Opinion
D071232
02-23-2018
ANN F. SORENSEN et al., Plaintiff, Cross-defendants and Respondents, v. DUNG T. THU TRAN, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Dung T. Thu Tran, in pro. per.; and Mark S. Rosen for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Ann F. Sorensen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent. No appearance for Tuan Anh Tran, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00038575-CU-OR-CTL) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gregory W. Pollack, Judge. Affirmed. Dung T. Thu Tran, in pro. per.; and Mark S. Rosen for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Ann F. Sorensen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent. No appearance for Tuan Anh Tran, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Dung T. Thu Tran (Tran) and her sister, Ann F. Sorensen, disputed ownership of a home purchased by their parents in 1976. Attempting to resolve the dispute, Sorensen filed an action for quiet title, among other claims, against Tran and Tran's two children, Mae Anna Workman (Mae) and Paul Ross Workman (Paul). In response, Tran filed a cross-complaint alleging Sorensen committed fraud by fabricating and concealing various deed transfers, and asserting additional claims. The trial court bifurcated the complaint and conducted a bench trial on the cause of action for quiet title, during which the court made findings regarding the authenticity of the contested deed transfers. The court then concluded those findings would have a collateral estoppel effect on Tran's fraud claim and, thus, dismissed Tran's fraud cause of action.
On appeal, Tran asserts she was entitled to a jury trial on Sorensen's quiet title action and her own cross-claim for fraud. In a motion to dismiss the appeal, Sorensen alleges Tran does not have standing because Tran conceded at trial that she transferred any interest she may have had in the property to her children. We conclude Tran does have standing, but that she has not met her burden to provide an adequate record to overcome the presumption of correctness on appeal, and therefore affirm the judgment.
We previously ordered the motion to dismiss to be considered with the appeal.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As the record on appeal does not include transcripts of the proceedings in the trial court or settled statement of the proceedings, we summarize the facts based on the complaint, cross-complaint, and rulings of the trial court as reflected in the minutes of the court contained in the clerk's transcript.
Tran and Sorensen's mother (Mother) and father (Father) purchased a home in November 1976. Over the course of the next several decades, the county recorded approximately 13 transfers of title to the property between various family members, including Tran and Sorensen, and a dispute arose over the ownership of the property. Following two altercations at the property requiring police intervention in late 2012 and early 2013, Father filed a request for domestic violence restraining orders against Tran and Mae, and Mother and Father went to Nevada to stay with Sorensen.
In March 2013, Sorensen filed a complaint against Tran, Mae, and Paul for trespass, ejectment, quiet title, and declaratory relief. The complaint alleged Tran and her children were in wrongful possession of the property and had wrongfully evicted Mother and Father, and sought a declaration of the parties' rights to occupy and to equitable and legal title of the property.
In May 2013, Tran filed a cross-complaint against Sorensen and alleged Sorensen created fraudulent deeds and actively concealed material facts about associated transfers of title to the property. She also asserted causes of action for elder abuse, conversion, trespass to chattels, conspiracy, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all related in some way to the ongoing dispute over the property.
The matter was set for a bench trial in November 2014. At the outset of the trial, the court (Judge Ronald S. Prager) requested the parties initially focus on the deeds and, after several days of testimony, the court made a finding that one of the primary disputed deeds was genuine. Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement whereby Sorensen agreed to pay a set amount to Tran and her children in exchange for quiet title to the property in Sorensen's name. However, Paul did not participate in the trial or the settlement, as he was on active deployment with the military at the time. Upon his return, Paul objected to the settlement and the court set it aside.
The court set the case for another bench trial, but this time Tran paid the jury fee and requested a jury trial. Sorensen asserted the court should sever the complaint and try the equitable quiet title claim first without a jury. Tran's counsel, Mr. Mataele, conceded the court had the authority to sever but nevertheless argued defendants were entitled to a jury trial on their fraud action. The court (Judge Gregory W. Pollack) noted the parties had stipulated that Sorensen's action was limited to the cause of action for quiet title, dismissed Sorensen's remaining claims, severed the complaint, and ordered that the action for quiet title proceed as a bench trial, to be followed by a jury trial on defendant's cross-complaint. The next day, the court confirmed with plaintiff and counsel for defendants—and both agreed—that the court would proceed with a bench trial as to the quiet title cause of action.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court determined that the deeds in question were not fraudulent and awarded Sorensen a 62.5 percent interest in the property. Thereafter, Tran filed a motion for a new trial, again asserting she had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the quiet title action. The trial court explained that Tran's counsel had previously agreed to proceed with a bench trial on the severed claim for quiet title and denied Tran's request.
Tran then requested a ruling as to whether the court's determination in the bench trial regarding the authenticity of the deed transfers would have a collateral estoppel effect on her fraud claim. The court concluded collateral estoppel would apply insofar as the court previously determined Sorensen did not commit any fraud against Tran with respect to the deed transfers in the quiet title action, and dismissed Tran's fraud claim. Tran voluntarily dismissed all remaining causes of action in the cross-complaint and the court entered judgment in favor of Sorensen. Tran once again moved for new trial, and to vacate the judgment, based in part on her request for a jury trial. The court reiterated that Tran had consented to the bench trial on the quiet title action and denied the motion.
