Starnes v. Fulton County School Dist., 233 Ga. App. 182, 185 ( 503 SE2d 665) (1998). We addressed a situation similar to this case in Soerries v. City of Columbus, 222 Ga. App. 745 ( 476 SE2d 64) (1996). There, the city revoked a licensee's liquor license, and rather than seeking review via writ of certiorari under OCGA § 5-4-1 (a), the licensee filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and damages.
3. Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in failing to find that the day care center is illegally operating in an Office-Institutional district, which does not include a school as a permitted use. However, Appellants waived this objection by failing to raise it before the City Council. See Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 427 (2) ( 383 S.E.2d 123) (1989); Hyman v. Pruitt, 226 Ga. 625-626 (1) ( 176 S.E.2d 707) (1970); Soerries v. City of Columbus, 222 Ga. App. 745, 746 ( 476 S.E.2d 64) (1996) (failure to raise statutory issues before the City Council precluded raising them for the first time in court). 4. Appellants urge that the trial court applied an incorrect standard, because it found that the distance requirements of the GSSO are not arbitrary or capricious.
See id. at 843 (3). See DeKalb County v. Post Properties, 245 Ga. 214, 217 (1) ( 263 SE2d 905) (1980) ("[a] constitutional attack on a zoning classification cannot be made for the first time in the superior court"); City of Cedartown, 193 Ga. at 843 (2), (3) (holding that even questions of constitutionality must be reviewed on appeal by applying for certiorari with the superior court and may not be challenged via a separate lawsuit); Mack II v. City of Atlanta, 227 Ga. App. 305, 310 (2) ( 489 SE2d 357) (1997) (holding that argument that hearing denied appellant due process was not properly raised in proceeding and should have been addressed by trial court on review of writ of certiorari); Soerries v. City of Columbus, 222 Ga. App. 745, 746 ( 476 SE2d 64) (1996). Love Shack also contends that because it raised the issue of constitutionality as an affirmative defense, the City did not meet its burden at summary judgment by proving that its ordinances were constitutional.
In summary, the January 1996 hearing was a quasi-judicial proceeding as contemplated by OCGA § 5-4-1 because the ordinance authorizing the hearing entitled the litigants to a hearing "in accordance with judicial procedures" and because the hearing officer acted judicially, rather than administratively, in hearing argument and applying the law as the officer interpreted it to the facts before it. Consequently, review by writ of certiorari is required. The trial court therefore did not err in dismissing Mack II's complaint for equitable relief. See Wilson v. Latham, 227 Ga. 530, 533 ( 181 S.E.2d 830) (1971); Soerries v. City of Columbus, 222 Ga. App. 745 ( 476 S.E.2d 64) (1996); Wooten v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 568 ( 254 S.E.2d 889) (1979). 2.
10950 Retail, LLC v. City of Johns Creek , 299 Ga. App. 458, 460 (1), 682 S.E.2d 637 (2009) (emphasis supplied); see City of Cedartown v. Pickett , 193 Ga. 840, 843 (3), 20 S.E.2d 263 (1942) ("Even [when] a case involves directly and primarily a property right, and even though equity may afford to the person so injured a more adequate and complete remedy than he would have under the procedure at law, yet [when] he, as the defendant in a proceeding before a municipal judicatory, has elected to maintain his rights under that proceeding and has thus had his day in court, he cannot ordinarily thereafter be heard on a petition in equity, to question the constitutionality of the ordinance involved in the decision; but his remedy was to have made his defense before the municipal judicatory, and to have corrected by certiorari any error in its decision." (citations omitted)); Soerries v. City of Columbus , 222 Ga. App. 745, 746, 476 S.E.2d 64 (1996) (holding that "[t]he exclusive mechanism by which [the property owner] could challenge [a City] Council’s revocation of his liquor license was by filing a petition for certiorari, and thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing his claims, which included constitutional challenges).Nevertheless, RLG relies on Moon v. Cobb County and Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Rauers to support its argument that the trial court erred in dismissing its constitutional claims.