Somerset Co. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co.

29 Citing cases

  1. Painter v. Mattfeldt

    119 Md. 466 (Md. 1913)   Cited 55 times
    In Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 474, 87 A. 413; Somerset County Comrs. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874, and State v. Baltimore County Commissioners, 29 Md. 516, it was held that valid parts of a statute may be enforced although other parts may be invalid.

    Their separation from other provisions would result in the mutilation and emasculation of the Act in essential and important particulars. Many Acts have been stricken down because of titles not more deceptive, misleading or restrictive than the one under consideration. Steifel v. Md. Institute for the Blind, 61 Md. 144; Luman v. Hitchens Bros., 90 Md. 15; Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 410; Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238; Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Company, 109 Md. 1; Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667; Christmas v. Warfield, 105 Md. 530; Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386. Good roads are desirable, and the taxpayers would no doubt submit to any reasonable increase in taxation to secure them; but no such extensive and costly scheme of public improvement as that provided for by this Act should be imposed upon them under a title so misleading and deceptive.

  2. Oregon Education Ass'n v. Phillips

    302 Or. 87 (Or. 1986)   Cited 18 times
    Concluding that the "one subject" requirements in Article IV, section 1(d), and Article IV, section 20, "should be given the same meaning"

    Another abuse which developed in legislative bodies was the practice of concealing from the members of the legislature the true nature of the proposed law by giving it a false and misleading title, and to prevent surreptitious legislation in this manner is one of the objects of the Constitution. These and similar abuses inspired the adoption of Article IV, Section 20: Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 400 ( 41 P. 931, 35 L.R.A. 188); Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Indianapolis R. Co., 179 Ind. 356 ( 101 N.E. 296, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 917, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 816); Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575 ( 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382); County Commissioners v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1 ( 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874)."

  3. Hope v. Baltimore County

    288 Md. 656 (Md. 1980)   Cited 27 times
    In Hope, we considered a county law that allowed for a party aggrieved by an executive, administrative or adjudicatory county order to appeal that decision directly to the circuit court without first appealing to the county board of appeals.

    Such presumption, however, does not prevent our striking down a statute when its invalidity is perceived, notwithstanding the passage of time. See, e.g., the comments for this Court of Chief Judge Boyd and Judge Pearce, respectively, in Somerset Co. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 8, 71 A. 462 (1908), and Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 258, 61 A. 413 (1905). It is suggested that "[t]he contemporaneous construction of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in considering Section 22-38 before and after the adoption of the Baltimore County Charter" should shield that section from being struck down.

  4. Perkins v. Eskridge

    278 Md. 619 (Md. 1976)   Cited 39 times
    Observing that the same rules apply in constructional construction as apply in statutory construction

    What we did in Davidson is analogous to what we do whenever it is necessary to separate the valid from invalid portions of a statute or of the Constitution when only one aspect of it conflicts with a higher authority. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48, 343 A.2d 521, 528 (1975); Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 28-29, 52 A.2d 79, 89 (1947); Baltimore v. O'Conor, 147 Md. 639, 653, 128 A. 759, 764 (1925); Somerset Co. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 8, 71 A. 462, 465 (1908); See also O. Field, supra at 8. (v)

  5. In re Nystuen's Estate

    80 N.W.2d 671 (N.D. 1957)   Cited 7 times

    The widespread acquiescence in not only the existence of the statute in question but in its general use throughout practically the entire history of the state by the legislature, the people, the lawyers, and the courts weighs in favor of its constitutionality. Linck v. City of Litchfield, 141 Ill. 469, 31 N.E. 123; Goodall v. Henkel, 60 Mich. 382, 27 N.W. 556; Miller v. Enterprise Canal Land Co., 142 Cal. 208, 75 P. 770, 100 Am.St.Rep. 115; County Commissioners of Somerset County v. Pocomoka Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874 and note; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sections 81 and 83; Kyle v. Abernathy, 46 Colo. 214, 102 P. 746. The acquiescence heretofore discussed has had one interruption as disclosed by the opinion of this court in the case of In re Peterson's Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751, when the statute under consideration, then Section 7985, Revised Codes of 1905, was held constitutional against the identical challenge now urged.

