Opinion
C/A 3:22-1794-SAL-PJG
09-06-2022
Rebecca Snow, Plaintiff, v. Genesis Eldercare Rehabilitation Services, LLC, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The plaintiff, Rebecca Snow, formerly Brunson, filed this discrimination case against her former employer, Genesis Eldercare Rehabilitation Services, LLC (“Genesis”). She alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.; as well as state law claims. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendant's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. (ECF No. 7.) At issue is whether Snow agreed to arbitrate her claims by e-signing an arbitration clause in 2019 through the company's electronic document management system. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 9) to the defendant's motion and the defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 11). Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendant's motion should be granted.
The Plaintiff married in 2017 and changed her surname to Snow. (Snow Aff. ¶ 17, ECF No. 9-1 at 3.)
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Compel Arbitration Standard
In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court employs the summary judgment standard. Rowland v. Sandy Morris Fin. & Est. Plan. Servs., LLC, 993 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2021); Shaffer v. ACS Gov't Servs., Inc., 321 F.Supp.2d 682, 684 (D. Md. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Arbitration Generally
A litigant can compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq., if the litigant can demonstrate: “(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties; (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute; (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce; and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the [party] to arbitrate the dispute.” Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002)). The FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The policy behind the FAA “was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Thus, courts are to afford a “healthy regard” for the federal policy favoring arbitration, id. at 26, and arbitration agreements are to be “rigorously enforced,” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). Doubts regarding the scope of issues covered by an arbitration agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
When a question of arbitrability arises, the district court, not the arbitrator, decides whether a matter should be resolved through arbitration. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299-301 (2010); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-44 (1995); AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986). This determination, however, is limited to a two-step inquiry: (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; and (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of the arbitration agreement. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Chorley Enters., Inc. v. Dickey's Barbeque Rests., Inc., 807 F.3d 553, 563 (4th Cir. 2015). Arbitration is compelled “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration [agreement] is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
C. Defendant's Motion
Applying the required two-step inquiry, the court concludes that this case must be dismissed. There is no dispute here as to whether the claims fall within the substantive scope of the arbitration agreement; rather, the plaintiff disputes only the first prong of the Hooters test.Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a question of state contract law. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944; see also Chorley Enters., Inc., 807 F.3d at 563. A valid contract in South Carolina requires an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration. Hardaway Concrete Co., Inc. v. Hall Contracting Corp. 647 S.E.2d 488, 492 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007.) An enforceable contract requires “a meeting of the minds between the parties with regard to all essential and material terms of the contract.” Player v. Chandler, 382 S.E.2d 891, 893 (S.C. 1989).
Similarly, only the second element of the American General test to compel arbitration under the FAA is in dispute. See Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 87.
Here, the defendant has established that Snow (1) agreed to an e-signature contract when she commenced her employment in 2015, and (2) electronically signed the arbitration agreement in 2019, manifesting her assent. In support of its motion, the defendant presents the relevant documents as stored in its GenServ personnel record software. The following images depict the e-signature blocks from both agreements:
(Image Omitted) (E-Signature Agreement, ECF No. 7-2 at 1.)
(Image Omitted) (Arbitration Agreement at 3, ECF No. 7-3 at 3.) Further, no dispute exists that the arbitration agreement, if signed, was supported by consideration. The court must therefore compel arbitration.
Snow's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, she argues that she did not sign the arbitration agreement. But on this record no reasonable jury could find otherwise. Regardless of the lack of a “wet” or “ink” signature, the defendant has carried its burden to show that Snow agreed to e-sign and did so. Second, Snow presents an affidavit averring that she does not recall signing the arbitration agreement. But a lack of recollection alone is insufficient to reasonably call into question the validity of the document. See Gordon v. TBC Retail Grp., Inc., C/A No. 2:14-cv-03365-DCN, 2016 WL 4247738, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2016) (“[A] signatory's inability to remember signing an agreement, or other surrounding facts, is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact as to the authenticity of the signature.”); Gadberry v. Rental Serv. Corp., C/A No. 0:09-3327-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 767034 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2011) (adopting Report & Recommendation and finding plaintiff's argument that an agreement did not exist because he did not recall signing the contract was not supported by affirmative evidence). Finally, Snow questions the validity of her e-signature, presenting a document which she accessed from the defendant's OnTrack software. This document is e-signed with her married surname-Snow- but is dated from before she married. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-2 at 5 of 76.) The implication is apparently that someone else “signed” it for her after the fact. However, the defendant explains the name discrepancy, (see Reply at 10, ECF No. 11 at 10) (discussing Eagen's supplemental declaration explaining that the OnTrack system updates to incorporate subsequently obtained employee data such as a name change, but the GenServ system does not), and no evidence in the record refutes this explanation. In any event, undisputed evidence shows that Snow's unique employee identification number appears on the arbitration agreement. Again, it is not disputed that the inclusion of the employee identification number in the signature block can only be triggered by Snow's login with a password that she herself sets. (Eagen Decl. ¶¶ 713, 17-18, 25, ECF No. 7-1 at 2-3, 4, 5; E-Signature Agreement, ECF No. 7-2 at 1; Arbitration Agreement at 3, ECF No. 7-3 at 3.)
RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff has not identified any genuine issue of material fact as to whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. See Chorley Enters., Inc., 807 F.3d at 563. The court therefore recommends that the defendant's motion (ECF No. 7) be granted and that this action be dismissed so that parties may arbitrate their dispute.
Because all of Snow's claim fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, this case should be dismissed rather than stayed. See Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001).
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).