17 AmJur2d Contracts, § 297; Anno. 76 ALR2d 232; 2 Williston on Contracts (3d Ed.), §§ 390-92. Code Ann. § 3-108; Thorpe v. Collins, 245 Ga. 77, 83 ( 263 S.E.2d 115) (1980); Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979); Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 676 ( 256 S.E.2d 357) (1979); Miree v. United States, 242, Ga. 126, 135 ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978). 2.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20 (b). For there to arise contractual duties to perform owed to a third party, it must appear from the contract that it was intended for the benefit of the third party by the contracting parties. Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979); Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 676 ( 256 S.E.2d 357) (1979); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 752-753 ( 206 S.E.2d 857) (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 578 ( 212 S.E.2d 377) (1975). In this case, the contract clearly indicates that parties not expressly named in the contract are to be effected by the contract as third party beneficaries.
The Anthonys' failure to show the contract was made for their benefit precludes their action against Grange to enforce the contract under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). See City of Atlanta v. Atlantic Realty Co., 205 Ga. App. 1, 6 (3) ( 421 S.E.2d 113) (1992); compare Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P.J., and Eldridge, J., concur.
`(A) remote grantee who takes mortgaged real property by a deed in which he agrees to pay the debt is personally liable to the mortgagee. . . .' [Cit.]." Carr v. Nodvin, 178 Ga. App. 228, 233 (4) ( 342 S.E.2d 698) (1986); see Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 461, n. 2 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). Just as plaintiffs remained sureties on the debt when they sold the property to defendants, the latter two remained liable for the debt despite the sale of the property to Mitcham.
This is an exception to the general rule that an action on a contract is brought by a party to it. See Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). The remedies available to the beneficiary are exactly the same as would be available to him if he were a contractual promisee of the performance in question.
[Cit.]" Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). "In order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract under [OCGA § 9-2-20 (b)] it must clearly appear from the contract that it was intended for his benefit.
"[A] remote grantee who takes mortgaged real property by a deed in which he agrees to pay the debt is personally liable to the mortgagee even though his grantor or a predecessor in title took only subject to the debt and was not personally liable for that debt." Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463-464 ( 261 S.E.2d 334). These appellants did not assert that they were unable to read or were prevented from reading the assumption language, and Nodvin's affidavit that he did not represent the subsequent purchasers either in the sale of any interest in the subject property or as an attorney was undisputed. "`(I)n the absence of special circumstances one must exercise ordinary diligence in making an independent verification of contractual terms and representations, failure to do which will bar an action based on fraud. [Cit.]' [Cit.
Thereafter, the following transpired: Tenney transferred her interest in the note and deed to appellant Martha Pendergrast and Harvie Ewing conveyed the property to appellee. While the conveyance to appellee from her husband was made subject to the modified first security deed held by appellants, there was no recital in the warranty deed indicating appellee's express assumption of the indebtedness secured by the security deed so as to make appellee directly liable to appellants under the rule enunciated in Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). By virtue of a default in the payment of installments due under the terms of the note secured by the deed to secure debt, appellants declared the entire unpaid indebtedness to be due and payable and transmitted to New London and its grantee, Harvie Ewing, the statutory notice of intention to seek attorney's fees.
QUILLIAN, Presiding Judge. The decision of this Court in Somers v. Avant, 149 Ga. App. 515 ( 254 S.E.2d 722) (1979), having been reversed by the Supreme Court in Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 (1979), the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this court. Judgment reversed. Smith and Birdsong, JJ., concur.