, the purpose of the notice requirement is to provide sufficient time prior to sentencing to rebut or explain prior convictions, and even if an objection is made, the trial court has the option of granting a postponement of sentencing to facilitate the purpose of the notice. Soler v. State, 840 S.E.2d 169, 172-73 (Ga.Ct.App. 2020). Only upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith would the trial court be allowed to prevent the introduction of a prior conviction.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Solerv.Slate, 354 Ga. App. 93, 96 (2), 840 S.E.2d 169 (2020). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

(punctuation omitted)).Turner , 273 Ga. at 342 (2), 541 S.E.2d 641 ; accordSoler v. State , 354 Ga. App. 93, 96 (2), 840 S.E.2d 169 (2020). Importantly, included within the constitutional right to counsel is "the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest." But for a defendant to prevail on his claim that his attorney was operating under a conflict of interest that violated his right to counsel, he must "show an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his attorney's performance."

Henderson's argument, however, ignores the fact that the State is not subject to the statutory notice requirements unless the defendant has provided written notice pursuant to OCGA § 17-16-2 (a) that he has elected to participate in reciprocal discovery. See Soler v. State , 354 Ga. App. 93, 97 (2), 840 S.E.2d 169 (2020) ("Under the current statutory scheme, the State is not required to provide notice of its intent to use a prior conviction in aggravation of sentencing under OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (5) unless written notice of a defendant's election to participate in reciprocal discovery under OCGA § 17-16-2 (a) is provided to the State.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the appellate record contains no evidence showing that either Henderson or the State "opted into the reciprocal discovery provisions of [the criminal discovery statute].