Sophia's Cure Inc. v. AveXis, Inc.

4 Citing cases

  1. Riley v. Cross River Bank

    2:22-cv-04266 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2024)

    Aside from piercing the corporate veil, a shareholder can be held liable for a corporation's misdeeds under the agency theory of liability. The hallmark of an agency relationship “is the right of a principal to control the conduct of an agent when the agent is performing work for it.” Sophia's Cure Inc. v. AveXis, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-865, 2017 WL 4541449, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2017). Ohio law indicates that a complaint relying on an agency theory of liability “must plead facts which, if proved, could establish the existence of an agency relationship.

  2. Hutzell v. Power Home Solar, LLC

    2:22-cv-03149 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Ohio law indicates, however, that a complaint relying on an agency theory of liability “must plead facts which, if proved, could establish the existence of an agency relationship.” Sophia's Cure Inc. v. AveXis, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-865, 2017 WL 4541449, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The hallmark of an agency relationship “is the right of a principal to control the conduct of an agent when the agent is performing work for it.

  3. NCWC Inc. v. CarGuard Admin.

    635 F. Supp. 3d 815 (D. Ariz. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Additionally, CarGuard has identified decisions from outside Arizona that seem to reject the notion that after-acquired knowledge is sufficient when it comes to tortious-interference-with-contract claims. See, e.g., Sophia's Cure Inc. v. AveXis, Inc., 2017 WL 4541449, *7 (S.D. Ohio 2017) ("To be liable for tortious interference, a tortfeasor must not only have knowledge of the contract, he must have knowledge of the contract at the time of, or before, the alleged breach."). Nevertheless, Synergy Logistics is not an outlier in holding that a defendant may be held liable for intentional interference with a third-party contract containing a non-compete clause, even it was unaware of the non-compete restriction at the time it entered into its own contract with the restricted party, by subsequently becoming aware of the non-compete provision and continuing its course of dealing with the restricted party after acquiring that knowledge.

  4. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. C&N Logistics, Inc.

    NO. 3:18-cv-00438 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    Plaintiffs move to dismiss Defendants' counterclaim for intentional inference with contract because Defendants have not sufficiently alleged that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the contract between Defendants and MBS at the time of the alleged breach. See Sophia's Cure Inc. v. AveXis, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-865, 2017 WL 4541449, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2017) ("To be liable for tortious interference, a tortfeasor must not only have knowledge of the contract, he must have knowledge of the contract at the time of, or before, the alleged breach."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. i (stating that even if the tortfeasor's "conduct is in fact the cause of another's failure to perform . . . the actor does not induce or otherwise intentionally cause that failure if he has no knowledge of the contract"). Defendants' counterclaims allege that "Plaintiffs were aware of the contract between C&N and MBS at least by and through their counsel."