Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:01-CV-030-BG
April 4, 2002
ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
The Plaintiff, Steven L. Sondley, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sondley brings this suit against Rochelle McKinney, Warden Robert Eason, Dr. Add Nafrawi, Dr. Stephen Peck, Kelli Ward, Warden Cary J. Cook, Robert Pruitt, Dr. Lonzetta, Nurse King, and Terri Cantrell, claiming that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights by showing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Sondley has consented to proceed before the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). An evidentiary hearing was held on September 12, 2001, in the Magistrate Judge's hearing room in Lubbock, Texas, pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). After reviewing Sondley's complaint, the testimony given under oath, and the authenticated records provided in this case, the court is of the opinion that the case should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Plaintiff's Complaint
Sondley states that he injured his back in March 1999 while incarcerated on the Wallace Pack I Unit and now suffers from sciatica. He claims his back injury has never been treated properly, and he has never been given proper medical restrictions to stop aggravation of the injury. Sondley claims that physicians have prescribed pain relievers but they do not work. He claims that in April 2001, Physicians Assistant ("PA") Dodd found that his right leg was smaller than his left and scheduled an MRI and a muscle relaxer. The test was never performed and PA Dodd is no longer on the unit.
On June 6, 2001, Sondley was examined by Dr. Lonzetta. Sondley claims that Dr. Lonzetta started a comprehensive treatment program for him, finding that Sondley' s back pain was caused by a deterioration of the L-5 disk. The doctor ordered Naprosyn and Robaxin, tennis shoes, and shower shoes; however, Sondley claims that before the Robaxin was dispensed it was discontinued by Defendant King. Sondley was again examined by Dr. Lonzetta on June 11, 2001. Sondley claims that Dr. Lonzetta "changed his story" and no longer attributed the pain to Sondley's L-5 disk.
Sondley claims there is a conspiracy between the doctor and others to deprive him of adequate medical care. He claims Defendants have violated his due process rights, equal protection rights, first amendment rights, eighth amendment rights, § 1985, RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, Texas Code, Chapter 101, and Texas Civil Statute Article 45901.
B. Spears Hearing Testimony
Sondley testified that he arrived on the French Robertson Unit on February 4, 2000. Sondley stated that he disagreed with the course of treatment prescribed by Dr. Nafrawi. He claims the doctor arbitrarily changed his medications, failed to allow him to elaborate on his pain and suffering, and threatened to call security to remove him from the examining room. Sondley agreed with medical records that showed Dr. Nafrawi renewed his Naprosyn prescription and ordered x-rays. Sondley also disagrees with the course of treatment prescribed by Dr. Peck, claiming that the treatment prescribed by this doctor did not work. Sondley agreed with medical records that showed Dr. Peck ordered an MRI and ordered shoe insoles. Sondley claims that muscle relaxers ordered by Dr. Lonzetta were discontinued because Nurse King entered the prescription for 10 days, knowing that any entry over seven days would be automatically rejected. Sondley never received the muscle relaxers. Sondley also claims that all of the physicians at the French Robertson Unit have failed to provide him with appropriate care for his pain because they are offered incentives for cutting back on treatment.
Sondley complained that Defendants McKinney, Eason, Ward, Cook, and Pruitt failed to investigate his complaints and failed to supervise their employees. Sondley admitted that Defendants McKinney, Eason, Ward, Cook, and Pruitt had no individual involvement in the incidents he alleged; however, he claims that they were made aware of his situation through the grievance procedure.
Sondley alleges that Defendant Cantrell has denied him access to the unit health services policy; however, no pending cases were affected by this denial.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), the court is required to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. A claim may be dismissed as frivolous if the claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). An evidentiary hearing may be used to assist the court in determining whether the case should be dismissed. Spears, 766 F.2d at 181-82. Dismissals can be based on authenticated prison records. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Section 1915(e) of Title 28, United States Code, accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of complainant's factual allegations and dismiss those claims in which the factual contentions are clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 21-32 (1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical
In order to state a valid § 1983 claim for relief for denial of adequate medical treatment, a prisoner must allege deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). Deliberate indifference to medical needs requires more than mere negligence on the part of prison officials. It requires that prison officials be aware of specific facts from which the inference could be drawn that a serious medical need exists and then the prison official, perceiving this risk, must deliberately fail to act. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Sondley has not established that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs based on the facts alleged in this case. See Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321 (disagreement with treatment received, unsuccessful medical treatment, and negligence or medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference and do not give rise to a § 1983 claim). Here, Sondley has alleged nothing more than disagreement with the treatment he received. According to Sondley, the treatment he received was not successful; however, unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action, nor does a disagreement between an inmate and a prison physician concerning the appropriateness of certain medical care. Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 235; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly, a claim that additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment should have been utilized is inadequate for purposes of§ 1983. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107. Hence, allegations of mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice on the part of a physician do not state an actionable claim under § 1983. Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321; Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 193. As the Supreme Court noted in Gamble, "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." 429 U.S. at 106.
While the court sympathizes with the pain that Sondley has endured during the attempts to treat his condition, he has not stated a claim of a constitutional violation.
Additionally, Sondley' s claims against Defendants McKinney, Eason, Ward, Cook, and Pruitt should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. To state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts reflecting the defendant's participation in the alleged wrong, specifying the personal involvement of each defendant. Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986). The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases. Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1986). Under § 1983, supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinates under any theory of vicarious liability. Monell v. Dept. of Social Sen's., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987); Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737 739 (5th Cir. 1985).
In this case, Defendants McKinney, Eason, Ward, Cook, and Pruitt were sued solely because of their positions of authority. As the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions, and no other basis of liability for these Defendants is mentioned, the case against these Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice because the claims against them have no arguable basis in law. See Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1989). Additionally, in the wake of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), any right Sondley has to the investigation of his grievances or complaints is founded in state law or regulations, not in the federal constitution's due process guarantee. The failure of an officer to follow agency procedural regulations or even the relevant state law is not, without more, a constitutional violation because the relevant constitutional minima may nevertheless have been satisfied. See, e.g., Murray v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5Lh Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Ranirez v. Ahn, 843 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1085 (1989); see also, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979).
B. Access to Courts
Prisoners have a right of access to the courts. McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1998). Toward that end, prisons may ensure a prisoner's access to the courts by providing adequate law libraries, assistance from legally trained personnel, or alternative means to ensure a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed constitutional violations. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Interference with a prisoner's right to access to the courts, such as a delay, may result in a constitutional deprivation. See Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986). Limitations may be placed on a prisoner's right of access as long as the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361-64; McDonald, 132 F.3d at 230. Moreover, direct access to legal materials may be narrowed when prison security is involved. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996).
To prevail on a claim of denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must show actual harm or prejudice resulting from the lack of access. Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). However, mere delay in filing a lawsuit, without a showing of harm, does not prejudice a prisoner's case. Eason, 73 F.3d at 1328-29.
Sondley brings this case complaining about the denial of access to the unit's health services policy; however, he admits that no pending case has been affected by this denial. For this reason, he has failed to state a claim of constitutional violation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the court finds that Sondley's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore,
ORDERED that this civil rights complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g) and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of this action does not release Sondley or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation to pay any filing fee previously imposed. See Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997)).
It is further
ORDERED that all pending motions not previously considered by the court are DENIED as moot.
This is a consent case assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) with authority to enter Judgment. Any appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(3).
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to all parties appearing pro se, to each attorney of record, to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID, Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas 78711, and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville. Texas 77342-0629 by first class mail.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.