Smyth v. Anderson

10 Citing cases

  1. Sardy v. Hodge

    264 Ga. 548 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 4 times

    The will is construed according to the law in effect at the time of the testator's death. Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 ( 232 S.E.2d 835) (1977); Thomas v. Trust Co. Bank, 247 Ga. 693 (1) ( 279 S.E.2d 440) (1981); Gresham v. Gannon, 243 Ga. 269 (1) ( 253 S.E.2d 748) (1979). The presumption is that the testator "intended that his property should go where the law carries it. . . ."

  2. Thomas v. Trust Company Bank

    280 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 8 times

    Along these same lines, it has been held that in construing the rights of an adopted child to take under a will, it is not a question of the right of the adopted child to inherit but simply a question of the testator's intent with respect to those who are to share in the estate. Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 ( 232 S.E.2d 835) (1977); Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79 ( 23 S.E.2d 420, 144 ALR 664) (1942). In order to effectuate the testator's intent, it has been held that the adoption laws in effect at the date of the testator's death will determine the class of beneficiaries entitled to take under a testamentary trust in the absence of an express contrary intent.

  3. Alexander v. Ga. Baptist Foundation

    266 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    Compare Hines v. Village of St. Joseph, 227 Ga. 431 ( 181 S.E.2d 54) (1971); Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188 ( 200 S.E. 689) (1938); Goree v. Ga. Industrial Home, 187 Ga. 368 ( 200 S.E. 684) (1938). Further, we find no clearly demonstrated intention that the trust fail if its terms cannot be exactly carried out. Code Ann. § 108-106; Trammell v. Elliott, supra; Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 ( 232 S.E.2d 835) (1977). We thus hold that the trial court correctly applied the cy pres doctrine and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Georgia Baptist Foundation, the Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention of the State of Georgia, and the administrator of Cook's estate, and properly denied the motion of the executrix of Mrs. Cook's estate.

  4. Trustees of Endowment Fund, Hoffman Mem. Hosp. v. Kring

    225 Kan. 499 (Kan. 1979)   Cited 15 times

    "Cy-pres" is a doctrine which literally means "as near as may be"; it may be applied to charitable trusts when the trust established by a testator fails, no alternative disposition of property has been made, and the testator's intention to provide for general trust purposes can be accomplished by permitting the benefits of the trust to be administered differently, but in a manner closely related to testator's plan. The cy-pres doctrine should not be applied when testator has manifested a specific charitable intent, has anticipated possible failure of the trust, or has made an alternative disposition of the property in event the charitable gift fails for any reason. Shannep v. Strong, 160 Kan. at 213; Simmons v. Parsons College, 256 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1977); Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343, 232 S.E.2d 835 (1977). The next question is whether the trial court could find as a matter of law that George M. Hoffman had a general charitable intent and that the cy-pres doctrine applied so as to permit the payment of trust income to Hospital District No. 2.

  5. Gresham v. Gannon

    253 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. 1979)   Cited 6 times
    Following failure of charitable devise, disposition of estate was controlled by reversionary clause in will

    We did not reach a determination of who were "next of kin" in that case. 1. At the termination of the life estates and of the failure of the charitable devise to Social Circle Schools under our holdings in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 (n. 1) ( 232 S.E.2d 835) (1977), the disposition of the estate was controlled by the following reversionary clause in the will: "In the event said property is not accepted by said Social Circle Schools or used for any other purpose that (sic) above indicated and directed, it is to revert to my estate and go to my next of kin." "Where a will provides that title, on a certain contingency, reverts to testator's estate, the language means that it goes to the heirs of the testator.

  6. Faulk v. Faulk

    240 Ga. 373 (Ga. 1977)   Cited 3 times

    Under the factual situation no trust ever came into being because Charlie R. Faulk never had a child "born to him," and the cases cited by the appellant dealing with the law applicable to the termination of a trust have no application here. The present case comes within the ruling in Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343 ( 232 S.E.2d 835) (1977), where it was held that an adopted grandchild whose adoption occurred after the testator's death (in 1937) was not included in the term "child" as used in the item of the testator's will being construed by the court. The trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment to the appellees, and denying summary judgment to the appellant.

