Opinion
3:04-CV-0146-L
February 12, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the District Court in implementation thereof, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a state inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is currently confined at the Smith Unit of the Texas Department Criminal Justice — Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) in Lamesa, Texas. Defendant is the Commissary Director at the Smith Unit. The court has not issued process in this case.
Statement of Case: The complaint alleges the Commissary Director has unlawfully charged Plaintiff sales taxes on his commissary purchases despite his tax exempt status. Plaintiff explains that on May 30, 2003, he became an ordained minister in the Universal Life Church (ULC) of Modesto, California, and thus he is entitled to tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff seeks monetary and declaratory relief. Findings and Conclusions: Although Plaintiff paid the $150.00 filing fee, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1998) (the statutory screening provision under § 1915A applies to all prisoners' actions against governmental entities, officers and employees, regardless of whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis). Section 1915A provides in pertinent part that:
The ULC is a "church" in which every member is a "pastor" or "minister." Many people join the "church" thinking they may then take advantage of various deductions in the tax code available to ministers.United States v. Day, 862 F.2d 318, 1988 WL 124814, **1 (9th Cir. 1988).
It is unclear whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies at the Smith Unit in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although he prepared a grievance for filing, he alleges the Grievance Department allegedly "failed to pick it up." (Complaint at ¶ III). Cf. Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that notwithstanding claim that facility's grievance procedures were inadequate, prisoner who had opportunity to file grievance, but chose not to do so, failed to exhaust administrative remedies).
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
For purposes of this recommendation it is assumed arguendo that Defendant is a state employee. However, if Defendant is a private person it is clear that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to invoke this court's jurisdiction. In the alternative, Plaintiffs claim is patently frivolous. See n. 5, infra..
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996 requires prisoners filing suit to demonstrate a physical injury to sustain a claim for damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1999).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) states: "No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."
The only injury which Plaintiff could have suffered as a consequence of being refused tax exempt status was mental pain and suffering. As a result, § 1997e(e) bars his request for monetary damages. See Harper 174 F.3d at 719; see also Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (prisoners could not recover for mental or emotional damages absent more than de minimis physical injury).
Plaintiffs request for declaratory relief fares no better. Despite his recent ordination as an ULC minister, Plaintiff is not entitled to tax exempt status when purchasing items from the prison commissary. Even assuming ULC is a tax-exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code, that holding applies only to the parent church in Modesto, California, not all ULC congregations or ministers nationwide. Andrews v. CIR, T.C. Memo 1994-615, 1994 WL 7011773, n. 3 (U.S. Tax Ct. Dec. 1994). RECOMMENDATION:
The prohibitive feature of § 1997e(e), requiring physical injury before recovery, does not apply in the context of requests for declaratory or injunctive relief sought to end an allegedly unconstitutional condition of confinement. See Harper 174 F.3d at 719.
The ULC was recognized as a church and denomination in Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, [74-1 USTC ¶ 9345], 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974), and was granted tax exempt status on April 13, 1976, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(C)(3). However, the Internal Revenue Service later revoked the tax exempt status on August 28, 1984, by letter ruling. The revocation of the tax exempt status of the ULC was upheld in subsequent litigation. Universal Life Church. Inc. v. United States, [87-2 USTC ¶ 9617], 13 Cl. Ct. 567 (1987).
For the forgoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff.