On the record before us, this requirement undoubtedly has been met. It is well settled that CUTPA applies to banks and banking activities. See, e.g., Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank , 230 Conn. 486, 521, 646 A.2d 1289 (1994) ; Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank , 86 Conn. App. 14, 27, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). Federal courts have specifically held that a bank's "lending and loan modification activities involve the โconduct of any trade or commerce.โ "
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rund v. Melillo, 63 Conn. App. 216, 221, 772 A.2d 774 (2001); see also Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn. App. 14, 18, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005); Larson v. Jacobson, 38 Conn. App. 186, 189, 659 A.2d 753 (1995). Our Supreme Court has instructed that appellate courts "construe a contract in accordance with what [the courts] conclude to be the understanding and intention of the parties as determined from the language used by them interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . The intention of the parties manifested by their words and acts is essential to determine the meaning and terms of the contract and that intention may be gathered from all such permissible, pertinent facts and circumstances."
If a contract is ambiguous, the clearly erroneous standard of review is used because the intent of the parties is a question of fact. Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn. App. 14, 18, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Because ยง 37-3a provides that interest may be recovered, it is clear that the statute does not require an award of interest in every case in which money has been detained after it has become payable, rather, an award of interest is discretionary. See Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 26, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005) ("an award of ... interest [pursuant to ยง 37-3a] is discretionary ... rather than automatic" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Where a judgment creditor sought an award of prejudgment interest, the district court had discretion to award less than ten percent.
Rather, an award of interest is discretionary. See Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 26, 860 A.2d 738 (2004) (an award of . . . interest [pursuant to ยง 37-3a] is discretionary . . . rather than automatic [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). The statute does not, however, clearly and unambiguously set forth the factors that a trial court must consider in exercising its discretion to award interest.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (citing Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 28, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005)). " The same facts that establish a breach of contract claim may be sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation.
" The banking industry is governed by CUTPA." Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 27, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). General Statutes ยง 42-110(g) provides in relevant part: " Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may bring an action . . ."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (citing Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 28, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005)). " To determine whether an act or practice is unfair under CUTPA, Connecticut courts look to the following factors: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise--in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons]."
" The banking industry is governed by CUTPA." Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn.App. 14, 27, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). CUTPA provides in pertinent part that " [n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smithfield Associates, LLC v. Tolland Bank, 86 Conn. App. 14, 19, 860 A.2d 738 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 839 (2005). Connecticut courts have considered proceedings involving unemployment compensation to be administrative proceedings.