  7. Incurables v. Maryland Medical

    797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    A leading case to this effect, and the case primarily relied on by University Hospital, is the 1972 opinion of the Superior Court of Connecticut in Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, supra, 30 Conn. Sup. 1, 294 A.2d 586. See also Smyth v. Anderson, 238 Ga. 343, 348-349, 232 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1977). Most of the cases relied on by University Hospital, however, do not involve illegal conditions attached to charitable bequests; instead, they involve conditions which could not be complied with for other reasons. See, e.g., Jewish Guild for the Blind v. First National Bank, 226 So.2d 414 (Fla.App. 1969); Burr v. Brooks, 83 Ill.2d 488, 416 N.E.2d 231 (1981); Nelson v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 592 P.2d 438 (1979); Orphan Society of Lexington v. Board of Education, 437 S.W.2d 194 (Ky.App. 1969); City of Belfast v. Goodwill Farm, 150 Me. 17, 103 A.2d 517 (1954); The Pennsylvania Company v. Board of Governors of the London Hospital, 79 R.I. 74, 83 A.2d 881 (1951).

  8. Burr v. Brooks

    83 Ill. 2d 488 (Ill. 1981)   Cited 7 times
    In Burr the supreme court noted that despite the above quoted language, the court in Village of Hinsdale declined to apply either the doctrine of equitable deviation or cy pres with regard to the funds subject to the alternate disposition in that case.

    First National Bank v. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (1946), 328 Ill. App. 481. Accord, Simmons v. Parsons College (Ia. 1977), 256 N.W.2d 225; Smyth v. Anderson (1977), 238 Ga. 343, 232 S.E.2d 835; Mississippi Children's Home Society v. City of Jackson (1957), 230 Miss. 546, 93 So.2d 483; City of Belfast v. Goodwill Farm (1954), 150 Me. 17, 103 A.2d 517; Board of Trustees v. Cheney (1954), 158 Neb. 292, 63 N.W.2d 177; Edwards v. DeSimone (1969), 105 R.I. 335, 252 A.2d 327; In re Estate of Berry (1966), 29 Wis.2d 506, 139 N.W.2d 72. There is no contention that any proposal made by any of the parties will effect literal compliance with either paragraph 11 or 12, and neither Morgan-Washington nor the School District contends that it is entitled to the funds under the express terms of paragraph 12 or under the doctrine of equitable deviation. It is clear that the doctrine of cy pres would apply to the general charitable purpose stated in either paragraph 11 or 12 of the will.

  9. Parsons v. Robinson

    206 Cal. 378 (Cal. 1929)   Cited 7 times

    If that estate was subject to be divested by the breach of any condition subsequent, any such breach that would divest the estate would of necessity destroy the lien.' See, also, Ackerman v. Gorton, 67 N.Y. 63; Rose v. Hatch, 125 N.Y. 427 [26 N.E. 467]; Leeds v. Wakefield, 10 Gray (Mass.), 514; Smyth v. Anderson, 31 Ohio St. 144; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 Ill. 103 [58 Am. Dec. 600]; Wetmore v. Midmer, 21 N.J. Eq. 242; Morse v. Hackensack Sav. Bank, 47 N.J. Eq. 279 [12 L.R.A. 62, 20 A. 961]; Mayo v. Merritt, 107 Mass. 505."

  10. Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Petry

    231 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 3 times
    In Stackhouse, a judgment debtor sold a vehicle to a third party and executed the assignment on the back of the title showing the transfer of the vehicle to the third party.

    The rights of plaintiff in this 1957 Cadillac automobile arise as a creditor of Eugene W. Petry, and the lien of plaintiff by reason of the attachment of this automobile is upon the interest of Petry in this automobile. Smyth v. Anderson, 31 Ohio St. 144; Straus v. Wessel, 30 Ohio St. 211; Armstrong v. McAlpin, 18 Ohio St. 184; and 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 654, Attachment, Section 304. The only evidence that plaintiff introduced as to the title to this 1957 Cadillac coupe at the time of the attachment was the testimony of John Hanlon, an employee of plaintiff, who was present with the deputy sheriff when this automobile was attached.