Opinion
October 1, 1943.
December 9, 1943.
Negligence — Automobiles — Intersections — Traffic signals — Reliance — Duty to continue to look — Anticipating negligence of others.
1. A motor vehicle driver who looks to his left as he enters an intersection with the traffic light favorable and sees no vehicle approaching him can not be said to have blindly relied on the traffic signal.
2. A motor vehicle driver who commits himself to an intersection, with the traffic signal favoring him, need not anticipate that another driver on the intersecting street who is not visible to him will travel 50 to 60 feet to the intersection, pass a red light and run into him.
3. Where a motor vehicle driver crosses a two-way street, he has a duty to look to his right as he approaches the middle.
4. Where a motor vehicle driver looks at a curb line, before entering upon an intersection, his failure to continue to look to the left, under circumstances such as in this case, is not contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Before KELLER, P.J., BALDRIGE, STADTFELD, RHODES, HIRT and KENWORTHEY, JJ. (RENO, J., absent).
Appeals, No. 189 and 190, Oct. T., 1943, from judgments of C.P. No. 7, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1940, No. 3439, in case of Jerome A. Sommer et al. v. Joseph Blacka. Judgments affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries and property damage. Before BLUETT, J.
Verdicts, for individual plaintiff in sum of $1,500, remitted to $750, and for plaintiff insurer, in sum of $181.66, and judgments thereon. Defendant appealed.
Raymond A. White, Jr., for appellant.
Hyman Zuckerman, with him Hirschwald, Goff Rubin, for appellees.
Argued October 1, 1943.
Defendant in this right-angle collision case appeals from the refusal of his motion for judgment n.o.v. made on the ground plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Joined with the individual plaintiff was the Casualty Co. which insured him for damages to his automobile.
The intersection of Germantown and Hunting Park Avenues, where this accident occurred, is controlled by a traffic light. Germantown Avenue is 30 feet wide, Hunting Park 60 feet with 20 feet sidewalks. Both are two-way streets.
The evidence and inferences favorable to plaintiff disclose that on November 2, 1940, at 3:30 A.M., he was driving his Dodge Sedan south on the west side of Germantown Avenue. It was raining and the streets were wet. At the house line he noticed the traffic light change from amber to green. When he reached the north curb line of Hunting Park Avenue, proceeding at a rate of 15 miles per hour, he looked to his left [east] and saw nothing for a distance of some 50 to 60 feet. His vision was obstructed beyond that point by an incline or hump in Hunting Park Avenue occasioned by a railroad right-of-way beneath the street. Without looking to his left again, he continued to cross the intersection. Just as he reached the center of Hunting Park Avenue, defendant, driving west in the north cartway of Hunting Park Avenue, passed the red light and ran into the left rear of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff did not see defendant approaching until the collision.
Blind reliance on a favorable traffic signal is fatal to recovery. Byrne v. Schultz, 306 Pa. 427, 160 A. 125; Galliano v. East Penn Electric Co., 303 Pa. 498, 154 A. 805. But to look and to see nothing of danger is not blind reliance. Graff v. Scott Bros., Inc., 315 Pa. 262, 266, 172 A. 659. A motorist need not anticipate that after he is committed to the crossing another will travel 50 to 60 feet to the intersection, pass a red light and run into him. Harris v. Moran, 121 Pa. Super. 16, 182 A. 660. Moreover, since plaintiff was crossing a two-way street, he had a duty to look to his right as he approached the middle (Freedman v. Ziccardi, 151 Pa. Super. 159, 30 A.2d 172); even without the additional protection of the signal the failure to continue to look to the left, having looked at the curb line, is not contributory negligence as matter of law. Lewis v. Hermann, 112 Pa. Super. 338, 342, 171 A. 109; Lockhead v. Nierenberg, 143 Pa. Super. 507, 511, 18 A.2d 472.
Plaintiff's contributory negligence was clearly for the jury.
Judgments affirmed.