property to the Laotian faction. The proceeds from the sale were to go to the Bhikkhus. Rajdharmavides signed a settlement agreement to that effect on behalf of the Bhikkhus. According to the Thai faction’s attorney, the Laotian faction refused to sign the settlement agreement and the settlement was never consummated. Rajdharmavides nevertheless continued to believe that the Bhikkhus would receive the proceeds from the sale of the Visalia temple.
Defendants introduced into evidence a copy of the April 2003 settlement agreement that appeared to be signed by representatives of the Laotian faction. Plaintiffs dispute the authenticity of the signatures.
At the time of trial, Sornchai had been a Buddhist monk for approximately 20 years. He was from Thailand, and he had taken vows of chastity and poverty. In 2003, Sornchai was teaching Bali language classes at the Wat Thai. One of his students was Nancy Poopongpaibul.
In February 2004, Rajdharmavides appointed Sornchai as abbot of the Visalia temple and asked him to “follow up” on the dispute between the Thai and Laotian monks. Ms. Poopongpaibul was asked to help Sornchai by translating documents in connection with the litigation. The Bhikkhus, however, refused to fund the litigation. Sornchai borrowed money from private individuals to pay legal expenses.
In June 2004, Sornchai was forced to leave the Visalia temple because the property had been sold by the Laotian faction. Sornchai thereafter initiated a lawsuit on behalf of the Thai faction against the Laotian faction. Because she spoke English, Ms. Poopongpaibul was the primary contact between Sornchai and the attorney handling the lawsuit.
With Rajdharmavides’s permission, Sornchai returned to live temporarily at the Wat Thai. In late 2004, both lawsuits relating to the Visalia temple were settled. The Bhikkhus was not a party to the settlement. The settlement provided that $50,000 of the proceeds from the sale of the Visalia temple would be paid to the Thai faction. The proceeds were to be used to set up a new Bhuddist temple in the Visalia area. Rajdharmavides was not informed of the settlement.
Sornchai formed the Wat Buddhanubhavena as a California nonprofit corporation to receive the settlement funds and to found a new temple in Visalia. Sornchai and Ms. Poopongpaibul were the corporation’s initial directors. Sornchai used the address of his cottage at the Wat Thai as the Watt Buddhanubhavena’s corporate address. In January 2005, the $50,000 in settlement proceeds were disbursed by the Superior Court in Visalia by check payable to the Wat Buddhanubhavena. The check was deposited into the Wat Buddhanubhavena’s bank account.
Rajdharmavides was not informed of these developments. Rajdharmavides learned the money had been distributed on March 20, 2005, when a woman who lived in Merced called Rajdharmavides and asked if he had received the money.
On March 22, 2005, Rajdharmavides and others from the Wat Thai confronted Sornchai and told him that he had to turn the $50,000 over to the Bhikkhus. Sornchai resisted at first and told Rajdharmavides that the money belonged to the Wat Buddhanubhavena. He arranged for Ms. Poopongpaibul, who was then in Thailand, to explain matters to Rajdharmavides by telephone. Rajdharmavides assured Sornchai that the money would be used by the Bhikkhus to found a new temple in Visalia. Sornchai testified that Rajdharmavides and others threatened to have him defrocked and to subject him to criminal prosecution and deportation if he did not give the money to the Bhikkhus. Sornchai relented. He obtained a cashier’s check for the full amount and presented it to Rajdharmavides, who received it on behalf of the Bhikkhus.
The next day, representatives of the Bhikkhus told an off-duty police officer who was worshipping at the Wat Thai that Sornchai had misappropriated funds that belonged to the Bhikkhus. They requested that the police officer ask Sornchai to leave the Wat Thai. The police officer went to Sornchai’s cottage, identified himself as an off-duty police officer and advised Sornchai that Rajdharmavides had asked Sornchai to leave the Wat Thai. If Sornchai did not leave, the police officer said, Rajdharmavides would refer the matter to the Van Nuys detective bureau. Sornchai left the Wat Thai by the following morning. Sornchai was thus expelled by the Bhikkhus from the Wat Thai.
In April 2005, Rajdharmavides addressed a meeting of approximately 40 monks and other members of the Wat Thai. Rajdharmavides told the group that Sornchai had been planning to take the settlement proceeds and go back to Thailand where a lady (presumably Ms. Poopongpaibul) was waiting for him. That same month, Rajdharmavides stated in a letter to the abbot of Sornchai’s temple in Thailand that Sornchai had lied to the court in Visalia and had engaged in criminal misconduct in taking the $50,000. In May 2005, Rajdharmavides gave an interview on a Thai language television station in which he stated that Sornchai had pocketed the $50,000. Rajdharmavides made similar statements in Chicago in a report to the monks of the Bhikkhus. Rajdharmavides’s accusations against Sornchai were repeated in the Asian Pacific News, a Thai language newspaper with a circulation of approximately 5,000.
