Opinion
99 C 6111.
March 26, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this case, plaintiff the Society of Lloyds seeks discovery in an effort to locate assets with which to satisfy a $ 551,644.97 English judgment in its favor and against the defendants, the estate of John McMurray and Harris Bankcorp (the executor of the McMurray estate and the trustee of the John McMurray trust). Harris filed a motion to quash Lloyd's citation to discover assets, and the court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Rosemond, who granted the motion as to estate assets and denied it as to trust assets. Harris filed timely objections to the denial of the motion as to trust assets. For the following reasons, the objections are overruled.
Jurisdiction
The court's inquiry begins with its subject matter jurisdiction. Because the jurisdictional allegations in the original citation did not contain any specifics regarding the citizenship of Harris or Mr. McMurray, the court orderd Lloyds to file an amended citation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653.
According to Lloyds, it is "a Society and Corporation incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom with its principal place of business in London, England." Citation at ¶ 2. On the other side, the deceased judgment debtor, Mr. McMurray, was a citizen of Illinois, and Harris is an executor of Mr. McMurray's will as well as the trustee of his trust, and is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Citation at ¶¶ 3-4. As the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, these allegations are sufficient to establish that diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is proper. The court will thus turn to the merits of Lloyds' objections.
Standard of Review
Magistrate Judge Rosemond's order resolved a discovery motion. Accordingly, this court's review is governed by Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that this court may only set aside the magistrate judge's order if it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In other words, the magistrate judge's ruling must stand unless this court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). Lloyds asserts that de novo review is appropriate. While the court believes that the more liberal standard applicable to a discovery motion applies, it will not belabor the point as Lloyds prevails under either standard.
Discussion
Familiarity with Magistrate Judge Rosemond's order is assumed. As the relevant facts are undisputed and set forth in detail in that order, the court will not repeat them here. Illinois' rules regarding post-judgment supplementary proceedings govern the post-judgment discovery issue before the court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). In their objections, Mr. McMurray's estate and Harris, the executor of Mr. McMurray's estate and director of his trust, contend that Magistrate Judge Rosemond erred when he found that the two year statute of limitations in the Illinois Probate Act, 755 ILCS § 5/18-12, applies only to claims against an estate and hence denied their motion to quash the citation to discover trust assets. The gravamen of their argument is that § 18-12 is not limited to claims against estates and thus reaches claims against other entities (such as Mr. McMurray's trust).
On the other hand, Lloyds asserts that it may obtain discovery regarding trust assets because Illinois' general seven year statute of limitations applies to disputes regarding this type of asset. See La Societe Anonyme Goro v. Conveyor Accessories, Inc., 286 Ill. App.3d 867, 869-870, 677 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (2d Dist. 1997) (foreign judgments are subject to a seven year statute of limitations under the Foreign Judgments Act).
Section 18-12 provides that:
(a) Every claim against the estate of a decedent, except expenses of administration and surviving spouse's or child's award, is barred as to all of the decedent's estate if:
(1) Notice is given to the claimant as provided in Section 18-3 and the claimant does not file a claim with the representative or the court on or before the date stated in the notice; or
(2) Notice of disallowance is given to the claimant as provided in Section 18-11 and the claimant does not file a claim with the court on or before the date stated in the notice; or
(3) The claimant or the claimant's address is not known to or reasonably ascertainable by the representative and the claimant does not file a claim with the representative or the court on or before the date stated in the published notice as provided in Section 18-3.
(b) Unless sooner barred under subsection (a) of this Section, all claims which could have been barred under this Section are, in any event, barred 2 years after decedent's death, whether or not letters of office are issued upon the estate of the decedent. . . .
According to Mr. McMurray's estate and Harris, nonprobate assets contained in a decedent's trust are claims "which could have been barred" under § 18-12(b). When Mr. McMurray's estate and Harris were before Magistrate Judge Rosemond, they did not cite to any authority in support of this reading of the statute. They have elected not to provide this court with any authority as well, instead contending that the point is so obvious that no court has needed to address it until now.
Magistrate Judge Rosemond, however, found that the plain language of § 18-12 limited it to claims against a decedent's estate. Specifically, he noted that § 18-12(b) expressly refers back to § 18-12(a) (which covers claims "against the estate of a decedent"), so that the words "all claims which could have been barred under this Section are, in any event, barred 2 years after decedent's death" by definition could only apply to claims directed at Mr. McMurray's estate.
Mr. McMurray's estate and Harris' wholly unsupported assertion that Lloyds' claim is against Mr. McMurray individually, as opposed to against the trust, does not provide the court with any reason to reject Magistrate Judge Rosemond's reading of § 18-12's plain language. The essence of this argument appears to be that, if the assets at issue are Mr. McMurray's, the two year period applies, and if the assets are not Mr. McMurray's, they cannot be used to pay his debts and thus are shielded from discovery. But this is not what § 18-12 says. That section simply provides that a two year limitations period applied to claims "against the estate of a decedent." And it is undisputed that the trust is not "the estate of a decedent." Thus, Lloyds is entitled to the requested discovery even though it sought this discovery more than two years after Mr. McMurray's death.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the objections filed by Mr. McMurray and Harris [37-1] are overruled. The clerk is directed to enter a Rule 58 judgment and to terminate this action.