Whether the beneficiary's interest is a mere expectancy or a more substantial interest, it has been held that either may be disposed of by a separation agreement if the parties so intended. See Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984). Although reaching a different result, Mullenax is not inconsistent with McEndaffer or with our decision in this case.

Iowa follows the majority rule that "divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy." Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). Likewise, divorce or dissolution of marriage does not per se void the designation of a named spouse on a retirement account.

We note initially that Iowa follows the majority rule that "divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy." Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). Beverley asserts that the rule should be different for retirement accounts because a retirement account has value during a decedent's lifetime whereas a life insurance policy generally has little value until the decedent's death.

We believe that, even if we were to adopt the estate's argument that ERISA does not preempt state law on this issue, it cannot prevail. Under our cases, a dissolution decree does not automatically terminate the interests of a life insurance beneficiary. See Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984) ("It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy."); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976); see also 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1714, at 697-98 (1982) In Sorensen, we concluded that the general rule did not apply under the facts of that case and held that the dissolution decree terminated the interests of a named beneficiary.

Although the parties to these appeals initially disagreed on the standard of review applicable here, both now agree that where there are no factual issues in dispute the construction of a dissolution decree is a matter of law. Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). In the case of In re Roberts Estate, 257 Iowa 1, 131 N.W.2d 458 (1964), the court outlined our task in construction of dissolution decree cases as follows:

Bobbi Jo's and Christina's interests were " ‘mere expectanc[ies,]’ ... which may be disposed of by the dissolution court." Sorensen v. Nelson , 342 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 1984).--------

Id. While interpreting an insurance policy, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated that a beneficiary has no vested interest in a policy, rather a "mere expectancy", where the policy holder holds the right to change the designation of the beneficiary. Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Iowa 1984); see also Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mulvaney, 265 N.W. 889, 893 (Iowa 1936) (holding that when the beneficiary is "dependent upon the will and pleasure of the insured" no property interest exists to "be the subject of a gift"). Trustee asserts Debtor's creation of the annuity with Erika as beneficiary fails as a gift based on Debtor's failure to follow the requirements of Iowa's Uniform Transfer to Minors Act.

As Justices Connolly and Stephan recognized in the context of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), whether a waiver has occurred often depends upon hairline distinctions. See, e.g., id.; Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984). See, e.g., Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb.App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976).

We review cases tried in equity de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. However, we review the construction of a dissolution decree as a matter of law. In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 2004) (citing Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984)). III. Merits.

We review the construction of a dissolution decree as a matter of law. See Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984). IV. Postsecondary Education Subsidy.