Opinion
No. C 02-2675 CRB (PR)
December 17, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc #3)
Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Santa Clara County Jail in San Jose, California, filed a civil rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 24, 2000, alleging that on October 23, 1999, Officers Art Markham, Fabian Ramirez and Darwin Okamoto of the City of Campbell Police Department used excessive force in the course of arresting him. Per order filed on September 28, 2001, the court, on defendants' motion, took judicial notice that plaintiff has been convicted of making false allegations of police misconduct against the officer defendants (including that they used unreasonable force during arrest) in violation of California Penal Code section 148.6(a)(1), and dismissed the action on the ground that the conviction rendered plaintiff's § 1983 claim for damages not cognizable under the rationale of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court explained that the dismissal was without prejudice: "If, as [plaintiff] claims, he succeeds in the criminal realm in invalidating his conviction on the ground that section 148.6(a)(1) is unconstitutional (or on any other ground), he can refile his excessive force claim in a new § 1983 action. Heck simply postpones the accrual of plaintiff's excessive force claim until his conviction is invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90."Sogbandi v. Markham, No. C 00-1397 CRB (PR), at 3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2001) (order of dismissal).
On June 4, 2002, plaintiff refiled his § 1983 claim for damages for use of excessive force during arrest against the officer defendants, accompanied by documentary proof that, on March 26, 2002, the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Appellate Department, reversed his conviction on the ground that California Penal Code section 148.6 "facially violates" the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants again ask the court to take judicial notice of plaintiff's conviction (specifically that a trier of fact found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that plaintiff's allegations of unreasonable force by the arresting officers were false), and move to dismiss on the ground that principles of collateral estoppel bar plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and defendants have filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling on a question of law. Parks School of Business, Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995). The court accordingly must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from these allegations. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the court is not required to accept as true "legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged," Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994), or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice,Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987), or that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint, Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). Even so, a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Terracom v. Valley National Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review is limited to the contents of the complaint, including documents physically attached to the complaint or documents the complaint necessarily relies on and whose authenticity is not contested. Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, the court may take judicial notice of matters of public record that are not subject to reasonable dispute. See id. at 689-90; Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).
The defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel (i.e., claim and issue preclusion) may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the court can take judicial notice of all relevant facts. See Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992); see also McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court may examine preclusive effect of prior judgment sua sponte).
B. Analysis
The court takes judicial notice that on August 20, 2000, plaintiff was convicted in Santa Clara County Superior Court of making false allegations of police misconduct against the officer defendants, specifically that the officer defendants used unreasonable force during their arrest of plaintiff, in violation of California Penal Code section 148.6(a)(1), and that, in finding plaintiff guilty, the trier of fact necessarily found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that plaintiff's allegations of unreasonable force during arrest were false. Defendants argue that the trier of fact's finding precludes plaintiff from relitigating whether the officer defendants used unreasonable force during arrest, despite the fact that on March 26, 2002, the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed plaintiff's conviction on the ground that California Penal Code section 148.6 "facially violates" the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court agrees.
State law governs the application of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to a state court judgment in a federal civil rights action.Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). Under California law, the criteria for the application of collateral estoppel are: "(1) the prior conviction must have been for a serious offense so that the defendant was motivated to hilly litigate the charges; (2) there must have been a full and fair trial to prevent convictions of doubtful validity from being used; (3) the issue on which the prior conviction is offered must of necessity have been decided at the criminal trial; and (4) the party again whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior trial." Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McGowan v. City of San Diego, 208 Cal.App.3d 890 (1989)). By substituting the word "proceeding" for the words "conviction" and "trial," the doctrine of collateral estoppel may also apply in a civil action to issues determined in a prior "proceeding" such as a probable cause hearing or suppression hearing. See id.
Applying the criteria identified in Ayers, the court concludes that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether the officer defendants used unreasonable force during his arrest, which was decided against him in the state criminal action. There is identity of issues because the threshold issue in the criminal action and here was/is the validity of plaintiff's claim of unreasonable force during arrest, which the trier of fact in the criminal action found to be false; privity exists because plaintiff was a party to the prior adjudication where the issue to be estopped was decided; the adverse finding and resulting conviction was fully and fairly litigated in the state courts, including appeal; and plaintiff clearly had the motivation to fully litigate the issue of unreasonable force since it was the basis of the criminal action against him. Accord id. at 1271-72 (affirming district court's conclusion that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating Fourth Amendment issues decided against him in criminal action after applying four criteria identified in McGowan).
It matters not for purposes of issue preclusion here that the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed plaintiff's conviction on the ground that California Penal Code section 148.6 "facially violates" the First and Fourteenth Amendments. That reversal in no way invalidates the fact that a state court jury found that plaintiff's claim of unreasonable force during arrest to be false. Cf. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288-90 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that where issue of whether there was probable cause was decided against plaintiff at preliminary hearing, plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating issue of probable cause for malicious prosecution under § 1983 despite fact that plaintiff was acquitted after trial). The trier of fact's finding remains presumptively conclusive. See, e.g.,Vanzant v. Daimler Chrysler, Corp., 96 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1288-91 (2002) (finding that interim orders by federal district court in underlying action created a conclusive presumption that trademark owner had probable cause to sue producer and therefore producer's malicious prosecution action in state court failed as a matter of law since he could not establish the required lack of probable cause, notwithstanding that the interim order in the underlying action were reversed by the Ninth Circuit on other grounds).
Although its relevance here is unclear, the court notes that the Supreme Court of California recently held, contrary to the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Appellate Division, that section 148.6 is not unconstitutional on its face. See People v. Stanistreet, No. S102722, 2002 WL 31720281 (Cal. Dec. 5, 2002).
Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for damages for use of excessive force during arrest must be dismissed as a matter of law because plaintiff is precluded from relitigating whether the officer defendants used unreasonable force during his arrest, a threshold issue decided against plaintiff in the state criminal action. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (claims of excessive force during arrest hinge on whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss (doc #3) is GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, close the file, and terminate all pending motions as moot.
The court is mindful that it is generally preferable to decide a collateral estoppel defense on a motion for summary judgment rather than on a motion to dismiss, see Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999); however, under the circumstances of this case, the court is satisfied that defendants' collateral estoppel defense may be properly decided on a motion to dismiss, see Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992).
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.