Somers v. Avant

9 Citing cases

  1. AAA Plastering Co. v. TPM Constructors, Inc.

    277 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    17 AmJur2d Contracts, § 297; Anno. 76 ALR2d 232; 2 Williston on Contracts (3d Ed.), §§ 390-92. Code Ann. § 3-108; Thorpe v. Collins, 245 Ga. 77, 83 ( 263 S.E.2d 115) (1980); Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979); Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 676 ( 256 S.E.2d 357) (1979); Miree v. United States, 242, Ga. 126, 135 ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978). 2.

  2. FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton

    240 Ga. App. 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that security service hired by residential housing complex had tort duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 stemming from both O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and contract with property manager to protect tenants

    O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20 (b). For there to arise contractual duties to perform owed to a third party, it must appear from the contract that it was intended for the benefit of the third party by the contracting parties. Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979); Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 676 ( 256 S.E.2d 357) (1979); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 752-753 ( 206 S.E.2d 857) (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 578 ( 212 S.E.2d 377) (1975). In this case, the contract clearly indicates that parties not expressly named in the contract are to be effected by the contract as third party beneficaries.

  3. Anthony v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company

    487 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that assignee of mortgage was not an intended beneficiary even when the insurance policy listed the original mortgagee as a payee

    The Anthonys' failure to show the contract was made for their benefit precludes their action against Grange to enforce the contract under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). See City of Atlanta v. Atlantic Realty Co., 205 Ga. App. 1, 6 (3) ( 421 S.E.2d 113) (1992); compare Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P.J., and Eldridge, J., concur.

  4. Hill v. Moye

    471 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining that the suit sought a "deficiency judgment because the property they pledged did not bring at a foreclosure sale the amount of the debt owed."

    `(A) remote grantee who takes mortgaged real property by a deed in which he agrees to pay the debt is personally liable to the mortgagee. . . .' [Cit.]." Carr v. Nodvin, 178 Ga. App. 228, 233 (4) ( 342 S.E.2d 698) (1986); see Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 461, n. 2 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). Just as plaintiffs remained sureties on the debt when they sold the property to defendants, the latter two remained liable for the debt despite the sale of the property to Mitcham.

  5. Reaugh v. Inner Harbour

    214 Ga. App. 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that general statute of limitation, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, was inapplicable to claim for fraud, which has its own four-year statute of limitations

    This is an exception to the general rule that an action on a contract is brought by a party to it. See Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). The remedies available to the beneficiary are exactly the same as would be available to him if he were a contractual promisee of the performance in question.

  6. Walls, Inc. v. Atlantic Realty Co.

    186 Ga. App. 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that because the express terms of a contract explicitly limited beneficiaries of the contract to the signatory parties, the plaintiff could not allege contract claim as a third-party beneficiary

    [Cit.]" Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). "In order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract under [OCGA § 9-2-20 (b)] it must clearly appear from the contract that it was intended for his benefit.

  7. Carr v. Nodvin

    342 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 9 times
    Noting that an indemnitor "is entitled to restitution from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability"

    "[A] remote grantee who takes mortgaged real property by a deed in which he agrees to pay the debt is personally liable to the mortgagee even though his grantor or a predecessor in title took only subject to the debt and was not personally liable for that debt." Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460, 463-464 ( 261 S.E.2d 334). These appellants did not assert that they were unable to read or were prevented from reading the assumption language, and Nodvin's affidavit that he did not represent the subsequent purchasers either in the sale of any interest in the subject property or as an attorney was undisputed. "`(I)n the absence of special circumstances one must exercise ordinary diligence in making an independent verification of contractual terms and representations, failure to do which will bar an action based on fraud. [Cit.]' [Cit.

  8. Pendergrast v. Ewing

    279 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 5 times
    In Ewing, the court held the lender could collect contractual attorneys fees from the proceeds of the sale of the property.

    Thereafter, the following transpired: Tenney transferred her interest in the note and deed to appellant Martha Pendergrast and Harvie Ewing conveyed the property to appellee. While the conveyance to appellee from her husband was made subject to the modified first security deed held by appellants, there was no recital in the warranty deed indicating appellee's express assumption of the indebtedness secured by the security deed so as to make appellee directly liable to appellants under the rule enunciated in Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 ( 261 S.E.2d 334) (1979). By virtue of a default in the payment of installments due under the terms of the note secured by the deed to secure debt, appellants declared the entire unpaid indebtedness to be due and payable and transmitted to New London and its grantee, Harvie Ewing, the statutory notice of intention to seek attorney's fees.

  9. Somers v. Avant

    263 S.E.2d 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)

    QUILLIAN, Presiding Judge. The decision of this Court in Somers v. Avant, 149 Ga. App. 515 ( 254 S.E.2d 722) (1979), having been reversed by the Supreme Court in Somers v. Avant, 244 Ga. 460 (1979), the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this court. Judgment reversed. Smith and Birdsong, JJ., concur.