  6. Pressman v. State Tax Commission

    204 Md. 78 (Md. 1954)   Cited 79 times
    In Pressman, we addressed challenges to a statute that reduced the franchise tax on mutual savings banks situated in Maryland.

    As the bills introduced in the Legislature are usually read by their titles only, and only the titles are printed in the Senate and House Journals, the value of this constitutional requirement is recognized in accomplishing three objects: (1) to prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon members of the Legislature by giving notice of provisions in bills which might otherwise be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to apprise the citizens of the State of the subjects of legislation which are being considered, so that anyone may have an opportunity to be heard thereon, by petition or otherwise. Fout v. Frederick County Com'rs, 105 Md. 545, 563, 66 A. 487; Com'rs of Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462; Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 187 Md. 67, 78, 48 A.2d 593. The test for determining whether the title of an act is so faulty that it violates Article III, Section 29, of the State Constitution, is whether there is a likelihood that the title may have led to a misconception of the enactment.

  7. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams

    199 Md. 382 (Md. 1952)   Cited 40 times
    In Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 396, 86 A.2d 892 (1952), Chief Judge Marbury quoted for the Court from Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580, 26 L.Ed. 492 (1880), where Justice Field said for the Supreme Court, "It would be a narrow and strict construction of the constitutional provision to hold that it prohibited the creation of indebtedness by a municipality by a direct use of its credit for the railway company, and yet permitted such creation by the indirect use of it for the same purpose."

    Of course, if they are clear and unambiguous, then there is no construction or clarification necessary or proper. It is also true that while contemporaneous construction or acquiescence in a particular course of dealing is of very great assistance, such construction or acquiescence cannot make an unconstitutional law constitutional. Somerset Co. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462. Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 387, 388, 24 A.2d 911. The Johns Hopkins University is a private, non-stock corporation engaged in the promotion of education in the State of Maryland at the collegiate and post-graduate levels.

  8. Duvall v. Lacy

    73 A.2d 26 (Md. 1950)   Cited 9 times

    This is emphasized by Chapter 29 of the Acts of 1950, hereinbefore referred to. The omission to include the entire income tax division in the requirement of the statute indicates an interpretation by the law making power that unless required to do so by statute, the Comptroller can perform the duties imposed on him by legislation elsewhere than at the seat of Government. We have frequently recognized the value of such interpretations in cases before us, although there is some difference in the interpretation of statutes and in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, and a positive, definite and clear provision of the Constitution cannot be changed by wrong practice and interpretations placed upon it. Somerset County Commissioners v. Pocomoke Bridge Company, 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Am. Cas. 874; Maryland Theatrical Corporation v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 388, 24 A.2d 911. We do not, however, think it necessary to invoke this principle in the case before us because we think the interpretation placed upon the constitutional provision by the Comptroller and his predecessors and by the Governor and by the Legislature correctly interprets the meaning of that instrument.

  9. Bell v. Prince George's County

    195 Md. 21 (Md. 1950)   Cited 12 times
    In Bell v. Prince George's Co., 195 Md. 21, 72 A.2d 746 (1950), we recognized that coin-operated mechanical or electrical devices, ostensibly for amusement, have been utilized as gambling devices where free games won by the successful player were "paid off" in cash.

    In other cases, only a portion of the act has been stricken down, because of a misleading title. Such cases are Stiefel v. Maryland Institute for the Blind, 61 Md. 144; Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 410, 31 A. 325; Somerset County Com'rs. v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; and Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 80 A. 1066. Neither of these methods can be used in the case before us to save the statute.

  10. Laundry Co. v. Dunn Hospital

    126 W. Va. 858 (W. Va. 1944)   Cited 22 times

    This acquiescence, or practical construction, of the statute in question is not at all binding upon the courts, but long agreement by courts and attorneys as to the constitutionality of an act, as respects its title, has been given weight on the question of the title's sufficiency. Detroit City Ry. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 48 N.W. 1007; Somerset County Commissioners v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462. The Legislature, under the title of the act which we call the Code, of course, could not amend, repeal, or otherwise modify special acts.