As Buffalo's correctly observes, this theory of negligence is squarely foreclosed by OCGA § 51-1-40, which provides that, except in limited circumstances not presented in this case, "the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury . . . inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person." OCGA § 51-1-40 (a). As we have explained, "this statute insulates providers of alcohol from third-party claims of negligence" except in the limited circumstances not presented here. Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., 301 Ga. App. 565, 567 ( 687 SE2d 924) (2009) (punctuation omitted); see also Kappa Sigma Int'l. Fraternity v. Tootle, 221 Ga. App. 890, 893 (2) ( 473 SE2d 213) (1996). To the extent that Bennett's assailants were intoxicated at the time of the assault and that their intoxication contributed to the assault, it was their consumption of alcohol, not the service of alcohol to them, that may have been the proximate cause of Bennett's injuries. For this reason, a negligence claim against Buffalo's premised on the service of alcohol at the party fails as a matter of law.

Under Georgia's Dram Shop Act, OCGA § 51–1–40, a person who sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages is not liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person except in limited circumstances not present here. See Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., Inc., 301 Ga.App. 565, 567, 687 S.E.2d 924 (2009); B–T Two, 307 Ga.App. at 653(2), 706 S.E.2d 87. We have found no cases, and the parties have not addressed, whether OCGA § 51–1–40 applies to claims for gross negligence, and therefore we decline to decide this claim on these statutory grounds.