Opinion
22A-PC-1539
12-05-2022
George Snyder, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorneys for Appellant Amy E. Karozos Katherine A. Newman Laura L. Volk Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian A. McLean Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Clay Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 11D01-1908-PC-695 The Honorable Sarah Mullican, Special Judge
Attorneys for Appellant Amy E. Karozos Katherine A. Newman Laura L. Volk Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian A. McLean Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RILEY, JUDGE 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, George Snyder (Snyder), appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶3] Snyder presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether Snyder entered his guilty plea with knowledge of his Boykin rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] On June 19, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Snyder with Level 4 felony child molesting. The trial court conducted an initial hearing on June 21, 2018. Snyder appeared with his appointed counsel, and he submitted a signed acknowledgment of rights form which implied that, by pleading guilty, he was knowingly and freely waiving his constitutional and statutory rights to: (1) a public and speedy trial by jury; (2) confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; (3) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and (4) require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he would not be compelled to testify against himself. Snyder then pleaded not guilty to the charged offense.
[¶5] On January 28, 2019, Snyder signed a guilty plea and sentencing recommendation agreement. The agreement provided that Snyder would plead guilty to Level 4 felony child molesting and that his sentence would be capped 2 at eight years. Paragraph 5 of the plea agreement provided that Snyder had admitted the allegations in the Information as true, and had waived his constitutional rights (also known as Boykin rights)-the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers. Snyder wrote his initials next to the listed constitutional rights in paragraph 5 and he signed at the bottom of the agreement. Snyder's defense attorney and the chief deputy prosecutor also signed the plea agreement.
[¶6] On February 13, 2019, the trial court conducted the guilty plea hearing. At the start of the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
[COURT]: On the second page purports to be your signature. Is that your signature?
[SNYDER]: Yes.
[COURT]: Right above that on paragraph 5 where you've initialed, sets forth your constitutional rights you have throughout these proceedings. You understand you give [sic] up your constitutional rights by pleading guilty here today?
[SNYDER]: Yes.(Trial Transcript Vol. II, p. 4). Next, the State questioned Snyder under oath to establish the factual basis for the crime of child molesting. After finding that a factual basis existed for the offense of child molesting, the trial court accepted Snyder's guilty plea. On March 27, 2019, the trial court conducted Snyder's 3 sentencing hearing and sentenced Snyder to eight years in the Department of Correction.
On May 1, 2019, Snyder filed a belated appeal which was later accepted. But on July 23, 2019, Snyder's appellate counsel moved to dismiss his appeal.
[¶7] Snyder filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR petition) on August 9, 2019, which he amended twice. His main argument was that the trial court failed to inform him of his Boykin rights, which would invalidate his guilty plea. During Snyder's post-conviction court hearing on January 24, 2022, the court took judicial notice of the record from his prior trial proceedings, which included the acknowledgment of rights form, his plea agreement, and the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. At the close of the hearing, the post-conviction court directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Ultimately, Snyder's PCR petition was denied on June 1, 2022, with the post-conviction court determining, in part, that:
22. At the initial hearing in this matter, [Snyder]was advised of his constitutional rights and executed an acknowledgment of rights form and filed the same with the [c]ourt on June 21, 2018. The form outlined [Snyder's] various rights including those required by Boykin.
23. The plea agreement in this matter was signed by [Snyder] and filed with the [c]ourt on November 18, 2021[,] and specifically recited the Boykin rights in paragraph five (5). The plea agreement not only contains [Snyder's] signature, but also4
includes his initials next to each of the Boykin rights which signifies his understanding of the waiver of such rights.
24. The [t]rial [c]ourt addressed [Snyder's] understanding of his Boykin rights during the guilty plea hearing specifically referring to the relevant paragraph in the signed agreement. During the hearing, the [c]ourt asked [Snyder], "You understand that you give [sic] up your constitutional rights by pleading guilty here today?" In response to the [c]ourt's questions, [Snyder] replied, "Yes." The [c]ourt further asked [Snyder] if any promises had been made to him which were not made part of written plea agreement, if he was under medication or receiving psychiatric treatment which would affect his judgment, if this was a voluntary plea, and if he had questions about the charges pending against him.
25. While this [c]ourt finds that the trial court did not explicitly advise [Snyder] of his Boykin rights in open court, [Snyder] is not entitled to reversal of his conviction in this matter. Because [Snyder] signed an acknowledgement of rights form at the initial hearing, entered into a plea agreement with the assistance of counsel, signed and initialed his plea agreement expressly affirming that he understood his Boykin rights and acknowledged that he was waiving those rights in open court, the [c]ourt finds that [Snyder's] guilty plea was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. After reviewing all of the evidence submitted to the [c]ourt in the post-conviction relief hearing, the [c]ourt finds [Snyder] has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief.(Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 90-91).
