The defendants contended that the provision that the property should not be subject to any debts, contracts, or dispositions of the devisees indicated that a life estate was intended, but this attempted restraint on alienation or charge would be void under any construction as repugnant to the estate granted. Verdier v. Youngblood, Rich. Eq. Cas., 220, 24 Am. Dec., 417; American Bible Society v. Noble, 11 Rich. Eq. (32 S.C. Eq.), 156, at page 198; Howe v. Gregg, 52 S.C. 88, 29 S.E., 394; Son v. Shealy, 112 S.C. 312, 99 S.E., 825. I therefore find that Edwin Wells mortgage to plaintiff set out in the complaint constitutes a first lien on both tracts of land described.
.E.2d 501; 11 Wn. App. 195, 522 P.2d 515; 210 S.C. 183, 42 S.E.2d 537; 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439; 209 S.C. 19, 34, 39 S.E.2d 133; 153 S.C. 106, 150 S.E. 760; 219 S.C. 221; 64 S.E.2d 651; 243 S.C. 342, 133 S.E.2d 838; 82 S.C. 22, 63 S.E. 3; 83 S.C. 88, 64 S.E. 1018; 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; 187 S.C. 474, 198 S.E. 403; 1 Speer 225. As to the Academy's being entitled to a reasonablerental for the properties during the period of detentionby the School District after its right of possessionended: 1 Speer 225; 153 S.C. 118, 150 S.E. 478; 257 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 893; Section 41-1 (3), Code of Laws of 1962. Messrs. Boyd, Knowlton, Tate and Finlay, of Columbia, for Respondents-Appellants, cite: As to the School Districtbeing still the absolute owner of the properties in question: 126 S.C. 484, 120 S.E. 236; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 146 at 1045; 28 Am. Jur.2d Estates § 136 at 250; L. Simes F. Smith, The Law of Future Interest §§ 1250 1511 at 395; H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 199 at 331; 112 S.C. 312, 99 S.E. 825; 289 Ill. 289, 124 N.E. 652; 169 N.C. 507, 86 S.E. 302; 154 Wis. 545, 143 N.W. 681; 38 Ill. 592; 46 F. Supp. 411; 152 F.2d 735; 209 S.W. 914; 105 Ga. 517, 31 S.E. 455; 75 Pa. St. 300, 34 A. 848; 46 F. Supp. 411; 152 F.2d 735; 209 S.W. 914; 105 Ga. 517, 31 S.E. 455; 75 Pa. St. 300, 34 A. 848; 79 Wis. 557, 48 N.W. 661; 4 Kent. Comm. 130; Coke, Litt. 206a; 2 Bl. Comm. 156; 123 Mass. 584; 62 Conn. 378, 26 A. 479; 28 Am. Jur.2d Estates § 136 158; H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 199; 3 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 1891; 6 Q.B. 107, 115 Eng. Rep. 41; S.C. Code Ann. § 22-201 (1962); S.C. Code Ann. § 22-351 (1962); 261 U.S. 236; 67 L.Ed. 629; 43 S.Ct. 306; 46 F. Supp. 411; 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88; Act No. 585; 170 S.C. 193, 170 S.E. 158. As to the question ofwhat estate in land passed to the School District under the1904 Indenture being presently before the Court in the issueof possession: 248 S.C. 421, 150 S.E.2d 607; 219 S.C. 313, 65 S.E.2d 232; F.
Again, it is elementary that a provision in a legal deed against liability of the property conveyed for the debts of the grantee is void for the simple reason that it is inconsistent with the estate granted. Son v. Shealy, 112 S.C. 312, 99 S.E. 825. Berry v. Hughes, 140 S.C. 371, 136 S.E. 846. Application of the stated rules reduces our problem to consideration of the effect, if any, of the condition attempted to be added to the fee by the evidently inexperienced author of the deed, as follows, quoting: `Now the above gift is made with the express understanding that the above-described property in lands is hereby Entailed upon the said Henry Garlington Creswell and his lawful heirs or heirs from a lawful marriage.
Suit by S.W. Gowdy against Charles M. Kelley and others. From a decree, E.F. McCutcheon, Jr., and others appeal. Mr. Charlton DuRant, for appellants, cites: Mutual mistake: 127 S.C. 166; 44 S.C. 22; 85 S.C. 474; 112 S.C. 320; 106 S.C. 346; 115 S.C. 67; 94 S.C. 349; 112 S.C. 106; 168 S.C. 145. Construction of deed: 51 S.C. 557; 77 S.C. 173; 36 S.C. 295; 48 S.C. 341; 42 S.C. 58; 78 S.C. 188; 101 S.C. 424; 85 S.E., 966; 102 S.C. 361; 86 S.E., 771; 112 S.C. 312; 99 S.E., 825. Admissibilityof evidence: 47 S.C. 48; 25 S.E., 797. Messrs. McEachin Townsend, for respondent, cite: Allegations of mutual mistake: 85 S.C. 472; 67 S.E., 734; 112 S.C. 320; 99 S.E., 810; 106 S.C. 346; 91 S.E., 293; 115 S.C. 267; 104 S.E., 330. Reformation: 168 S.C. 145; 167 S.E., 151; 106 S.C. 245; 91 S.E., 97; 36 S.C. 295; 15 S.E., 202. Admissible evidence: Sec. 692, Code, 1932; 92 S.C. 501; 75 S.E., 889; 47 S.C. 488; 25 S.E., 797; 109 S.C. 424; 96 S.E., 154; 26 S.C. 251; 113 S.C. 88; 101 S.E., 113; 177 S.C. 184; 181 S.E., 16; 17 S.C. 527; 22 S.E., 9. Laches: 56 S.W. 377; 43 S.E., 864; 53 C.J., 995; 72 S.C. 503; 52 S.E., 597; 43 S.C. 436; 21 S.E., 277; 106 S.C. 106; 91 S.E., 293. Estoppel: 23 R.C.L., 306; 106 A.L.R., 1338; 152 S.C. 640; 155 S.E., 414; 29 Am. Rep., 445; 85 S.E., 65; 85 S.E., 652; 21 S.C. 143. Construction of deed: 177 S.C. 40; 180 S.E., 562; 116 S.C. 228; 107 S.E., 914.
Messrs. Wolfe Berry, for appellants, cite: Effectshould be given to all words of a deed: 112 S.C. 113; 4 DeS., 447; 23 S.C. 232; 105 S.C. 268. Messrs. Lide Felder, for respondents, cite: All provisionswhich tend to place property out of reach of thepower of alienation are void: 2 McC., 323; 30 Cyc., 1486; 112 S.C. 312. While intention should govern, it cannotviolate a rule of law: 106 S.C. 304; 78 S.C. 334; 79 S.C. 166. Deed at bar cannot operate as a lease: 119 S.C. 470. July 15, 1927.
'" Messrs. Lee Shuler, for appellants, cite: Technicalwords strictly construed: 21 S.C.L. 194; 22 S.C. Eq. 221; 24 S.C. Eq. 574; 2 S.C. 68; 4 S.C. 18; 4 S.C. 83; 11 S.C. 300. Burden of showing they were used other thanin technical sense is on parties so claiming: 16 S.C. Eq. 204; 18 S.C. Eq. 396; 27 S.C. Eq. 26; 35 S.C. Eq. 147. Intention should not prevail against settled rulesof law and construction: 29 S.C. 466; 28 S.C. 125; 28 S.C. 459; 27 S.C. 497; 26 S.C. 464; 26 S.C. 181; 26 S.C. 565; 23 S.C. 235; 19 S.C. 308; 21 S.C.L. 193; 46 S.C. 262. Error to construe "lawful heirs" to mean"heirs of the body:" 112 S.C. 312. Fee conditional: 26 S.C. Eq. 441. How created: 18 S.C.L. 249; 11 S.C. Eq. 198; 41 S.C. 209; 2 S.C.L. 397; 10 S.C. Eq. 265; 21 S.C. Eq. 101; 4 Kent Coms. 9; 91 S.C. 487; 24 S.C. Eq. 277; 17 S.C. 551. Where grantor partswith entire fee there can be no fee conditional: 18 S.C. L. 248; 11 S.C. Eq. 196. Fee conditional cannot be createdby implication: 10 S.C. Eq. 282; 1 Civ. Code 1912, Sec. 3551; 70 S.C. 125; 85 S.C. 54; 41 S.C. 209. Where no words of inheritance in granting clause, habendummay be resorted to: 88 S.C. 296; 51 S.C. 557; 1 Tiffany Real Prop. 470, Sec. 130; 2 Blackstone Coms. 175; 94 S.C. 1; 91 S.C. 59; 96 S.C. 263; 57 S.C. 173; 48 S.C. 316; 17 S.C. 532; 40 S.C.L. 54; 21 S.C. Eq. 101; 106 S.C. 304; 88 S.C. 299. Messrs. Kelley Hinds, for respondents, cite: "Lawfulheirs" should be construed "heirs of the body:" 293 S.C. 182; 25 S.C. 289; 23 S.C. 238; 4 S.C. 16; 10 Rich. Eq. 358; 2 Strob. Eq. 66; 4 DeS. 459; 4 Rich. Eq. 158; McMull. Eq. 236. So constructed, grantee took a fee