Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the defendants by tendering evidence that Barbara Gore's failure to yield the right-of-way in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 was a proximate cause of the accident (see Ricciardi v Nelson, 142 AD3d 492, 493; Ferrara v Castro, 283 AD2d 392, 393; see also Lallemand v Cook, 23 AD3d 533, 534). However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to whether the collision was caused solely by Jo's failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision (see Berner v Little, 137 AD3d 1675, 1676) and whether the defendants' vehicle entered the roadway prior to being struck by the plaintiffs' vehicle, rendering Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 inapplicable (see Soibov v Palmer, 102 AD3d 951, 952; Passamondi v Hunt, 80 AD2d 889, 889).

Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the defendants by tendering evidence that Barbara Gore's failure to yield the right-of-way in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 was a proximate cause of the accident (see Ricciardi v Nelson, 142 A.D.3d 492, 493; Ferrara v Castro, 283 A.D.2d 392, 393; see also Lallemand v Cook, 23 A.D.3d 533, 534). However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to whether the collision was caused solely by Jo's failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision (see Berner v Little, 137 A.D.3d 1675, 1676) and whether the defendants' vehicle entered the roadway prior to being struck by the plaintiffs' vehicle, rendering Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 inapplicable (see Soibov v Palmer, 102 A.D.3d 951, 952; Passamondi v Hunt, 80 A.D.2d 889, 889).

Here, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing as a matter of law that Wright was free from any comparative fault in the happening of the accident. There are triable issues of fact as to whether Wright failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of his senses ( see Brandt v. Zahner, 110 A.D.3d 752, 974 N.Y.S.2d 482;Colpan v. Allied Cent. Ambulette, Inc., 97 A.D.3d at 777, 949 N.Y.S.2d 124; Topalis v. Zwolski, 76 A.D.3d 524, 525, 906 N.Y.S.2d 317;Tapia v. Royal Tours Serv., Inc., 67 A.D.3d 894, 896, 889 N.Y.S.2d 225), failed to exercise due care to avoid the collision ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1146[a]; Soibov v. Palmer, 102 A.D.3d 951, 952, 958 N.Y.S.2d 597;Matamoro v. City of New York, 94 A.D.3d 722, 941 N.Y.S.2d 684;Bonilla v. Calabria, 80 A.D.3d 720, 915 N.Y.S.2d 615;Todd v. Godek, 71 A.D.3d 872, 895 N.Y.S.2d 861;Tapia v. Royal Tours Serv., Inc., 67 A.D.3d at 895, 889 N.Y.S.2d 225), or was traveling at a reasonable and prudent speed as he approached the intersection in light of the conditions then present ( seeVehicle and Traffic Law § 1180). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers.

Here, Naqui claims that he was already in the intersection when Hall made a quick left into his vehicle. However, this court finds that there is conflicting testimony as to the facts surrounding the accident, including, but not limited to, the issue concerning which vehicle lawfully entered the intersection first, whether defendant Hall violated VTL § 1141, if he did whether such violation was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Soibov v Palmer, 102 AD3d 951 [2d Dept. 2013]; Gause v Martinez, 91 AD3d 595 [2d Dept. 2012]). As testified to by the plaintiff, both vehicles were inching up after the light turned green and were hesitating about which vehicle would proceed first into the intersection.

Further, the plaintiff testified that he observed the defendants' vehicle begin to make the left turn about 7 seconds before the impact occurred. Therefore, this court finds that there is conflicting testimony as to the facts surrounding the accident, including, but not limited to, the issue concerning which vehicle lawfully entered the intersection first, whether defendant violated VTL § 1141, and if he did, whether such violation was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Soibov v Palmer, 102 AD3d 951 [2d Dept. 2013]; Gause v Martinez, 91 AD3d 595 [2d Dept. 2012]).