Opinion
2010-08-6
William SNACKI, Plaintiff, v. Mary E. PEDERSON, Defendant.
Matthew D. Nafus, Esq., Scottsville, Attorney for Plaintiff. Chad Pidanick, Esq., Buffalo, Attorney for Defendant.
Matthew D. Nafus, Esq., Scottsville, Attorney for Plaintiff. Chad Pidanick, Esq., Buffalo, Attorney for Defendant.
RICHARD A. DOLLINGER, J.
The parties were married in April 2009 and separated six months later. As part of the current divorce action, the wife seeks, through equitable distribution, reimbursement for debt she incurred to pay for the parties' wedding and honeymoon. The husband contends that the debt is “separate property” belonging to the wife alone because she incurred it prior to their marriage.
When settlement discussions failed, the wife moved for leave to amend her answer to include a claim for annulment
and for an award of attorney fees. The husband has moved for a declaration that the pre-marriage expenses are separate property, not subject to equitable distribution.
There is no opposition to the amendment of the answer and this aspect of the application is granted, even though there was no proposed amended answer included in the papers. CPLR 3025(a). The Court directs that the plaintiff file a reply consistent with the CPLR.
The wife alleges that $12,294.84 (in Canadian dollars) in wedding, vacation, and honeymoon expenses are marital debts. The expenses include a wedding ring, vacation flights to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, expenses in South Carolina, the honeymoon to Mexico, and other expenses. It is undisputed that the wife incurred these expenses, but it is unclear to the Court, based on the documents before it, what exact expenses the wife seeks to have equitably distributed under New York law.
The Court notes that the amount demanded by the wife apparently includes the costs associated with a trip to Myrtle Beach in October 2009, during the time that the parties were married. If so, this is marital debt subject to equitable distribution.
There is no evidence that the husband, prior to the marriage, entered into an agreement to share the wedding/honeymoon expenses.
New York has recognized claims for breach of contract—even oral contracts—for wedding anticipation expenses. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980)(express oral agreement between nonmarried persons is enforceable); accord Potter v. Davie, 275 A.D.2d 961, 713 N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dept. 2000)(while an express oral agreement is enforceable, no agreement will be inferred based on a quasi-marital relationship between the parties). Here, there was no such agreement prior to the marriage. The only basis for the wife's claims for repayment of these expenses is through her right to equitable distribution under the Domestic Relations Law.
While there is no claim for breach of contract before the Court, the Court notes that there is an email from the husband to his wife, dated October, 20, 2009, in which he offers to pay “half of the Leon's bill.” There is no evidence of an acceptance of this offer, which apparently coincided with the attempts by the parties to negotiate a divorce under the laws of the Province of Ontario. There is also no evidence of whether the “Leon's bill” was incurred either before or during the marriage. To the extent that any portion of the “Leon's bill” was incurred prior to the marriage, the opinion in this case should resolve the question of its status as separate or marital debt. If the bill was incurred during the marriage, then it is marital debt. Finally, even if there were a claim for breach of contract for these costs incurred prior to the marriage, this Court concludes that this email comment, made at the time of separation, is insufficient to support such a claim.
This court has broad discretion in fashioning equitable distribution awards of marital property. Jones–Bertrand v. Bertrand, 59 A.D.3d 391, 874 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dept.2009); Fagan v. Fagan, 2 A.D.3d 394, 767 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dept. 2003); Niland v. Niland, 291 A.D.2d 876, 877, 737 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dept. 2002). Moreover, marital property is to be broadly construed consistent with the economic partnership concept of marriage and separate property should be narrowly interpreted. DRL § 236 Part B; Judson v. Judson, 255 A.D.2d 656, 679 N.Y.S.2d 465 (3d Dept.1998). Only property acquired during the marriage is classified as “marital.” DRL § 236 Part B, 1(c), (d)(1). Debt is subject to the same rules: only debt acquired during the marriage is marital property. Eigenbrodt v. Eigenbrodt, 217 A.D.2d 752, 754, 629 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dept.1995).
