Opinion
2013-03-20
Philip SOLOMON, et al., appellants, v. Walter H. BURDEN III, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
John J. Andrews, Port Jefferson, N.Y. (Kenneth J. Lauri of counsel), for appellants. Sugarman Law, P.C., Deer Park, N.Y. (Shari Lee Sugarman of counsel), for respondents.
John J. Andrews, Port Jefferson, N.Y. (Kenneth J. Lauri of counsel), for appellants. Sugarman Law, P.C., Deer Park, N.Y. (Shari Lee Sugarman of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated March 5, 2012, which denied their motion for summary judgment on the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the complaint is granted.
The plaintiffs met their initial burden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to a judgment of foreclosure by producing the mortgage, the note, and evidence of default ( see Baron Assoc., LLC v. Garcia Group Enters., Inc., 96 A.D.3d 793, 793, 946 N.Y.S.2d 611;GRP Loan, LLC v. Taylor, 95 A.D.3d 1172, 1173, 945 N.Y.S.2d 336;Citibank, N.A. v. Van Brunt Props., LLC, 95 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 945 N.Y.S.2d 330). Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the defendants to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense “such as waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff[s]” ( Mahopac Natl. Bank v. Baisley, 244 A.D.2d 466, 467, 664 N.Y.S.2d 345;see Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663, 436 N.E.2d 1265; Baron Assoc., LLC v. Garcia Group Enters., Inc., 96 A.D.3d at 793, 946 N.Y.S.2d 611). The respondents failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning their fraud defense, and they are barred by the parol evidence rule from introducing evidence of an alleged oral modification of the note and mortgage which would make the note and mortgage relate only to one parcel of property rather than the two parcels of property expressly named in the terms of the note and mortgage ( see Eastern Sav. Bank, FSB v. Sassouni, 68 A.D.3d 917, 918, 892 N.Y.S.2d 421;M & T Mtge. Corp. v. Ethridge, 300 A.D.2d 286, 287–287, 751 N.Y.S.2d 741;Bank of N.Y. v. Lockwood Venture Hous., 222 A.D.2d 633, 635 N.Y.S.2d 692;cf. Bontempts v. Aude Constr. Corp., 98 A.D.3d 1071, 1072, 951 N.Y.S.2d 561;Hallaway Props. v. Bank of New York, 155 A.D.2d 897, 547 N.Y.S.2d 728).
The respondents' remaining contentions are without merit, and the remaining defendants did not oppose the plaintiffs' motion.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the complaint.