Snead v. Commonwealth

Full title: MARVIN L. SNEAD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia. Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

Date published: Oct 25, 1994

Record No. 0379-93-1 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1994)

Opinion

Record No. 0379-93-1

Decided: October 25, 1994

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON, John D. Gray, Judge

Affirmed.

Terry N. Grinnalds for appellant.

Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Bray

MEMORANDUM OPINION^_

_ Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.

JUDGE JERE M.H. WILLIS, JR.:

This case is controlled by our decision in Garland v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ 446 S.E.2d 628 (1994), wherein we said:

[L]arceny from the person embraces not only theft of property from physical contact with the victim, but also theft of property that is in the victim's possession and within his immediate custody and control.

Id. at ___, 446 S.E.2d at 630 (citation omitted).

The stolen envelope, containing cash, was tucked down between the side of the wheelchair and its seat belt near the victim's left thigh. It was in the victim's constructive possession and was within his immediate custody and control. Thus, the theft of that envelope constituted larceny from the person.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BENTON, J., concurring.

Because the envelope was beside the victim's thigh and securely inserted between his thigh and the belt used to lift him from his wheelchair, I agree that the evidence proved that Snead committed a larceny from the person. See Garland v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ ___, 446 S.E.2d 628, 632 (1994) (Benton, J., dissenting) (" 'from the person' necessarily contemplates removing property that actually touches or is attached to the person").