Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-10257-R-KES
09-24-2019
Juan SOLANO, Petitioner, v. Warren L. MONTGOMERY, Warden, Respondent.
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition (Dkt. 1), the other records on file herein, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 24). No objections to the Report and Recommendation were filed, and the deadline for filing such objections has passed. The Court accepts the report, findings, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered dismissing the Petition without prejudice, because Petitioner has not concluded his state criminal proceedings.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE, RECOMMENDING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED
KAREN E. SCOTT, United States Magistrate Judge
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned Honorable United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Juan Solano ("Petitioner") filed an undated Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the "Petition"), docketed by the Court on December 11, 2018. (Dkt. 1 at 1. ) Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison.
Page citations are to the pagination imposed by the Court's electronic filing system, CM/ECF.
On May 7, 2019, Respondent Warren L. Montgomery ("Respondent") moved to dismiss the Petition without prejudice, arguing that Petitioner seeks relief from a conviction rendered in a state criminal proceeding that is not yet final. (Dkt. 15.) On August 1, 2019, the Court docketed Petitioner's opposition, which conceded that his state proceedings are ongoing but argued that the grounds for relief raised in the Petition do not challenge the ongoing proceedings. (Dkt. 22.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends granting Respondent's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
II.
BACKGROUND
In the Los Angeles Superior Court (case no. BA390066), Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of committing the gang-related murder of Franklin Munoz on October 15, 2011; at the time of the murder, Petitioner was seventeen years old. (Dkt. 16-1 at 2 [California Court of Appeal Opinion].) The jury found true the allegation that Petitioner personally used a firearm ( Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.53(c), (d), (e)(1) ) and the gang allegation. Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(b)(1)(C). (Id. at 3.) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifty years to life in state prison. (Id.)
On January 6, 2017, Petitioner directly appealed his conviction (case no. B280061), arguing that the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) giving conflicting self-defense instructions; (2) allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from Bustamante (Petitioner's co-defendant) that Bustamante was also charged with another murder; and (3) allowing evidence that Petitioner was in possession of a firearm after the Munoz murder that matched the caliber of the murder weapon. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner also argued that his judgment must be conditionally reversed and remanded to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 and for the trial court to exercise its discretion regarding the firearm enhancements in light of Senate Bill No. 620. (Id.)
Jairo Bustamante was charged in Munoz's shooting and convicted of voluntary manslaughter; he was sixteen at the time of the shooting. (Dkt. 16-1 at 3.) Bustamante was also convicted of murdering Israel Salinas; Petitioner was not charged with participation in this crime. (Id. at 2-3.) The trials of the two co-defendants were severed, but they were sentenced together. (Id. at 2.)
Proposition 57 amended Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 602, 707, repealing § 707(d), which allowed prosecutors to file criminal charges against minors directly in adult court under certain circumstances; instead, prosecutors must commence the action in juvenile court, then that court conducts a transfer hearing to determine whether the matter should remain in juvenile court or transfer to adult court. See People v. Superior Court (Lara), 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 410 P.3d 22 (2018).
Senate Bill No. 620 provides the trial court with discretion to impose a sentence for Petitioner's firearm enhancement, which was previously mandatory. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 12022.5(c), 12022.53(h).
--------
The California Court of Appeal found no substantive error in the trial court proceedings (i.e., it rejected Petitioner's first three arguments). (Id. at 13-21.) That court did, however, reverse and remand Petitioner's conviction for a transfer hearing to determine Petitioner's fitness for treatment within the juvenile justice system and to allow that court to reconsider Petitioner's firearm enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill 620. (Id. at 21-24.) If Petitioner is found fit for juvenile court treatment, then the juvenile court will treat his conviction as a juvenile adjudication, hold a dispositional hearing, and impose a juvenile disposition. (Id. at 23.) If Petitioner is found unfit for juvenile court treatment, then his case will be transferred to adult court and his conviction will be reinstated. (Id.)
On July 2, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court (case no. S249678), reasserting his three claims of substantive trial court error. (Dkt. 16-2 [Petition for Review].) On September 19, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. (Dkt. 16-3 [Review Denial].) The instant Petition, docketed by the Court in December 2018, brings those same three grounds for relief. (See Dkt. 1.)
On May 6, 2019, Eugene Miyata, Deputy District Attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, filed a declaration indicating that "the juvenile proceedings continue to be ongoing and I anticipate the transfer hearing setting will be continued past May 21, 2019." (Dkt. 16-3.) Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss, docketed August 1, 2019, also indicates that proceedings are still ongoing. (Dkt. 22.)