Conceding that her debt was incurred prior to her marriage, the wife nonetheless argues that it should be considered marital because it was incurred in expectation and in furtherance of the marriage. Upon a closer view, New York case law is bereft of any decisions to support this position. The authorities cited by the wife—Jonas v. Jonas, 241 A.D.2d 839, 660 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept.1997); Feldman v. Feldman, 291 A.D.2d 876 (4th Dept. 2002)—simply stand for the proposition that when determining whether a debt incurred during marriage is marital or separate, the nature of the debt itself is the primary factor to be considered. But, unlike the litigants in Jonas and Feldman, the wife incurred this disputed debt before the marriage, not during it.
An interesting fact gives rise to an additional inquiry: the wife lives in Ontario, Canada and the husband in New York. In this regard, other states might be more receptive to the wife's claims. Connecticut and Missouri allow for the equitable distribution of pre-marital wedding and honeymoon debt on the theory that such debt is incurred in contemplation of marriage. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Renshaw, 1997 WL 149645, 1997 Conn.Super. LEXIS 724 (Conn.Super.Ct. March 24, 1997); In re Marriage of Altergott, 259 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Mo.Ct.App.2008). These states also permit the courts to consider the marital conduct of the parties in fashioning an equitable distribution award. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–81(c); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 452.330.1(4) (Cum.Supp.2007).
New York, by contrast, views marriage as a strictly economic partnership. Cooper v. Cooper, 217 A.D.2d 904, 630 N.Y.S.2d 158 (4th Dept.1995). Marital fault plays no role in a court's equitable distribution of the marital property. DRL § 236 Part B, 5(d). The only exception is the rare instance of egregious or shocking conduct. Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 N.Y.3d 431, 902 N.Y.S.2d 17, 928 N.E.2d 399 (2010);Kaur v. Singh, 44 A.D.3d 622, 623, 843 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dept.2007). Thus, in New York, a court's inquiry into a divorcing couple's conduct toward one another, even after commencement of the marriage, is limited insofar as it relates to their relative contributions to the economic partnership. Id.
New York justifies this public policy choice on the grounds that fault is notoriously difficult to evaluate within the context of a marriage and is rarely attributable solely to one party. Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 291–92, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dept.1984). If it is difficult for a court to evaluate conduct and fault in the marriage context, it becomes a nearly impossible task in the context of the couple's pre-marital relationship. Yet, the defendant requests that this Court:
(a) evaluate the husband's conduct, prior to the marriage and determine whether he was engaged in “good faith” pre-marital conduct when he permitted or encouraged his prospective partner to spend large sums on the wedding reception and honeymoon; and,
(b) if the court finds “bad faith” or some other culpability, then find an “implied contract” to pay half of these debts or, equitably convert this otherwise “separate” debt into a marital one.
While this Court expresses no opinion on the husband's conduct or character, the Court declines the invitation to delve into the facts surrounding the parties' pre-marital understandings. Given that the public policy of New York—as a general rule—does not permit this court to factor the marital fault of the parties into the equitable distribution of property they acquired during their marriage, surely this court must refrain from doing so with respect to the property one partner acquired before their marriage.
The New York Legislature has similarly instructed this Court to decline the wife's invitation in this case. More than 70 years ago, the Legislature enacted the “Heart Balm Statute” which abolished causes of action based on a breach of promise to marry, including damages for wedding preparation expenses. N.Y. CIV. R. § 80–a; See Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d 471, 473–74 (1971) (providing an historical overview of the Heart Balm Statute); See also DeFina v. Scott, 195 Misc.2d 75, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003); Bruno v. Guerra, 146 Misc.2d 206, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1990). The statute was designed to prevent the use of engagement-and-marriage-related causes of action to “caus[e] extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation, and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances.” Gaden v. Gaden, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d at 474.
