The DOT failed to show that it had standing to contest the County's decisions made in prior years to issue the business license to Simmons and to permit Simmons' continued use of the property without a variance or rezoning. See Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 (2) ( 455 S.E.2d 834) (1995). Moreover, the authority the DOT offers is readily distinguishable.
The Foundation relies upon Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 (455 SE2d 834 ) (1995), for its assertion that a tenant has standing to challenge a zoning decision. Nothing in the opinion, however, establishes that the appellant in that case was a tenant of the property covered by the zoning ordinance at issue in that case.
Thus, by depriving Hill of standing to assert claims on behalf of the children, Hall's appointment deprived the Thomas County Superior Court of jurisdiction over any such claims brought by Hill. See Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding , 284 Ga. 369, 371, 667 S.E.2d 348 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff with standing is a prerequisite for the existence of subject matter jurisdiction."); Sherman v. Dev. Auth. of Fulton County , 324 Ga. App. 23, 23, 749 S.E.2d 29 (2013) (same); see also generally Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County , 265 Ga. 410, 411 (2), 455 S.E.2d 834 (1995) (a party can lose standing during the course of litigation); accord Peck v. Lanier Golf Club , 315 Ga. App. 176, 176, n. 2, 726 S.E.2d 442 (2012) ; McWhorter v. Greene , 221 Ga. App. 590, 591, 472 S.E.2d 135 (1996). We therefore reject Hill's claim in her supplemental brief that her lawsuit abated Hall's later-filed lawsuit under OCGA § 9-2-5 (a).
(Citation omitted.) Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 (1) ( 455 SE2d 834) (1995). Millwood argues that a contract was created when the Executive Director informed him that his submission had been approved by the jurists because all of the essential elements of a contract were laid out in the Call for Artists. The Art Factory contends that no valid contract was created because: (1) Millwood never entered into the written contract specified in the Call for Artists, and (2) Millwood's proposal did not comply with the request for "original" work and was therefore an acceptance that did not match the terms of the offer.
See Ga. Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 560-561 (1) ( 212 SE2d 628) (1975); see generally AT T Wireless PCS v. Leafmore Forest c., 235 Ga. App. 319, 320 (1) ( 509 SE2d 374) (1998); Clark's Valdosta, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, 224 Ga. 331 ( 161 SE2d 867) (1968); First Nat. Bank c. v. Harmon, 186 Ga. 847 (2) ( 199 SE 223) (1938). See Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348 ( 647 SE2d 6) (2007); see, e.g., Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410, 411 (2) ( 455 SE2d 834) (1995). See Lewis v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. 296 ( 553 SE2d 611) (2001).
That statement is not the law of the case because that decision reviewed the validity of an interlocutory injunction based on a preliminary evidentiary hearing and not the more complete record of the proceeding on the motion for partial summary judgment, during which additional evidence was presented. See Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 (1) ( 455 SE2d 834) (1995) (Grant or denial of interlocutory injunction, as well as the affirmance of it by an appellate court, does not establish the law of the case for the trial on the merits.); McGregor v. Town of Fort Oglethorpe, 236 Ga. 711, 713 ( 225 SE2d 238) (1976).
Any contrary holdings in Dillard I regarding the Adles' rights are not binding here, as Dillard I reviewed the validity of an interlocutory injunction that was based on a preliminary evidentiary hearing and not on the more complete record of a full-blown trial. See Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 (1) ( 455 SE2d 834) (1995) (because a trial court in an interlocutory injunction decision does not make a final determination of the issues, "the grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction, as well as the affirmance thereof by [an appellate court], does not establish the law of the case for the trial on the merits"). For example, Dillard I, supra at 508, n. 3, held that HVI marketed the property to the Adles, when in fact the Adles purchased their property from Monteagle in March 1984, months before HVI even existed.
Nor does there exist any known constitutional provision preventing a state from prescribing reasonable and appropriate causes of action, and precluding the chilling proliferation of unnecessary causes of action of a specific kind or class, so long as the basis of distinction is, as here, real and the limitation imposed has reasonable relation to a legitimate object (compare OCGA § 51-7-85). See State of Ga. v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 89 (1) ( 166 S.E.2d 19); compare Sneakers c. v.Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410, 411 (3) ( 455 S.E.2d 834). Moreover, proliferation of unnecessary causes of action for the alleged improper filing of law-suits would have a chilling effect on the exercise by citizens of their right of access to the courts.
See also Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701 (2) ( 449 S.E.2d 602) (1994). Cf. Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410 ( 455 S.E.2d 834) (1995). Because Smith retired prior to the adoption of either incentive program, the administration of the incentive programs did not affect his rights, which were determined at the time he retired.
As the Supreme Court of Georgia has pointed out "in granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, a trial court cannot make a final determination of the issues unless the interlocutory hearing is consolidated with the trial of the action on the permanent injunction as authorized by OCGA § 9-11-65(a)(2)." Sneakers of Cobb Cnty. v. Cobb Cnty., 265 Ga. 410, 410, 455 S.E.2d 834, 835 (1995) (citing Georgia Canoeing Assn. v. Henry, 263 Ga. 77, 428 S.E.2d 336 (1993)). "Thus, the grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction . . . does not establish the law of the case for the trial on the merits."