It is well settled in our jurisprudence that Section 5 of Act No. 29 of 1924 is an exceptional instance where a suspensive appeal is not allowed but it has reference to interlocutory decrees pertaining to temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions but cannot be extended to apply to a suspensive appeal prosecuted expressly from a final decree of the court dismissing the plaintiff's suit and finally rejecting the plaintiff's demands upon the merits. Young et al. v. Village of Bossier City, 152 La. 18, 92 So. 719; Snowden v. Red River Bayou Des Glaises Levee Drainage Dist., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389; Everett, Commissioner v. Hue Aarnes, 173 La. 420, 137 So. 201; American Bakeries Co. v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 185 La. 959, 171 So. 90; Brock, Com'r, v. Stassi, 189 La. 88, 179 So. 44; Brock et al. v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 198 La. 787, 4 So.2d 829. The fact that the suspensive appeal in this case would not have the legal effect of suspending any action taken by the district judge for the reason that the plaintiffs' demands were rejected in toto is not a legal reason for denying them a suspensive appeal as a matter of right. This was pointed out in the case of Snowden v. Red River Bayou Des Glaises Levee Drainage Dist., supra [ 172 La. 447, 134 So. 391], where the Court said:

Moreover, this result is completely consistent with well-established purpose of the TRO; an order that by its terms is temporary. "A restraining order is intended to se[r]ve only a temporarypurpose, namely, to maintain the status quo until, after a hearing, the judge determines whether the preliminary injunction, prayed for, should be granted." Snowden v. Red River and Bayou des Glaises Levee and Drainage Dist., 134 So. 389, 390 (La. 1931) (emphasis added). Kreppein's citation to Davis v. Davis, 420 So.2d 432 (La. 1982) in support of the purpose of the injunction issued in connection with the separation of the spouses pending the partition of community property is misplaced.

It does not determine any controverted right but issues as a preventive to a threatened wrong, an obvious perpetration of injury, the prevention of a material lessening in the value of a thing or its total loss, and by such restraint to protect the rights of all parties involved until the issues and equities can be resolved in proper subsequent proceedings. Snowden v. Red River and Bayou Des Glaises Levee and Drainage Dist., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389. Unquestionably, a trial judge enjoys the power and authority, upon a proper showing, to dissolve a temporary restraining order improvidently issued.

"No appeal shall be allowed from any order granting, continuing, refusing or dissolving a restraining order; but where upon a hearing, a preliminary writ of injunction shall have been granted, continued, refused or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve an injunction shall have been refused by such order or decree, a devolutive, but not a suspensive appeal, may be taken as a matter of right from such interlocutory order or decree; * * *." In Snowden v. Red River Bayou des Glaises Levee, etc., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389, 390, in speaking of temporary restraining orders, we said: "That such an order is intended to serve only a temporary purpose appears, not only from the fact that in the very law that provides for its issuance it is designated a `temporary restraining order,' but also from the fact that it expires within such time after entry as the court may fix, which must not exceed ten days, unless within the time so fixed the order is extended for a like period for good cause shown.

" To the same effect was the decision in the case of Snowden et al. v. Red River Bayou Des Glaises Levee Drainage District et al., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389, 391. The plaintiffs in that case sued to enjoin the levee and drainage district and the tax collector from collecting certain levee taxes, on the ground that the tax was invalid.

In this case the relators seek to set aside an order, granting a suspensive appeal from a judgment rendered. The case involves the same issues as those presented on the motion to dismiss in the case of Mrs. George G. Snowden et al. v. Red River Bayou Des Glaises Levee Drainage District et al., ante, p. 447, 134 So. 389, this day decided. For the reasons assigned in that case, the order under review is affirmed.

Had the TRO still been in effect on that date, a suspension of such would have nonetheless been improper. As the Supreme Court stated in Snowden v. Red River and Bayou des Glaises Levee and Drainage Dist., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389 (La. 1931), cert. dismissed, 284 U.S. 592, 52 S.Ct. 198, 76 L.Ed. 510: "The restraining order, however, ceased to operate, if it had not already ceased to be effective, pretermitting its dissolution by the trial judge, when he refused to grant the injunction. The order had then served its purpose.

" (Emphasis provided.) See also Ducros v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 200 La. 766, 8 So.2d 694 (1942); Austin v. Currie, 16 La.App. 375, 134 So. 723 (2 Cir. 1931); Albert Pick Co. v. Stringer, 171 La. 131, 129 So. 731 (La. 1930); Lyons v. Campbell, 216 So.2d 895 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1968), per Judge (now Justice) Dixon concurring; Snowden v. Red River and Bayou Glaises Levee and Drainage District, 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389 (1931), certiorari dismissed, 284 U.S. 592, 52 S.Ct. 198, 76 L.Ed. 510 (1931). In the action before us, the trial court signed an order on November 4, 1980, directing the issuance of the TRO requested by petitioners conditioned upon their furnishing bond.

CCP Art. 3612 states in part: "There shall be no appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order." A judgment such as the one rendered by the trial court in this case is covered by this article and as such is not appealable. Snowden v. Red River and Bayou Des Glaises Levee and Drainage Dist., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389 (Supreme Court 1932); Shingledecker v. Spencer, 157 So.2d 622 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963); Woods v. Woods, 128 So.2d 74 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961). The Union is also claiming damage from the issuance of this restraining order.

" The following cases sustain relator's contentions herein: State ex. rel. Ingram v. Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 20 La. Ann. 529; State ex. rel. Cain v. Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 574; State ex rel. Geddes v. Judge of Civil District Court for the Parish or Orleans, 36 La. Ann. 301; Snowden et al. v. Red River Bayou Des Glaises. Levee Drainage District et al., 172 La. 447, 134 So. 389; Ramos v. Ramos, 173 La. 407, 137 So. 196; Agricultural Supply Co., Inc., v. Livigne et al., 177 La. 15, 147 So. 365; Interstate Tax Bureau, Inc., et al. v. Conway, 180 La. 453, 156 So. 463; Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., Inc., v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 185 La. 729, 170 So. 548. It seems clear to us that relator is entitled to the relief he seeks. It is, therefore, ordered that the writ of mandamus herein issued be made peremptory and that the respondent judge do allow plaintiff a suspensive appeal from the judgment aforesaid and fix the amount of bond for such appeal.