Opinion
No. 5-110 / 04-0113
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D. Ackerman, Judge.
Applicant-appellant, Larue Snake, appeals from the district court's denial and dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Craig Lane, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Jill R. Pitsenbarger, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Applicant-appellant, Larue Snake, appeals from the district court's denial and dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. He contends the ruling was not supported by and was contrary to the evidence and a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. We affirm.
Background facts and proceedings.
The appellant was charged in March 1995 with first-degree murder, willful injury, going armed with intent, assault causing serious injury while participating in a felony, first-degree robbery, and conspiracy. Following deposition of a witness the appellant thought would provide helpful testimony, defense counsel determined the testimony would likely be harmful and advised the appellant to consider a plea agreement. Counsel advised him his intoxication defense would be difficult to prove and, if convicted of first-degree murder, he would face a sentence of life in prison. If the intoxication defense were successful, it would reduce the murder offense to second-degree murder. The State offered to drop all the other charges if the appellant would plead guilty to second-degree murder.
The appellant signed the plea agreement just before the plea and sentencing proceeding in August 1995. It provided he would receive a fifty-year sentence. During the plea and sentencing colloquies with the court, the appellant acknowledged reading and understanding the trial information and minutes of testimony and that they accurately reflected what occurred. He acknowledged the terms of the plea agreement, that no one had made any promises to him not contained in the agreement, that no one had threatened him to cause him to enter into the agreement, and that he wanted to plead guilty. He knew the elements the State would have to prove at trial and the maximum penalty of no more than fifty years which was, "in fact, the penalty that will be imposed if [he] were to plead guilty." He admitted stabbing the victim, knowing it would cause him physical harm. He acknowledged having had a complete opportunity to discuss the entire matter with defense counsel, including the elements of the crime and any possible defenses, and that he was satisfied with defense counsel's services. He declined the court's invitation to ask questions or make any statements. The court accepted the guilty plea and imposed an indeterminate sentence not to exceed fifty years.
On July 30, 1997 the appellant sent defense counsel a request for the file and a copy of the transcript. In the letter, he also states,
It was understood by me that I would be out on Parole in five years pursuant to the Plea agreement by the State. However, I have learned from the institution administrators of the State of Iowa that I would be required to complete 10 to 12 years before I am released on parole.
On August 18, 1997 the appellant wrote to defense counsel again requesting the file and transcript and restating, "It is my understanding that I would be out on Parole in five years pursuant to the advice I received from you and the Plea agreement by the State." The only mention of any length of sentence in the plea agreement is a sentence of fifty years. There is no mention of parole.
In June 1998 the appellant filed an application for postconviction relief alleging numerous errors, including that defense counsel advised him he could be paroled in five years and could serve his sentence in Wisconsin, where his family lives. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court denied. The State filed a renewed motion for summary judgment eight months later, alleging the appellant's failure to file a direct appeal constituted waiver under Iowa Code section 822.8 (1999). The court granted the State's motion. The appellant appealed the summary judgment grant. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment except for the ineffective assistance claim relating to counsel's misrepresentation of the consequences of the guilty plea. Snake v. State, No. 99-1759 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug. 29, 2001). The court found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the appellant's ineffective assistance claim because his statement and defense counsel's statement contradicted each other. Id.
On May 6 and October 30, 2003, hearing on the appellant's remaining postconviction relief claim was held. The appellant testified defense counsel did not promise him he would be released on parole in five years. He also testified counsel told him there was no mandatory minimum and that he could spend between five and eight years in prison. Defense counsel also advised the appellant he had about an eighty-five percent chance of being convicted of first-degree murder and receiving a life sentence if he went to trial.
Defense counsel did not have any specific recollection of his discussions of the plea agreement with the appellant, but testified concerning his usual practice and that he would have followed his usual practice. He testified he recommended the plea because the best result he thought possible at trial would have been a successful intoxication defense, reducing the conviction to second-degree murder plus any convictions for the remaining felony charges, while the plea would achieve the same result without the risk of a conviction for first-degree murder or additional convictions for the other felony charges. Counsel remembered mentioning a possible transfer to Wisconsin, but told the appellant he would have to pursue it with prison officials.
The district court considered the conflicting evidence and found "no reason to think that [defense counsel] acted inappropriately. [His] advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Considering the evidence against the appellant, the court also found it likely he would have received a longer sentence had he insisted on going to trial. Therefore, the court reasoned, the appellant could not demonstrate prejudice because there was no reasonable probability the result would have been different if he had gone to trial instead of accepting the plea.
Scope and standards of review.
Postconviction proceedings are civil proceedings at law and our review ordinarily is for errors of law. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). Claims defense counsel was ineffective are reviewed de novo. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998). We give weight to the district court's credibility findings. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 141; Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g). A guilty plea waives all Sixth Amendment claims counsel was ineffective "except those that bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea." Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 2002).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must demonstrate both ineffective assistance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000). Both elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Iowa 2000). Both elements, however, do not always need to be addressed. If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699. Prejudice is established by proof "that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2003); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
Discussion.
In our discretion, we address the prejudice prong first. See State v. Nebinger, 412 N.W.2d 180, 192 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987). The appellant argues the length of time he would have to serve before parole and the opportunity to serve his sentence in Wisconsin near family "were clearly very important issues" to him. He contends he would have proceeded to trial "but for the assurances of his attorney regarding these issues. From our review of the record before us, we agree with defense counsel and the district court that the appellant very likely would have been convicted of first-degree murder had he not accepted the guilty plea. Even if we assume his intoxication defense would have succeeded, he still would have faced the remaining six felony charges in addition to a conviction for second-degree murder. The appellant has not shown, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty. See State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002). We find no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different, except, perhaps, to have been worse for the appellant. Consequently, the appellant has not met his burden to demonstrate prejudice and his ineffective assistance claim must fail. We affirm the decision of the postconviction court.