[¶8] Snyder now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 5
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
A. Standard of Review
We observe that post-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a "super-appeal" but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules. [Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)]. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner who appeals the denial of PCR faces a rigorous standard of review, as the reviewing court may consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the judgment of the post-conviction court. The appellate court must accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact and may reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous. If a PCR petitioner was denied relief, he or she must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion than that reached by the post-conviction court.Shepherd v. State, 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.
[¶9] We also note that the post-conviction court here entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, § 6. "A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error-that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Little v. State, 819 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (citation omitted), trans. denied. In this review, findings of fact are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but no regard is given to conclusions of law. Id. 6
B. Boykin Rights
[¶10] Snyder argues that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly or voluntary because he was not advised of his rights set forth in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.
[¶11] "In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. 2006) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243). In Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2014), our supreme court explained:
Boykin requires that a trial court accepting a guilty plea must be satisfied that an accused is aware of his right against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. The failure to advise a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights in accordance with Boykin prior to accepting a guilty plea will result in reversal of the conviction. Accordingly, a defendant who demonstrates that the trial court failed to properly give a Boykin advisement during the guilty plea hearing has met his threshold burden for obtaining post-conviction relief.(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once the defendant shows that the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving his Boykin rights by pleading guilty, "the burden shifts to the State to prove that the petitioner nonetheless knew that he was waiving such rights." Id. at 1273. Further, a "signed plea agreement reciting that the defendant waives the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses and the right against self-incrimination, is 7 an adequate advisement to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights." Spencer v. State, 634 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) (citing Von Hagel v. State, 568 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990), trans. denied). "The trial judge is not required personally to advise the defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving if those rights are recited in the plea agreement." Moriarty v. State, 490 N.E.2d 1106, 1108 (Ind. 1986).
[¶12] Snyder claims that, based on the Ponce holding and the trial court's finding that he was not "explicitly advised" of the impact of his guilty plea to his Boykin rights during the guilty plea hearing, he "met his threshold burden for obtaining post-conviction relief." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 100) (Appellant's Br. p. 13). We disagree. While the post-conviction court found that Snyder had not been specifically advised of his Boykin rights during the plea hearing, trial courts are not required to personally advise a defendant of the constitutional rights they are waiving if those rights are recited in the plea agreement. See Moriarty, 490 N.E.2d at 1108. As we will discuss below, the Boykin rights were set out in his plea agreement, and the trial court was not required to advise Snyder of them.
[¶13] Turning to the record, our review reveals that before pleading guilty, and prior to his initial hearing, Snyder was presented with an acknowledgment of rights form which stipulated that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be knowingly and freely waiving his constitutional rights to: (1) a speedy and public trial by jury; (2) confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; (3) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and (4) require the State to prove 8 his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he would not be compelled to testify against himself. Then at his initial hearing, a signed copy of acknowledgment of rights form was submitted to the court, and a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf. Snyder subsequently changed his not guilty plea to a guilty plea, and he signed a plea agreement. When he signed the plea agreement, Snyder had counsel representing him. At his guilty plea hearing, Snyder appeared with his counsel, and the trial court questioned him about his plea. Snyder affirmed that he was the one that signed the plea agreement and that he was fully aware of the repercussions of giving up his constitutional rights (which included the Boykin rights) in paragraph 5. Furthermore, Snyder affirmed that his guilty plea stemmed from his own free will and was not influenced by alcohol or drugs of any kind. At the close of the hearing, the trial court determined that Snyder had knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty with knowledge of his Boykin rights.
[¶14] Even assuming that Snyder is correct that the trial court did not make an adequate independent determination that his plea was made without knowledge of his Boykin rights, we disagree with Snyder that his plea must be vacated. Snyder presented no evidence, nor did he testify to prove that he was unaware of the constitutional rights he was waiving when he signed the plea agreement. As our supreme court has held, a "petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 472. 9
[¶15] Based on the above, we conclude that Snyder's contention that the trial court's alleged failure to notify him of his Boykin rights rendered his guilty plea involuntary lacks merit. See Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 170-171 (Ind. 2001) (applying the "rigorous" post-conviction relief standard of review, our supreme court affirmed the post-conviction court's decision that Dewitt knew he was waiving Boykin rights when he pleaded guilty to a burglary charge and held that "we cannot conclude that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court").
CONCLUSION
[¶16] Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the evidence, as a whole, leads unmistakably to a decision opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court.
[¶17] Affirmed.
[¶18] Bailey, J. and Vaidik, J. concur 10