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary of the Parties' Arguments.
Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner's criminal proceedings are ongoing, and the juvenile court must assess Petitioner's fitness for treatment in the juvenile system (i.e., his conviction is not final). (Dkt. 15 at 5-5.) Respondent argues that California has an important interest in protecting the public by adjudicating these proceedings. (Id. at 6.) Further, the habeas relief sought by Petitioner would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceedings, and Petitioner has not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances to warrant such intervention. (Id. at 6-7.)
Petitioner counters that the grounds for relief raised in the Petition are "final," i.e., they do not challenge any ongoing proceedings in juvenile court, but errors made in his initial jury trial. (Dkt. 22.)
B. Younger Abstention.
In the seminal case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), after the defendant was indicted for violations of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, he sued in federal court to enjoin his prosecution, contending that the Act was an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. The United States Supreme Court determined that the defendant's situation did not present the "factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention ...." Id. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746. Specifically, he had failed to show that his prosecution would result in "irreparable injury" that was "both great and immediate." Id. at 46, 91 S.Ct. 746. The Court noted that injury in the form of "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution" was not an irreparable injury for purposes of obtaining equitable relief in federal court. Id.
" Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution." Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). Younger abstention is rooted in "a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger abstention promotes comity, an idea that encompasses "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746 ).
The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that "[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter" and that "[c]ircumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine ... are ‘exceptional[.]’ " Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73, 134 S.Ct. 584. Such exceptional circumstances exist where the state court proceedings are (1) "state criminal prosecutions," (2) "civil enforcement proceedings," or (3) "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Id. at 73, 134 S.Ct. 584 (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ).
If the state court proceedings at issue fall into one of these three categories, then federal courts ask whether the state proceeding: (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges. Id. at 81, 134 S.Ct. 584 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515 and noting that these are "additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger" in a quasi-criminal context); see also Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Middlesex factors "guide consideration of whether Younger extends to noncriminal proceedings"). "If these ‘threshold elements’ are met, [courts] then consider whether the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to Younger applies." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014).
C. Analysis.
This case implicates one of the "exceptional" circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine: a state criminal prosecution. Moreover, each of the three threshold requirements for Younger abstention is met in this case.
First, Petitioner has an ongoing state judicial proceeding in the juvenile justice system; Petitioner's conviction has been conditionally reversed and his case remanded to the juvenile court to determine his fitness for treatment within the juvenile justice system. Petitioner concedes that those state court proceedings are ongoing. (See Dkt. 22.)
Second, the juvenile justice system proceeding implicates an important state interest in the administration of the criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) ("This Court has recognized that the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.") (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45, 91 S.Ct. 746 ).
Third, the proceeding in the juvenile justice system provides Petitioner an opportunity to raise his federal constitutional challenges, albeit tangentially. In conducting a transfer hearing, the juvenile court must consider the five factors set forth in Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(3) : (1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated before expiration of the court's jurisdiction, (3) the minor's previous delinquent history, (4) success of previous rehabilitation attempts, and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the offenses. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(3). Pertaining to these five factors, Petitioner might argue, for example, that the Munoz shooting was committed in self-defense (a claim that underlies his first ground for habeas relief) or that Bustamante's conviction for the Salinas murder has no bearing on the gravity/circumstances of Petitioner's participation in the Munoz shooting (a claim that underlies his second ground for habeas relief). See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate opportunity for consideration of constitutional claims "in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary").
Because the three threshold requirements are met, the Court considers whether granting habeas relief here would practically enjoin the ongoing state proceedings. Were the Court to grant habeas relief, it necessarily would entail interference because the ongoing state proceeding effectively would be terminated. See San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding interference under Younger where the federal relief sought would "involve the federal courts in terminating or truncating" the ongoing state proceeding) (citation omitted).
Although an exception to Younger abstention exists, it applies "[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith" or "in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971). Petitioner has made no showing of extraordinary circumstances or irreparable harm warranting federal intervention, and the Court cannot discern any. Rather, it seems that the ongoing proceedings might alleviate Petitioner's sentence.
IV.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15); and (3) dismissing this action without prejudice to Petitioner refiling upon the conclusion of his state criminal proceedings.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals but are subject to the right of any party to timely file objections as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the instructions attached to this Report. This Report and any objections will be reviewed by the District Judge whose initials appear in the case docket number.