After Sornchai was expelled from the Wat Thai, other Thai temples refused to house him because his reputation had been tarnished. Sornchai testified that, because of defendants’ misconduct, he was afraid and unable to concentrate, eat or sleep. He was depressed and had nightmares, headaches, and trouble with his left eye. Sornchai presented no medical bills or evidence of lost income. At the time of trial, he had been staying in private residences for two years.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs commenced this action in June 2005, alleging causes of action for conversion, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, money had and received, and a constructive trust. The matter was tried to the trial court, without a jury, in August 2007. In a written statement of decision, the trial court ruled for Sornchai on his defamation claim, finding that Rajdharmavides had slandered Sornchai “by calling him a liar and a thief and a Monk involved with women....” The trial court found that, as a result of defendants’ conduct, Sornchai “suffered unpleasant emotional distress reactions” and “damage to his reputation as a Buddhist monk.” The trial court awarded Sornchai $20,000 in damages. Without stating its reasons, the trial court ruled for defendants on plaintiff’s other claims. The trial court entered judgment in November 2007. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Sornchai argues that the undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated as a matter of law that defendants were liable on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “‘Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the “elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that... the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor.... [Citation.]’” (Bickel v. City of Piedmont, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) To prevail on the contention that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Sornchai must demonstrate that the evidence on each element of his claim was undisputed and of such probative force that “reasonable [persons] following the law [could] draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented. [Citations.]” (Gray v. Brinkerhoff (1953) 41 Cal.2d 180, 183; see also Callahan v. Gray (1955) 44 Cal.2d 107, 111; Aivazi v. Marcano (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 792, 794-796.)
To prevail on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Sornchai was required to prove that: (1) defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) Sornchai suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) Sornchai’s emotional distress was actually and proximately caused by defendants’ outrageous conduct. (Chang v. Lederman (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 67, 86-87; accord, Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 300.) “Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is ‘“so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community”’ [citation] and must be ‘“of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress.”’ [Citation.]” (Chang v. Lederman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 86-87.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling. With respect to Sornchai’s expulsion from the Wat Thai on March 23, 2005, the trial court made no finding that Sornchai’s expulsion from the Wat Thai was wrongful, and the evidence does not compel the conclusion that it was. There was evidence that Sornchai was not a tenant of the Wat Thai, but was a mere gratuitous licensee who occupied his cottage at the invitation and sufferance of the Wat Thai’s abbot, Rajdharmavides. (See Qualls v. Lake Berryessa Enterprises, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283-1284; Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 36; 7 Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 19:5, pp. 23-24 (8/2004).) Generally, a license to occupy the property of another is revocable at the will of the licensor, without notice, excuse or consideration to the licensee. (6 Miller & Starr, supra, § 15:2, pp. 15-10 to 15-11 (8/2006); 7 Miller & Starr, supra, § 19:5, pp. 23-24 (8/2004); see also Bomberger v. McKelvey (1950) 35 Cal.2d 607, 618; Gladwin v. Stebbins (1852) 2 Cal. 103, 105; Belmont County Water Dist. v. State of California (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 13, 17.)
Nor did the involvement of an off-duty police officer render Sornchai’s expulsion extreme or outrageous. The officer testified that, when he met Sornchai, he bowed as an indication of respect. He spoke to Sornchai in the Thai language and identified himself as an off-duty police officer. He told Sornchai that Rajdharmavides had requested that Sornchai leave the Wat Thai, and that if Sornchai did not leave, Rajdharmavides would refer the matter to the police. The officer testified that he did not threaten Sornchai with arrest or deportation or in any other manner. The trial court could thus conclude that the officer’s conduct was not coercive, and that the officer delivered defendants’ message in a calm and respectful manner.
There is no evidence in the record to support Sornchai’s assertion that defendants “contacted other Buddhist organizations and temples... and demanded that [Sornchai] not be allowed to stay at any other Buddhist temple in the United States....” The fact that other temples refused to accept Sornchai after he was expelled from the Wat Thai does not establish that defendants affirmatively contacted those temples and demanded that Sornchai be turned away. To the contrary, Sornchai testified and the trial court found that Sornchai was refused by other temples because of the accusations made against him, not because of a campaign by defendants to have Sornchai blackballed.
Finally, the trial court’s ruling in Sornchai’s favor on his defamation claim did not establish as a matter of law that defendants engaged in intentional or reckless conduct, as required to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In cases involving a private figure plaintiff, a defamation claim may be supported by evidence of mere negligence with respect to the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement. (Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 274; Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 748-749; Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1016; McNair v. Worldwide Church of God (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 363, 377.) The trial court could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence in this case, that defendants made their defamatory statements with a good faith but erroneous belief that their statements were true, and that defendants therefore lacked the requisite intent to support liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In any event, to the extent Sornchai’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was based on defendants’ defamatory statements, Sornchai has not established that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Tucker v. Scott (1919) 181 Cal. 734, 736 [no miscarriage of justice when amount of damages measured under incorrect theory was the same as amount measured under correct theory].) Damages for emotional distress are recoverable in an action for slander. (Civ. Code § 48a, subd. (4)(a); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co. (1919) 181 Cal. 345, 365; Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1011, 1013; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1701, pp. 1230-1231.) The trial court in this case made an express finding that Sornchai suffered emotional distress as the result of defendant’s defamatory remarks. Sornchai produced no evidence of other damages, such as economic loss, that would have been compensable under his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, to the extent Sornchai’s damage was caused by the defamation, he was compensated for that injury by the damages he was awarded for defamation. Sornchai has failed to establish reversible error.