Tran appeals. Sorensen asks us to dismiss the appeal.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standing
Standing is a jurisdictional issue that either party may challenge at any time. (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947; Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1345.) Typically, to have standing, an appellant must have been a party in the underlying case and aggrieved by an appealable order or judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) A party is aggrieved if his or her rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment, so long as the affected rights are immediate, pecuniary, substantial, and not nominal. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.)
Here, Sorensen argues Tran does not have standing because she transferred her interest in the property to her children, and conceded the same during the trial. However, Sorensen named Tran in her complaint and sought a judicial declaration that Tran had no claim to or interest in the property. Thereafter, despite learning that Tran had transferred her interest to her children, Sorensen did not take any action to dismiss Tran as a defendant. Even now on appeal, Sorensen maintains she named Tran "for the purposes of clearing all claims to title on the disputed property." Thus, Tran has an interest in the resulting final judgment, which remains binding on her, as well as the associated denial of her request for a new trial. (See Vivatech Internat., Inc. v. Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796, 804 [party aggrieved by judgment where court denied its motion to set it aside and judgment was binding on the party].)
Tran asks this court to take judicial notice of a grant deed recorded on August 28, 2017, transferring Mae's and Paul's interest in the property back to her. As the deed transfer was not before the trial court at the time of the disputed rulings, and is not necessary for our determination as to standing, we deny Tran's request. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)
Moreover, the trial court applied the underlying findings associated with that judgment to dismiss Tran's cause of action for fraud, and Tran has a direct and substantial interest in the validity of her fraud claim. Sorensen does not dispute that Tran had a direct ownership interest in the property at the time of the allegedly fraudulent deed transfers, and Tran also alleged she sustained additional damages as a direct result of the fraudulent transfers, including adverse tax consequences, emotional stress, and costs associated with maintaining the property and having to defend against Sorensen's complaint. Thus, even if Tran no longer held direct title to the property, she maintained a direct and substantial interest in the legitimacy of the process the trial court used to decide the validity of her fraud claim, and that interest is sufficient to confer standing.
Sorensen also asserts we should dismiss Tran's appeal because the causes of action in Tran's cross-complaint were "petty" and frivolous. However, the record indicates there was a genuine dispute as to the authenticity of certain deed transfers, and we therefore conclude Tran's fraud claim was not frivolous. Accordingly, Tran's appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the fraud claim is not frivolous. We do not address the remaining causes of action, as they are not at issue in this appeal.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Tran does have standing and deny Sorensen's motion to dismiss the appeal. B. Tran Has Not Established a Right to a Jury Trial
1. General Appellate Principles
On appeal, we presume the lower court's ruling is correct and, where the record is silent, indulge all presumptions and inferences to support that ruling. (Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We affirm the judgment if any possible grounds exist for the trial court to have reached its factual conclusions. (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
As the party seeking reversal, the appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record to overcome the presumption of correctness and show prejudicial error. (See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132 (Aguilar).) In doing so, the appellant must provide supporting citations to the factual record and must support each point by argument and citation of authority where available. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239.) In the absence of a reporter's transcript or settled statement, we cannot evaluate issues requiring a factual analysis and must presume "the trial court acted duly and regularly and received substantial evidence to support its findings." (Stevens v. Stevens (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 19, 20; see Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003; Hodges v. Mark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 651, 657.)
Although an attorney did not represent Tran for the entirety of this appeal, we hold Tran to the same standards as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)
2. Legal Principles Governing the Right to a Jury
The California Constitution establishes a right to a jury trial in civil matters, but that right is limited to civil actions at law and a court may decide matters in equity without a jury. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8; Wolford v. Thomas (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 347, 353.) Where a case involves both equitable and legal issues, courts in California typically decide the equitable issues first as resolution of the equitable issues may resolve the legal issues, and may do so without a jury. (Raedeke v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671; Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 353-358 (Alcoa).) If any legal issues remain after the court resolves the equitable issues, the court will then refer the remainder of the case to a jury. (Alcoa, at p. 355.) In addition, the parties to a civil case may consent to waive a jury trial "by oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes." (Code Civ. Proc., § 631; Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 736.)
3. Analysis
Tran asserts she was entitled to a jury trial on Sorensen's action for quiet title and her own cause of action for fraud. However, the trial court made an explicit factual finding that Tran's counsel consented to a bench trial on the quiet title cause of action and concluded that collateral estoppel barred her cross-claim for fraud. As defendant has not provided transcripts of the relevant hearings, we cannot evaluate the trial court's factual findings, and Tran has not met her burden to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court's decisions.
a. The Trial Court's Factual Finding of Waiver
In its order denying Tran's first motion for a new trial, the court made an explicit factual finding that Tran had waived her right to a jury trial on Sorensen's quiet title action. The trial court explained: "[the court] specifically recalls parties' agreement to bench trial on quiet title action in this severed action. Court advises parties of documentation of this agreement in minutes. Mr. Mataele concedes that he had agreed to bench trial on plaintiff's quiet title action, but maintains that he never agreed that his clients' quiet title action would be a bench trial. Court and [defendant's counsel] explain to Mr. Mataele that there can only be one quiet title action involving the same property." As the trial court correctly stated, once the court decided Sorensen's cause of action for quiet title, Tran could not request a separate jury trial on the same cause of action. (See DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings) [claim preclusion bars relitigation of claims already decided between the parties].)
