Opinion
04-16-1908
SOOY OYSTER CO. v. GASKILL et al.
Bourgeois & Sooy, for complainant. William C. French, for defendants.
Injunction by the Sooy Oyster Company against Thomas J. Gaskill and others. Injunction granted.
Bourgeois & Sooy, for complainant. William C. French, for defendants.
LEAMING, V. C. Complainant seeks to restrain 50 or more defendants from a threatened raid upon oyster beds owned by complainant under a grant from this state executed by the riparian commissioners November 25, 1903. Defendants assert that the grant under which complainant holds is void by reason of the fact that it includes natural oyster beds, contrary to the provisions of the statute of March 6, 1888 (P. L. 1888, p. 140; Gen. St. p. 2792, § 31). The affidavits filed by defendants, at the return of an order to show cause, are ample to justify a finding that the riparian grant in question includes natural oyster beds, and is, in consequence, by reason of the provisions of the statute referred to, a grant which the riparian commissioners had no power to make. The difficulty with which I am confronted, however, arises from the circumstance that I am unable to give consideration to the fact thus asserted. It has been repeatedly held, in this state and elsewhere, that the validity of grants of this nature cannot be attacked in this manner. The grant is from the sovereign power, and is protected from collateral attack, except through false suggestions appearing on the face of the grant. Gough v. Bell, 22 N. J. Law, 441, 480; Elizabeth v. Central R. R. Co., 53 N. J. Law, 491, 496, 22Atl. 47; Polhemus v. Bateman, CO N. J. Law, 163, 37 Atl. 1015. In the latter case collateral attack was sustained because of the express provision in the grant that it was void unless the vendee was the owner of the ripa. The present grant is an absolute grant, and, like the grant in Elizabeth v. Central R. R. Co., supra, contains no reference to any exclusive source of authority for the grant. Without disregarding the authority last cited, I am unable to entertain the claim of defendants to the effect that the land in controversy is a natural oyster bed. See, also, Blakslee Mfg. Co. v. Blakslee Iron Works, 129 N. Y. 155, 29 N. E. 2. If defendants desire to contest the validity of complainant's grant on the ground named, it must be done in a direct proceeding for that purpose. To hold otherwise would not only ignore the principles defined in the adjudicated cases, but would operate to render such grants in effect no more than mere prima facie evidence of title to the premises conveyed. I am therefore compelled in this case to regard complainant as the undisputed owner of the locus in QUO.
The relief sought by the bill is an injunction against a threatened trespass. While this court will not ordinarily restrain a trespass, the rule is not without its well-defined exceptions. In the present case, as already stated, complainant must be regarded as the owner of the land described in the grant, and, in consequence, of the oysters thereon. The bill and its accompanying affidavits assert that defendants have once made a concerted raid on these oysters, and now contemplate another concerted raid, and that defendants are pecuniarily irresponsible. If these averments are true, there can be no doubt touching the duty of this court. Britton's Adm'r v. Hill, 27 N. J. Eq. 389, approved in Hart v. Leonard, 42 N. J. Eq. 416, 421, 7 Atl. 865; Shreve v. Black, 4 N. J. Eq. 177; Kerlin v. West, 4 N. J. Eq. 449; Wilson v. Hill, 46 N. J. Eq. 367, 19 Atl. 1097; De Veney v. Gallagher, 20 N. J. Eq. 33. Had defendants denied participation in the former raid, or disclaimed any intention to again participate in a similar raid, I should not feel compelled to advise an injunction at this time; but in the numerous affidavits filed the several defendants assert the right to enter upon complainant's land and take the oysters therefrom, and merely deny that they have threatened to do so, and in no case does any defendant assert that it is not his purpose to do so. In view of this condition of the record, I must assume that the purpose of defendants is that asserted in the bill. I therefore conceive it to be my duty to advise an injunction pursuant to the prayer of the bill.
I cannot refrain from expressing a regret that I am compelled to arrive at the conclusions stated. The affidavits filed disclose that the land in controversy is probably natural oyster beds, and as such is land which the riparian commissioners had no power to convey. Defendants desire an adjudication upon the validity of the grant, and I regret my inability to afford them such an adjudication in this case. If complainant's title is to be adjudicated, it must be by a direct proceeding in the name of the Attorney General, and I entertain no doubt but that, if defendants will cause the data now before this court to be properly placed before the Attorney General, accompanied with a bond to secure the state against cost, leave will be granted for the necessary proceeding to raise the issues sought.