Specifically, the admission must be direct and unqualified. Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270 (1999). "[A]wareness [of a debt] does not constitute an acknowledgment of an existing debt and a willingness to pay."

That condition expresses a promise to pay that is too "equivocal, vague and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inferences" to be enforceable. Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270-71 (1999). (c) Unjust Enrichment Claims

But "[t]he admission itself does not take the action out of the statute of limitations; rather, it is the new promise that may be inferred from that admission that removes the bar." Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270 (1999). Accordingly, as the Archdiocese argues in its sur-reply, "the creditor's remedy on the new promise is not barred by statutory limitation until the lapse of the full period counting from the time of breach of this new promise."

The defendant did not acknowledge any obligation to the plaintiffs, nor did its communication suggest that the policy provided coverage for the damage caused by the collapse. See Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270-71, 740 A.2d 1044 (1999) (" ‘[I]f the expressions be equivocal, vague and indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, ... we think they ought not to go to a jury as evidence of a new promise to revive the cause of action.’ " (quoting Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 237, 7 S.Ct. 1229, 30 L.Ed. 1156 (1887) ).

Next, we consider whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the department. A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where no genuine issue of material fact is present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270 (1999). In determining whether summary judgment should be granted, we consider the affidavits and other evidence submitted below, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Fleet first argues that it had no duty to notify Christenson that Mitoulas reduced the insurance coverage on the property because this did not breach the promissory note. While we agree that the promissory note did not require Mitoulas to insure each property for $375,000, and that the trial court erred in so finding, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's ruling. See Soper v. Purdy, 144 N.H. 268, 270-71, 740 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1999). The promissory note required Mitoulas to insure the Chestnut Street property in an amount not "less than 80% of the [property's] insurable value."

It is not necessary that the right to possession or the enjoyment of the premises must pass with the conveyance, but it is essential that the grantees acquire at the time of the conveyance some legally recognizable right in and to the property. "As stated in Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, at page 85, 151 S.W. 45, at page 46: 'The rule is that, if the instrument has no present operation, if it intended to vest no present interest, but only appoints what is to be done after the death of the maker, it is a testamentary instrument, and good only if made and proved as a will.' "

To constitute such a gift the property must be delivered absolutely and the gift go into immediate unconditional effect. If future control over the property remain in the donor until his death there was no valid gift inter vivos. It is absolutely essential to the validity of such gifts that there should be a delivery to the donee whereby the thing given should immediately pass and be irrevocable by the donor. Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky. 376, 113 S.W. 498; Brewer's Adm'r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W. 393; Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S.W. 381, 27 L.R.A., N. S., 308, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 327; Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45. This court in harmony with the general trend of authority has consistently held that the delivery need not actually be made to the donee but may be made to another as agent or trustee for him. Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S.W. 423; Farris v. Farris, 269 Ky. 466, 107 S.W.2d 299, 303. A third person to whom property is delivered with instructions to give it to the donee is presumed to take it as trustee for him. Williams v. Letton, 228 Ky. 371, 15 S.W.2d 296. While the delivery of the gift inter vivos may be actual, symbolical, or constructive, in either event there must be the parting of dominion over the property included in the gift from the donor and placing it with the donee. Kelley-Koett Manufacturing Company v. Goldenberg, 207 Ky. 695, 270 S.W. 15. Unquestionably the letter and the enclosed pass book with directions respecting change in the account, etc., were not delivered to the bank until after the death of appellant's decedent.

Mere intention to give without delivery is unavailing and delivery is insufficient unless made with an intention to give.' * * * It is equally true that, since gifts of this character [inter vivos] furnish a ready means for the perpetration of fraud, the evidence necessary to establish all of the essentials to complete them must be clear and convincing." The case cites many cases, among which are Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky. 376, 113 S.W. 498; Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S.W. 381, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 308, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 327; Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45; and Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S.W. 423. In the Roark Case we said on the same subject:

A gift of personal property is completed by a delivery thereof, either actual or symbolical, with an intention that the title thereto shall pass and that the future legal power and dominion of the donor over the property shall cease. Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566, 64 S.W. 420; 65 S.W. 607, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 800, 1101; Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82, 151 S.W. 45; Rodemer v. Rettig, 114 Ky. 635, 71 S.W. 869, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1474; Simmonds v. Simmonds, 133 Ky. 493, 118 S.W. 304; Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S.W. 381, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 308, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 327; Combs v. Roark, 221 Ky. 679, 299 S.W. 576; Downing v. Whitlow, 211 Ky. 294, 277 S.W. 262. There may be a gift of money on deposit in a bank by the delivery of the pass book (McCoy v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S.W. 1031, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1189), but the question here is whether the deposit of the money in the names of the infant donees, coupled with subsequent declarations of a purpose to vest the ownership in them, is a sufficient gift in the face of the fact that the pass books were retained by the donor who exercised authority over the deposits by making substantial withdrawls therefrom.