Opinion
C. A. 1:23-2150-TMC-SVH
02-22-2024
Darrell Snow, Plaintiff, v. Ron Lawrenz, Facility Administrator; Dr. Michelle Dube, Clinical Director; Lisa Young, Security Major; and Eric Ramos, Chief of Security, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Darrell Snow (“Plaintiff”), who has been involuntarily committed to a treatment facility operated by Wellpath Recovery Solutions (“Wellpath”) under contract with the South Carolina Department of Mental Health, filed this case against Ron Lawrenz (“Lawrenz”), Dr. Michelle Dube, Lisa Young, and Eric Ramos (collectively “Defendants”), concerning his conditions of confinement and alleged due process violations. [See ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff's complaint was served on Defendants on June 26, 2023 [ECF No. 12], and Plaintiff requested entry of default as to Defendants on September 28, 2023 [ECF No. 13].
Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaint on January 19, 2024, and requested the court deny Plaintiff's request for entry of default on the following business day. [ECF Nos. 14, 22, see also ECF No 23]. Also pending before the court is Plaintiff's motion to stay or amend the scheduling order and motion for declaratory judgment. [ECF Nos. 20, 21].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), this case was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motions and recommends the district court deny Plaintiff's request for entry of default, allowing this case to proceed on the merits.
I. Procedural Background
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff served Defendants with the appropriate complaint and summons on June 26, 2023, and that Defendants failed to timely answer or otherwise respond. Defendants have provided affidavit evidence from Lawrenz, the facility administrator for Wellpath at the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program, as follows:
On the same day that we were served with Plaintiff's complaint in the above captioned case, my secretary sent Plaintiff's complaint to Wellpath's corporate counsel so that it could be legally handled by Wellpath's corporate counsel. For reasons as yet unclear, corporate counsel appears to have mislaid or misdirected Plaintiffs complaint and inadvertently failed to take further action with respect to it until this default became known to Defendants on January 19, 2024.[ECF No. 19 ¶ 4].
II. Discussion
“Even where default has not been formally entered, a defendant must petition the Court for relief from default if the defendant has failed to answer or otherwise respond within the prescribed time limit.” Glenn v. Commc'n Workers of Am., C/A No. 8:04-23071-GRA-BHH, 2007 WL 2022186, at *3 (D.S.C. July 11, 2007).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c), an entry of default may be set aside for “good cause.” Rule 55(c) must be “liberally construed in order to provide relief from the onerous consequences of defaults and default judgments.” Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). “Traditionally, . . . relief from a judgment of default should be granted where the defaulting party acts with reasonable diligence in seeking to set aside the default and tenders a meritorious defense.” United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982); see Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969) (“[a]ny doubts about whether relief should be granted should be resolved in favor of setting aside the default so that the case may be heard on the merits”).
The Fourth Circuit has outlined the following six factors that district courts may examine in deciding whether to grant relief from default for good cause shown: (1) whether the moving party has a meritorious defense, (2) whether it acts with reasonable promptness, (3) the personal responsibility of the defaulting party, (4) the prejudice to the party, (5) whether there is a history of dilatory action, and (6) the availability of sanctions less drastic. Payne ex rel Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204-05 (4th Cir. 2006).
First, Defendants appear to have a potentially meritorious defense to Plaintiff's complaint, in that Defendants have submitted evidence as follows:
Defendants followed the policies and procedures of the Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program with respect to Plaintiff's behavioral management committee hearing and any associated sanctions, and with respect to Plaintiff's placement on the secure management unit-these policies and procedures provide appropriate notice and hearing and other due process safeguards.
Defendants followed the policies and procedures of the Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program with respect to the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement on the secure management unit-these policies and procedures ensure regular and thorough cleaning of rooms on the secure management unit, maintenance of appropriate temperature, provision of clothing and bedding, and appropriate opportunities for personal hygiene and recreation.
Plaintiff continued to receive psychological care while segregated within the secure management unit, and Plaintiff was not denied medical care for any objectively serious medical condition- neither were Defendants deliberately indifferent to any of his serious medical needs.[ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 5-7, see also ECF No. 14 (Defendants' answer to Plaintiff's complaint)]. “[A]ll that is necessary to establish the existence of a ‘meritorious defense' is a presentation or proffer of evidence, which if believed, would permit either the Court or the jury to find for the defaulting party.” Moradi, 673 F.2d at 727. Although Plaintiff characterizes the above evidence as “only make[ing] a general denial of the claim” [ECF No. 21 at 2], the undersigned disagrees and finds this factor weighs in Defendants' favor.
As to the reasonable promptness factor, Defendants argue they “learned they were in default on Friday, January 19, 2024, and they answered Plaintiff's complaint on the same day,” and filed a response to Plaintiff's request for entry of default on the following business day, thus acting with reasonable promptness. [ECF No. 17 at 3]. It appears this factor weighs in favor of Defendants. See Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 418 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding no error in the district court's finding that “Hoover Universal acted with the requisite promptness and diligence in seeking to set aside the entry of default when it acted nine days after its counsel learned of the existence of the case”)); see also Moradi, 673 F.2d at 728 (“It is beyond cavil that there was no delay here once the default was discovered. Instead, counsel immediately filed for relief.”); LM Gen. Ins. v. Frederick, C/A No. 4:18-01264-RBH, 2019 WL 689570, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2019) (“Frederick's counsel has indicated that he filed the motion to set aside the default two days after discovering the default. Regardless, approximately only a month passed between the entry of default and the motion to set aside. The Court finds that Frederick acted with reasonable promptness in moving to set aside the default.”); Ashmore v. Melvin, C/A No. 8:16-01045-JMC, 2016 WL 3610609, at *2 (D.S.C. July 6, 2016) (“Although Defendants failed to timely file a response to Plaintiff's Complaint, they did promptly respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment.”).
Regarding the third factor, the court must determine whether the party or its counsel bears the responsibility for the delay at issue. Here, there is no indication that Defendants bear the responsibility for the delay at issue, and as noted by Defendants, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held the “personal responsibility” factor under Payne does not weigh against a defendant where the default occurs due to an error made by an attorney or some other agent of the defendant rather than the defendant himself. See, e.g., Lolatchy, 816 F.2d at 952 (vacating default where the attorneys rather than defendants were at fault); see also Colleton, 616 F.3d at 420 (overturning district court's decision to treat actions of non-attorney agents of corporation as “personal responsibility” of the corporation for purposes of default)).
Additionally, the remaining factors favor Defendants except, perhaps, prejudice. Prejudice is not shown either by the fact that a plaintiff must try the case on the merits, or the fact that a plaintiff's possible recovery would be delayed. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding no prejudice to plaintiff “beyond that suffered by any party which loses a quick victory”). Plaintiff argues, however, that he is prejudiced in that certain witnesses are no longer employed by Wellpath and “video footage [has been lost/destroyed] of when the gas powered air compressor was in the unit without proper air ventilation.” [ECF No. 21 at 3].
To the extent this factor favors Plaintiff, it is the only one. Given “the strong policy that cases be decided on their merits,” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993), the court finds that the delay in this case is tolerable.
Plaintiff's two pending motions, to stay or amend the scheduling order and for declaratory judgment [ECF Nos. 20, 21], are denied without prejudice where both are solely premised are on Plaintiff's request for entry of default.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned denies without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to stay or amend the scheduling order and for declaratory judgment [ECF Nos. 20, 21] and recommends the district judge deny Plaintiff's request for entry of default. [ECF No. 13].
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).