Opinion
24A-CT-689
11-15-2024
Bill Snider, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Indiana Department of Corrections, Robert E. Carter, Jr., Commissioner Appellees-Respondents
APPELLANT PRO-SE Bill Snider New Castle, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court The Honorable Thomas J. Alevizos, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-1810-CT-1838
APPELLANT PRO-SE Bill Snider New Castle, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bradford and Foley concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Bill Snider, pro-se, filed an amended complaint against the Department of Correction ("DOC") and DOC Commissioner Robert E. Carter, Jr., individually (collectively, "Defendants"). Snider alleged that he had suffered personal injuries because Defendants permitted contractor Aramark Correctional Services, LLC ("Aramark") to serve unhealthy food. He alleged that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was not provided with an appropriate diet for a diabetic; he further alleged that Defendants had acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, in his prayer for relief, Snider requested an order for injunctive relief which would prohibit, among other things, more than twelve-hour lapses in food service for diabetics. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and, in his response to Defendants' motion, Snider withdrew his claim under the federal constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants and denied any pending motions as moot. Snider now appeals the grant of summary judgment, presenting a single, consolidated issue: whether the trial court improvidently granted summary judgment on Snider's negligence claim. We affirm.
Snider also articulates an issue concerning the trial court's alleged failure to rule upon his motion for preliminary injunctive relief. However, the trial court denied all pending motions.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Snider has been incarcerated in the DOC since 2004. In January of 2018, Snider was diagnosed with periodontal disease. On April 6, 2018, he was diagnosed with type-two diabetes. Snider eventually had all of his teeth pulled and was fitted with dentures.
[¶3] On October 24, 2018, Snider filed his complaint alleging that Defendants' negligent failure to provide him with an appropriate diet had caused the diagnosed health conditions. On April 27, 2021, Snider filed his amended complaint alleging negligence and violations of the Eighth Amendment.
[¶4] On November 10, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Snider's claims were barred under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-1, et seq., ("ITCA"). Snider filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On February 26, 2024, the trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied any other pending motions as moot. Snider now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We construe the evidence in favor of the nonmovant and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted).
[¶6] The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to establish its entitlement to summary judgment. Id. at 396-97. Only then does the burden fall upon the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 397 (quotation omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied. A grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015).
[¶7] Snider's claim against Defendants is one of negligence. To recover upon a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach. Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence. Kramer, 32 N.E.3d at 231. However, summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate if the moving party negates at least one element of the negligence claim. American Legion Pioneer Post No. 340 v. Christon, 712 N.E.2d 532 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). A grant of summary judgment may be affirmed upon any theory supported by the designated materials. Bernstein v. Glavin, 725 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied.
[¶8] Snider's amended complaint alleges that, for many years, Snider has been served a high-glycemic inmate diet with negative consequences for his health. The designated materials reveal that Aramark has, since 2005, been responsible for the planning, preparation, and service of inmate meals at the facility where Snider is incarcerated. Aramark employs dieticians and nutritionists for menu planning; Aramark has been routinely audited by the DOC and found to be compliant with its contractual obligations.
[¶9] "The ITCA grants immunity 'when the alleged basis of governmental entity liability is the act or omission of a third person.'" S.E. by Next Friend Glaser v. City of Carmel, 198 N.E.3d 1209, 1213 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (citing Hinshaw v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jay Cnty., 611 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 1993).)
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from the
following: ... [t]he act or omission of anyone other than the governmental entity or the governmental entity's employee.Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(10). Immunity assumes negligence but denies liability. Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003). "The purpose of immunity is to ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶10] The acts or omissions of which Snider complains were not committed by the Defendants, but Aramark; therefore, the Defendants enjoy immunity under the ITCA. They are entitled to summary judgment.
Conclusion
[¶11] The trial court did not improvidently grant summary judgment on Snider's negligence claim.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.