When applying the intermediate standard of review in Johnson, supra, we concluded that the North Dakota automobile guest statute was unconstitutional because it created an arbitrary distinction between paying and nonpaying guests which was not justified by the underlying purposes of the statute. Shortly after our decision in Johnson, supra, we were again faced with an equal protection question in Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1974). When analyzing the equal protection claim, we refrained from applying the intermediate standard of review adopted in Johnson, supra, and, instead, applied the lower rational basis test.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized the three standards of review in determining whether a statute is valid under the state constitution. See e.g., Snyder's Drug St., Inc. v. North Dakota St. Bd. of Ph., 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1974) (applying rational basis standard); Johnson v. Hasset, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974) (employing intermediate standard); State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1977) (applying strict scrutiny). It is clear, however, that although essentially the same three standards are employed under the Federal Constitution and the state constitution, they may be employed under different circumstances so that a state statute may meet federal standards but fail under a state constitutional analysis.
Reform may take one step at a time. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D. 1974); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749, 760 (N.D. 1966). "[A] court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies." Signal Oil Gas Co. v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75, 83 (N.D. 1973). "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification."
See North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 407, 38 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), reversing 202 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1972). See also, Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1974) (on remand). We are guided by the maxim that "[w]hen the reason of a rule ceases so should the rule itself."
The Commissioner "may have conceived of" that or other good purposes, "and that is a sufficient basis for sustaining" the Commissioner's action. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 151 (N.D. 1974). Considering NL's arguments in light of the foregoing tenets of construction, we are not persuaded that NL has shown that the Commissioner's method of treating NL's negative United States source income violated NL's right to equal protection. Affirmed.
See Schaefer v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1990) ("Assuming for purposes of argument that the Bureau's expectations are indicative of the Legislature's intent in enacting the amendment, they are not necessarily controlling.") (citations omitted); Metric Construction, Inc. v. Great Plains Properties, 344 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D. 1984) ("The legislative history provides little insight. It mostly consists of sponsor testimony or citizen testimony preserved in the form of sparse committee notes."); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 147 (N.D. 1974) ("It is our view that we cannot accept Senator Sinner's statement of the objective of the amendment . . ., as encompassing all of the objectives of the amendment, or any of the objectives of the amendment, for that matter."). See also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 48.10 ("Statements of committee members or interested parties are not admissible."), 48.13 ("The statements of individual legislators, however, can be given effect if they are consistent with statutory language and other legislative history which justifies reliance upon them as evidence of legislative intent.") (5th ed. 1992 revision).
Assuming for purposes of argument that the Bureau's expectations are indicative of the Legislature's intent in enacting the amendment [ compare 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. §§ 48.10, 48.12, and 48.15 (4th ed. 1984)], they are not necessarily controlling. See Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 147 (N.D. 1974). We have said that when a statute is clear and unambiguous it is improper for courts to attempt to go behind the express terms of the provision so as to legislate that which the words of the statute do not themselves provide.
Stated otherwise, we sustain a statute if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530, 79 S.Ct. 437, 442, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dak. St. Bd. of Pharm., 219 N.W.2d 140, 149 (N.D. 1974). The United States Supreme Court has treated Sunday closing laws as social and economic legislation to be upheld on a demonstration of a rational basis.
We disagree. In Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D. 1974), this court expressed the "view that most corrective legislation necessitates a Grandfather Clause" and held in Syllabus ¶ 4 that the "[m]ere existence of a Grandfather Clause within a statute should not of itself make the statute unconstitutional." An evident purpose of § 25-1508(E) is to reduce the incidence of impulse purchases of alcoholic beverages by persons shopping for other goods. Preventive legislation need not "work a perfect cure. It is enough that the questioned Act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least make the evil less.
We concluded that the classification inherent in sections 47-10-21 and 47-10-22, N.D.C.C., was unreasonable and the resulting discrimination invidious, and therefore the statutes were unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection. If we were to apply the rational basis standard what we said in Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D. 1974), would be pertinent: "`It is also well established that a classification although discriminatory is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Cites omitted.] Furthermore, a court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the policy is one within the power of the legislature to pursue, and so long as the classification bears a reasonable relation to those reasons, motives, or policies.' Signal Oil and Gas Company v. Williams County, 206 N.W.2d 75 at 83 (N.D. 1973)."