B. Adequacy of Damage Award
Sornchai contends that the damage award of $20,000 on his defamation claim was inadequate as a matter of law. Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that the damages awarded were inadequate unless the party presented the issue to the trial court in a motion for a new trial. (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1122; Zaxis Wireless Communications, Inc. v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577, 581, fn. 3; Diemer v. Eric F. Anderson, Inc. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 503, 508.) Sornchai made but abandoned a motion for a new trial, and never obtained a ruling. We do not decide whether Sornchai forfeited his claim of error, however, because we conclude his contention lacks merit.
“The fixing of such damages [based on injury to reputation and emotional well-being] has long been vested in the sound discretion of the trier of fact.” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 64.) “‘... The question as to the amount of damages is a question of fact. In the first instance, it is for the [trier of fact] to fix the amount of damages.... The appellate court has not seen or heard the witnesses, and has no power to pass upon their credibility. Normally, the appellate court has no power to interfere except when the facts before it suggest passion, prejudice or corruption..., or where the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that the award is insufficient as a matter of law.’” (Miller v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 555, 558-559; see also Haskins v. Holmes (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 580, 585 [same standard of review applies when trial court is trier of fact].) In assessing the adequacy of the damage award, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the award. (Harris v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 593, 597.) “It is not for this court to weigh the evidence. Our province goes no further than a determination that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict.” (Miller v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 212 Cal.App.2d at p. 560; see also Dodson v. J. Pacific, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 931, 936-937; Jenkins v. Dahnert (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 567, 568-569; Johnson v. McRee (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 524, 529.)
In this case, Sornchai produced no evidence that he suffered economic loss. His damages consisted entirely of the loss of reputation and emotional distress he suffered as a result of defendants’ defamatory remarks. Sornchai produced no objective evidence to establish the severity of his losses, and no expert testimony to assist the trial court in quantifying his damages. The trial court was thus required to calculate damages for intangible items of loss, based on witness testimony that the trial court might or might not have found credible. In such circumstances, the trier of fact is in a far better position to calculate damages than an appellate court. (See Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1067-1068, fn. 17; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 64.) There is no basis in the record for this court to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in this case.
C. Conversion—False or Inherently Improbable Evidence
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s ruling against them on their conversion claim must be reversed because it is based on “demonstrably false or inherently improbable” evidence. This is, in effect, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 373, p. 430.) As discussed, we review plaintiffs’ contention under the substantial evidence rule. In this context, in which the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove their case, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the evidence supporting each element of their conversion claim was undisputed and established defendants’ liability as a matter of law. (Discussion Part A, ante.)
The tort of conversion “is generally described as the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. [Citation.] The basic elements of the tort are (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant’s disposition of the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) resulting damages. [Citation.]” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119;accord, PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395 (PCO).) “The gravamen of the tort is the defendant’s hostile act of dominion or control over a specific chattel to which the plaintiff has the right of immediate possession.” (PCO, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) Money may be the subject of conversion if the claim involves a specific, identifiable sum. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants converted the $50,000 in settlement proceeds from the sale of the Visalia temple. Accordingly, plaintiffs were required to prove as a threshold matter that the money belonged to them. But defendants disputed that point, and the evidence at trial was conflicting. Rajdharmavides testified that the Visalia temple was a member of the Bhikkhus, and that when a member temple sold its property the proceeds of the sale belonged to the Bhikkhus. This testimony was consistent with the terms of the first settlement agreement, which provided that the proceeds from the sale of the Visalia temple were to go to the Bhikkhus. Rajdharmavides further testified that, although the first settlement agreement was never consummated, he continued to believe that the Bhikkhus would receive the proceeds from the sale of the Visalia temple. Rajdharmavides also testified that he was not informed of the terms of the second settlement agreement providing otherwise. The trial court reasonably could infer from the evidence that the money belonged to the Bhikkhus, and that the provisions of the second settlement agreement changing the disposition of the money were not authorized by or binding on the Bhikkhus. The trial court thus reasonably could conclude that plaintiffs failed to prove their ownership or right to possession of the settlement proceeds.
Even if one were to accept plaintiffs’ contention that the representatives of the Laotian faction never signed the first settlement agreement (see ante fn. 3), that fact would be irrelevant to determining who, as between the Bhikkhus and the plaintiffs, owned the settlement proceeds.
Because plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof on this threshold issue, the trial court was not required to determine whether plaintiffs’ donation of the settlement proceeds to the Bhikkhus was voluntary or coerced. The evidence of threats made against Sornchai at the March 22 meeting or the defendants’ allegedly altered tape of that meeting thus have no bearing on whether the trial court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.