Opinion
No. 4-04-00875-CV
Delivered and Filed: October 19, 2005.
Appeal from the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas, Trial Court No. 01-04-00067-Cvk, Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State Office of Risk Management ("SORM") appeals a judgment finding that Norma J. Laxson sustained an injury in the course and scope of employment entitling her to workers' compensation benefits. SORM contends that Laxson's injury was not a compensable injury. SORM also raises a separate issue regarding the trial court's failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
In its brief, SORM states that it "does not believe any of the basic facts are disputed in this matter." As Laxson was turning away from a sink at work after filling a bottle of water to drink, she turned to the right and took one step with her right leg. When she put her foot down, she felt a sharp pain in her right knee. Laxson grabbed onto the sink to keep from falling. Laxson received medical attention and was diagnosed with a right meniscus tear. Laxson had a history of knee problems since 1996, including surgery to her right knee in 1997, and to her left knee in 1998. Laxson was on full, unrestricted duty at the time of the accident.
After a contested case hearing, the hearing officer found that Laxson's turning away from the sink did not constitute ordinary walking and the risk of the right knee injury in part was created by her employment activities. The hearing officer further found that Laxson's injury was caused by activities performed by her in the course and scope of her employment. The hearing officer concluded that Laxson sustained a compensable right knee injury. The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer's decision. On appeal to the trial court, SORM waived its right to a jury trial. The trial court entered a judgment finding that Laxson sustained an injury in the course and scope of her employment and was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. SORM appealed to this court.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Although SORM asserts a separate issue relating to the trial court's failure to make requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, SORM cites case law stating that the failure to make findings and conclusions is not harmful if the appellant does not have to guess at the reasons for the trial court's judgment. See Larry F. Smith, Inc. v. The Weber Co., 110 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). SORM then asserts that because no disputed issue existed regarding critical facts, the question before the trial court is reviewed de novo as a question of law.
SORM appears to concede that it was not harmed by the trial court's failure to enter findings and conclusions; however, in its prayer for relief, SORM alternatively prays that this court "remand this matter for proper findings of fact and conclusions of law."
To obtain a reversal based on a trial court's refusal to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circumstances must be such that the appellant is forced to guess at the reasons for the trial court's decision. Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.). In this case, SORM challenged the compensability of Laxson's injury. In pronouncing judgment, the trial court expressly stated that Laxson sustained an injury in the course and scope of her employment and that the injury was compensable. In order for the trial court to have concluded that the injury was compensable, the trial court necessarily found that the injury occurred in the course and scope of Laxson's employment and arose from her employment. See Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Simon, 980 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). The circumstances, therefore, are such that SORM was not forced to guess at the reasons for the trial court's decision. Accordingly, SORM was not harmed by the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Compensability of Injury
SORM phrases its issue regarding compensability as follows: "Under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, does merely being at work on the employer's premises make an idiopathic knee injury compensable with only an ordinary `normal" movement — a step to the side — without striking any object, without involvement of any instrumentality of the employer, without any strenuous activity, and without any untoward movement." The Texas Workers' Compensation Act states, "A carrier is liable for compensation when an employee is injured or killed at work, if the injury arises out of and occurs in the course and scope of employment." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.031 (Vernon 1996). This court has noted that the issue of compensability under the Act is a two prong test: (1) whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment; and (2) whether the injury arose from employment. Simon, 980 S.W.2d at 734. Because employees may engage in acts that "minister to their personal comfort" without leaving the course of their employment, Laxson was covered for work-related injuries that she sustained while getting a drink of water. See id. at 735. Accordingly, Laxson's injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The issue then becomes whether the injury "arose" from Laxson's employment.
The question under the second prong for determining compensability is whether the injury would have occurred if the conditions and obligations of employment had not placed the claimant in harm's way. Id. at 735-36. A pre-existing condition does not preclude compensation under the Act. Id. at 736. An accident arising from employment causes an injury if it is "a" cause, even if there are other causes; however, the accident must still be the producing cause of the injury. Id.
Texas courts must liberally construe workers' compensation legislation to carry out its evident purpose of compensating injured workers and their dependents. Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999). SORM asserts that the shift in the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission's Appeals Panel Decisions around 1997 and 1998 expanded the Act beyond the legislature's statutory language and intent. We disagree. The reasoning in those decisions is consistent with the liberal construction we are required to give the Act, and we agree with those decisions and rely on their reasoning to affirm the trial court's judgment in this case.
"Workers' compensation law is not tort law; the employee need not prove that the employer was in some way negligent, or the premises defective, in order to recover for injuries that are encountered in the course and scope of employment or arise from that employment, while the business of the employer is being furthered." Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, Appeal No. 990252, 1999 WL 202036 (Mar. 25, 1999). "[A]n injury arising from an activity that could also be experienced outside of work is [not], per se, noncompensable for that fact alone." Id. "In many, if not most, instances an accident could either occur at work or away from work, and, as a result, the fact that an accident could have occurred at some other location does not mean that an on-the-job injury becomes noncompensable." Id. (quoting Appeal No. 951736). If a strict construction of the Act were adopted, it "would, in effect, have the worker moving in and out of the course and scope of employment throughout the work day, depending on whether the activity undertaken is one which could also be undertaken elsewhere." Id.
SORM relies heavily on the "positional risk" test referred to in Employers' Cas. Co. v. Bratcher, 823 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied). "That test focuses the court's inquiry upon whether the injury would have occurred if the conditions and obligations of employment had not placed the claimant in harm's way." Bratcher, 823 S.W.2d at 721. "The use of the word `would' by the court in [ Bratcher] in describing the `but for' test is indicative of the inevitability of the injury as opposed to the possibility that it could occur elsewhere." Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, Appeal No. 001002, 2000 WL 1119408, at *2 (June 22, 2000). Laxson "did not sustain a spontaneous [meniscus tear] that just appeared because it was `inevitable.'" Id. Laxson sustained the meniscus tear because she turned away from the sink. The evidence did not conclusively establish that the injury Laxson sustained was inevitable. In fact, the evidence showed that Laxson was on full, unrestricted duty at the time of the incident. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that Laxson sustained a compensable injury.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.