Tran now asserts the trial court was misinterpreting the minutes it referred to as evidence of Tran's consent to the bench trial. In making that argument, she relies primarily on declarations Mr. Mataele submitted to the trial court in accordance with her motions for a new trial, but the court specifically addressed those declarations in response to Tran's second motion for a new trial, pointing out that Mr. Mataele had more recently conceded again, during the hearing on Tran's first motion for a new trial, that Tran had agreed to the bench trial on Sorensen's claim for quiet title. Moreover, Tran has not provided the transcripts for any of the relevant hearings. Thus, we must presume the trial court's ruling is correct, and conclude that Tran has not met her burden of providing an adequate record to overcome that presumption. (See Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 132.)
b. The Trial Court's Dismissal of Tran's Cross-claim for Fraud
Tran asserts she was entitled to a jury trial on her cross-claim for fraud, even if she was not entitled to one on the quiet title action. She argues that the allegations in her cross-complaint were broad enough to support additional claims, such as a claim for fraud by concealment, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim based on collateral estoppel because the court's previous factual findings did not preclude all such claims. While we agree that the allegations in the cross-complaint are sufficiently broad to include a claim for fraud by concealment, we also agree with the trial court that collateral estoppel barred the entirety of the asserted cause of action for fraud.
" '[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: " '(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" [Citation.]' " (Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 870.) Here, the cross-complaint alleges that the cross-defendants fabricated and concealed material facts related to the allegedly fraudulent deed transfers with the intent to deceive Tran, that at least one of the cross-defendants had a fiduciary relationship with Tran, that Tran would have acted differently had she known the concealed facts, and that Tran was harmed as a result. Thus, the allegations in the cross-complaint are sufficient to state a claim for fraud by concealment.
Regardless, though, the trial court correctly concluded that Tran's fraud claim was foreclosed by its previous factual findings regarding the authenticity of the disputed deed transfer. (See DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) Tran did not dispute the purported contents of the various deed transfers at issue but instead asserted, both at trial and in her cross-complaint, that certain of the deed transfers were fraudulently recorded, that she was previously unaware of their existence, and that her signature on the deed transfer recorded in March 1991—in which Tran purportedly transferred her interest in the property to Sorensen and Father—was a forgery. In its written statement of decision on the quiet title action, the trial court made specific factual findings that the transfers at issue were not forged or otherwise obtained by fraud, duress or material mistake, and that Tran herself had in fact signed the March 1991 deed transfer.
Following that decision, Tran asked the court to make a ruling as to whether collateral estoppel or res judicata would apply to her fraud claim. The court explained, in the associated minute order, that it had reviewed its prior written decision and determined the decision "would have a res judicata/collateral estoppel effect on the fraud cause of action within the cross-complaint, inasmuch as the court had determined there was no fraud by Ms. Sorensen or any of the cross-defendants in deciding that earlier action." The court therefore dismissed the fraud cause of action from the cross-complaint.
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that its previous factual findings barred Tran's fraud claim, including any related or embedded claims such as fraud by concealment. Fundamental to that claim is the allegation that the cross-defendants filed the allegedly fraudulent deed transfers without Tran's knowledge. However, the trial court specifically found that Tran herself signed the only disputed deed transfer that directly affects her property rights—and that she did so knowingly and without fraud or duress. Inherent in that finding is a finding that Tran was aware of the deed transfer, and thus, that the cross-defendants did not conceal it from her. Applying that finding to the allegations associated with the fraud claim in Tran's cross-complaint necessarily precludes Tran from asserting any included variation of the claim.
Tran also asserts collateral estoppel does not apply because she was acting in a different capacity with respect to the fraud complaint, but she provides no authority to support that position. Regardless, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of issues, as opposed to entire causes of action, and can be asserted by one that was not a party in the first suit. (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824) Therefore, Tran's position as a cross-complainant asserting a different case of action is immaterial with respect to the trial court's application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Finally, Tran argues she could have amended her complaint to include other claims, such as a claim for restitution or unjust enrichment. Again, though, we are hampered by the lack of transcripts. There is no indication in the record before us that Tran offered any such amendment in the trial court. Instead the minutes indicate that Tran voluntarily dismissed all remaining causes of action in the cross-complaint after the court dismissed her fraud claim. By failing to offer an amendment and voluntarily dismissing any remaining claims, Tran has forfeited any argument that the court should have allowed a trial to proceed on other grounds. (See K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 939, 948-949 [appellant forfeits any argument regarding trial court's procedure by failing to object]; Royster v. Montanez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 362, 366-367 [appellant may not raise new issues on appeal].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. DATO, J.