Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GC030576, Coleman A. Swart, Judge. Affirmed.
The Soni Law Firm, Leo E. Lundberg, Jr., and M. Danton Richardson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hamburg, Karic, Edwards & Martin, David M. Almaraz and David J. Reed for Defendants and Respondents.
VOGEL, Acting P.J.
This is an appeal from an order quashing a writ of execution. We affirm.
FACTS
A.
On March 30, 2004, Surjit P. Soni (a lawyer) and Pedro D. Tomaz (Soni’s former client) executed a settlement agreement to resolve a fee dispute. The agreement provided for the entry of a judgment obligating Tomaz to pay $149,319.98 to Soni, but also provided that, upon Tomaz’s payment of $92,000, Soni would file a full satisfaction of judgment.
Our references to Soni include his law firm (The Soni Law Firm), and our references to Tomaz include his corporation (PGI International Corp.).
The $92,000 had to be paid as follows: $10,000 upon execution of the agreement; $10,000 on or before April 29, 2004; and the balance of $72,000 by installments of “$2,000.00 per month plus interest at 6% per annum accruing on the unpaid balance beginning April 29, 2004 and continuing each and every month on the 29th day of the month for . . . (36) months . . . .” Tomaz’s failure to comply with this schedule gave Soni the right to immediately execute on the stipulated judgment for $149,319.98 “without set-off for payments made.” The stipulated judgment was entered on April 21, 2004.
B.
Tomaz made the first and second $10,000 payments, then made 51 payments of $1,000 each, one every two weeks from April 16, 2004 to March 17, 2006. The bi-weekly payments were scheduled through Tomaz’s business in order to make sure they were timely. In March 2006, Tomaz tried to contact Soni to ask for the balance so that he could pay it in one lump sum (there is a dispute about whether Tomaz in fact tried to contact Soni in March). At about the same time, Tomaz stopped the automatic payments. On May 10, Tomaz contacted Soni. On June 18, Tomaz received this note by fax:
“The Soni Law Firm
“55 S. Lake Avenue
“Suite 720
“Pasadena, Ca 91101
“EIN #: 95-4757244
“Invoice submitted to:
“Pedro Tomaz
“Paper Graphics Ink
“250 N. Vinedo Avenue
“Pasadena CA 91107
“June 13, 2006
“In Reference To: Heidelberg v. PGI, et al.
“Amount
“Previous balance
$25,792.85
“Balance due
$25,792.85”
On June 22, Tomaz sent this e-mail to Soni: “I have received your statement . . . and am in agreement with your figures. However, before making final payment on this account I would appreciate it if you could send an invoice clearly stating that the payment of $25,792.85 will be the final payment owed to the Soni Law Firm from myself or PGI and that no further payments will be necessary regarding this case or settlement.”
On July 5, Soni sent Tomaz a letter asking for $25,792.85 for “[s]ervices rendered through the month of May 2006.” On July 8, Tomaz sent $13,000 to Soni and said the balance of $12,792.85 would be paid within 30 days.
On July 18, Soni sent this e-mail to Tomaz: “Pedro: [¶] The Agreement required payment of $2000 plus accrued interest per month for 36 months. [¶] That did not happen. Most months only $2000 was paid without interest and for several months, even the $2000 was not paid. [¶] So, the payment required to clear this account is $149,319.98. You have now made a $13,000 payment towards that obligation and $136,319.98 is due.”
On August 2, Tomaz’s new lawyer sent a fax to Soni stating that Tomaz was ready and willing to pay the $12,792.85 due ($25,792.85 less the $13,000 payment Tomaz made in response to Soni’s July 5 invoice). Soni rejected the tender and demanded the full amount due under the judgment. On August 15, Tomaz sent Soni a check for $14,596.05.
C.
On August 17, Soni notified Tomaz that he was about to levy upon Tomaz’s bank account for the amount due to satisfy the judgment -- $157,459.79. On August 31, after notice to Soni on August 30, Tomaz applied to the trial court for orders quashing the writ of execution and deeming the judgment satisfied. Soni appeared and filed written opposition. At the conclusion of the ex parte hearing, the trial court, on “proof made to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt,” found that notice had been given to Soni and granted Tomaz’s application, recalled and quashed the writ of execution, and ordered Soni to return to Tomaz any money received as a result of the writ of execution.
Soni appeals from the August 31 order.
DISCUSSION
In his opening brief on appeal, Soni tells us a great deal about the events leading up to the March 30, 2004 settlement agreement and stipulated judgment, and about the terms of the payment schedule set out in the agreement -- but doesn’t mention any of the payments made by Tomaz. In related arguments, he then contends the order must be vacated because he was entitled to a more extensive hearing and was deprived of his due process rights. We disagree.
Soni does not challenge the merits of the order.
Due process is a “flexible concept,” the essence of which is “fairness in the procedure employed.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 757.) In the circumstances of this case, Soni was entitled (1) to notice sufficient to apprise him of the pendency of the court proceeding, and (2) a meaningful opportunity to present his side of the dispute before the court ruled. (In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1418; Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 550-551; California Teachers Assn. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327, 338-339.) Soni got all this and more.
Tomaz’s lawyer notified Soni about the ex parte hearing the day before he went into court -- and the fact that Soni arrived in court with written opposition defeats his assertion that this notice was inadequate.
Soni’s assertion that he should have been granted a more extensive or formal hearing fails for the simple reason that he does not explain what good that would have done. With the benefit of many months between the time the order was made (August 2006) and the time Soni filed his respondent’s brief on appeal (April 2007), Soni has yet to advance an argument that he did not make in the trial court (and he does not suggest there was evidence he could have obtained had the matter been set for a noticed hearing). Soni has never disputed the accuracy of Tomaz’s evidence about the payments made -- and the only factual dispute arises out of Soni’s assertion that Tomaz did not contact him until June 2006 (not in March as Tomaz claims).
Because Soni had actual notice of the hearing and appeared in court fully prepared to oppose Tomaz’s application, and because Soni has failed to suggest that more time or a more formal hearing would have given him an opportunity to do something more than he did, he has failed to show any basis for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Tomaz is entitled to his costs of appeal.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.