The public policy reasons behind the adoption of the Heart Balm Statute are equally compelling—if not more so—when applied to this plaintiff, who fulfilled his promise to marry. It would be too easy to exploit a cause of action that allowed the separate debt acquired by one spouse during the pre-marital relationship to be subsequently deemed marital when some culpable conduct by one of the two parties causes the marriage to breakdown. The Court understands the tender dynamics presented here: a spouse who has voluntarily spent money for the benefit of her betrothed during a blissful engagement later regrets the outlay when the “honeymoon is over.” Under such circumstances, a court order that directed the beneficiary of the pre-marital expenditure to pay some portion of it back upon divorce would be tantamount to the extraction of a penalty for conduct, which although it may provide grounds for a divorce, does not justify converting separate debts into marital ones. The punitive aspect of adopting the rule advanced by the wife in this case clearly runs counter to New York's “economic partnership” concept of marriage and, based on this Court's research, has no authority in statute or case law.
Under the Heart Balm statute, there are a limited number of circumstances in which a party may recover property from a betrothed, namely if such property was given solely in anticipation of a marriage that fails to occur. See, e.g., Bruno v. Guerra, 146 Misc.2d 206 , 549 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (holding that the recipient of an engagement ring would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain it, given that the parties did not marry). The purpose of allowing for the recovery of pre-marital gifts given solely in anticipation of marriage, such as an engagement ring, is “to return the parties to the position they were in prior to their becoming engaged, without rewarding or punishing either party for the fact that the marriage failed to materialize.” Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 323 N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d at 476. But these unique circumstances are not present here: unlike an engagement ring, which can be returned to the giver, the wedding and honeymoon, enjoyed by both the wife and the husband, cannot. These events are nothing more now than a memory and the money spent to produce them is long gone. In addition, the husband did not breach his promise to marry: the couple did marry. Hence, the main rationale for ordering the return of an engagement ring or other pre-marital gift—that the marriage failed to occur in breach of a promise to marry—is not present here.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court is mindful that the bar against recovery of pre-marital wedding debts can be criticized as unfair because women and their families have, traditionally at least, borne the cost of the wedding. DeFina v. Scott, 195 Misc.2d 75, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 591. While sympathetic to such arguments, the Court notes that there are remedies available under contract law to protect the interests of parties during engagement, marriage and divorce. See DeFina v. Scott, 195 Misc.2d 75, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 591–92 (“the court finds no cognizable rationale for treating a contract regarding wedding expenses as significantly different from any other contract”). Because there is no evidence of a breach of any promise by the husband here, these remedies are unavailable. Stewart v. Stewart, 26 Misc.3d 1062, 893 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. Delaware Cty.2009)(implied contracts between unmarried cohabitants are not enforceable and will not be implied from the conduct of the parties, citing Morone ).
Marriage, viewed in this State as an “economic partnership,” would have little or no meaning if the same property rights and liabilities conferred by marriage were retroactively imputed to the parties' pre-marital relationship during the litigation of the parties' divorce action. In essence, by permitting a party to recover on an “implied promise” to repay these premarital debts, as a result of their conduct before or during the marriage, this Court would, in its judgment, be sanctioning a form of palimony (contract-like relationship-based obligation founded on relationships rather than express statements) which has been long rejected in this state. Morone, supra.
Regardless of whether the husband acted in bad faith when he married his wife, marry her he did. Under these circumstances, this court is simply not empowered to rearrange the outcome of, let alone inquire into, the private conduct or unstated understandings which governed their actions as individual, consenting adults prior to their marriage. As one court concluded:
Unless and until the law imposes equitable distribution on unmarried couples, in New York, at least, the legal status of marriage remains vitally important to establishing the economic rights of members of a couple.
M. v. F., 27 Misc.3d 1205(A), 2010 WL 1379034 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 2010). The debts incurred in this case are not marital property because they were incurred outside the marriage. The Court declines to use any legal theory to convert them into marital debts and sweep them into equitable distribution.
Finally, the wife seeks attorneys fees for this motion and other relief. This Court sees little reason to award legal fees at this point. The husband's opposition to paying any portion of the pre-marriage expenses is well founded. His refusal to pay, while it has delayed resolution, is not obstreperous conduct sufficient to justify an award of attorneys fees. The motion is denied.