The plaintiff appeals. While a possessor of real property has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241), there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059; Boyd v New York City Hous. Auth., 105 A.D.3d 542, 543; Cupo v Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the alleged defect was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d at 1059; Faulkner v Effective Sec. Sys., 230 A.D.2d 627, 628).

The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals. While a possessor of real property has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241), there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058; Cupo v Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the rope suspended between the planters was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d at 1059; LeComples v More Specialized Transp., Inc., 144 A.D.3d 757, 758; Lazic v Trump Vil.

"Landowners generally owe a duty of care to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition, and are liable for injuries caused by a breach of this duty" (Henry v Hamilton Equities, Inc., 34 N.Y.3d 136, 142; see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059). Where members of the public are invited onto the premises, the owner has "'a nondelegable duty to provide the public with a reasonably safe premises and a safe means of ingress and egress'" (Cox v 118 E. 60th Owners, Inc., 189 A.D.3d 1169, 1170, quoting Backiel v Citibank, 299 A.D.2d 504, 505; see Gallagher v St. Raymond's R. C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557; see also Bynum v Keber, 135 A.D.3d 1066, 1067).

The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals. While a possessor of real property has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241), there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058; Cupo v Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the rope suspended between the planters was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d at 1059; LeComples v More Specialized Transp., Inc., 144 A.D.3d 757, 758; Lazic v Trump Vil.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals. While the owner or possessor of real property may have a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241), "there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" (Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059; see Sebagh v Capital Fitness, Inc., 202 A.D.3d 853; Cupo v Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the concrete slab was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Gerner v Shop-Rite of Uniondale, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 1122, 1122-1123; Rivas-Chirino v Wildlife Conservation Socy., 64 A.D.3d 556, 557-558).

The scope of a landowner's duty extends to maintaining its property "in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk" ( Alonzo v. City of New York, 188 A.D.3d 1123, 1124, 134 N.Y.S.3d 429 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeJ.R. v. City of New York, 170 A.D.3d 1211, 1212, 96 N.Y.S.3d 686 ). Despite this basic duty, "there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" ( Sneed v. Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d at 1059, 145 N.Y.S.3d 86 ; seeMasker v. Smith, 188 A.D.3d 867, 868, 135 N.Y.S.3d 135 ). We agree with the Appellate Division, First Department, that a stationary escalator, without more, is not inherently dangerous (seeAdamo v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 71 A.D.3d 557, 558, 897 N.Y.S.2d 85 ; Schurr v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 307 A.D.2d 837, 838, 763 N.Y.S.2d 304 ; see alsoRoberts v. Old Navy, 134 A.D.3d 1088, 24 N.Y.S.3d 96 ; Jaikran v. Shoppers Jamaica, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 864, 867, 925 N.Y.S.2d 596 ).

A motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party" ( CPLR 3212[b] ; seeAlvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ). As relevant here, while the owner or possessor of real property may have a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (seeBasso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 ), "there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" ( Sneed v. Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 145 N.Y.S.3d 86 ; seeCupo v. Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52, 767 N.Y.S.2d 40 ). A condition is open and obvious if it is "readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident" ( Lazic v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 776, 777, 20 N.Y.S.3d 643 ).

The defendant made the following arguments. There is no duty to protect or warn against an open an obvious condition that is readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, and that is not inherently dangerous (Sneed v. Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059 [2nd Dept 2021]). The subject gate was not dangerous, defective, or inherently dangerous.

Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 776, 777). Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the rolled-up mat, which was known to the plaintiff prior to the accident, was open and obvious, and was not inherently dangerous (see Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058; Ramirez v Creative Linen House, Inc., 170 A.D.3d 913; Nannariello v Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 161 A.D.3d 1089; DeLorenzo v Bales, 129 A.D.3d 1013, 1014; Boyle v Pottery Barn Outlet, 117 A.D.3d 665). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

As relevant here, while the owner or possessor of real property may have a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241), "there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" (Sneed v Fulton Park Four Assoc., L.P., 192 A.D.3d 1058, 1059; see Cupo v Karfunkel, 1 A.D.3d 48, 52). A condition is open and obvious if it is "readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident" (Lazic v Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 776, 777).