Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wn.2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Precision Lab., 96 Wn. App. at 728. In discussing this factor, Raymond incorrectly refers to the minimum contacts analysis contained in Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 504 P.2d 782 (1972). There, the court determined that if it found sufficient minimum contacts this factor was established.

"The first criterion outlines the statutory requirements of RCW 4.28.185(1)(a) and (b)." Smith v. York Food Machinery Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 721 (1972). "The second expresses the limitations set forth in RCW 4.28.185(1) and (3)." Id.

This court has held many times that when an injury occurs in Washington, it is an inseparable part of the "tortious act" and that act is deemed to have occurred in this state for purposes of the long-arm statute. See, e.g., Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972); Bowen v. Bateman, 76 Wn.2d 567, 575, 458 P.2d 269 (1969). Whether Idaho's acts were actually tortious is not currently before this court.

RCW 4.28.185(1)(b). For purposes of determining jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, the plaintiff need only show a prima facie case; the underlying action of "[w]hether a `tortious act' was actually committed" must be determined by the trier of fact. Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972). For this purpose alone, a court must treat the allegations in the complaint as established. MBM Fisheries, Inc., at 418.

¶ 8 For purposes of determining jurisdiction under RCW 4.28.185(1)(b), the plaintiff need only show by prima facie evidence that the defendant committed a tort in the forum state; whether a tort was actually committed must be determined by a trier of fact. Lewis, 119 Wash.2d at 670, 835 P.2d 221 (quoting Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wash.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972) ). Thus, for purposes of determining jurisdiction, we treat the allegations in the complaint as established.

To establish jurisdiction under this subsection, a plaintiff need not prove that a tortious act was committed; that issue is for the trier of fact. Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972); Fernandez v. Department of Hwys., 49 Wn. App. 28, 37 n. 5, 741 P.2d 1010 (1987). The plaintiff must, however, have at least alleged the commission of such an act.

Grange Insurance alleged that the injury occurred in Washington and since such injury is an inseparable part of the "tortious act" as mentioned in RCW 4.28.185(b)(1), the "tortious act," for the purpose of this appeal, is deemed to have occurred within the state. See Hogan v. Johnson, 39 Wn. App. 96, 692 P.2d 198 (1984); Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 722, 504 P.2d 782 (1972); Bowen v. Bateman, 76 Wn.2d 567, 575, 458 P.2d 269 (1969); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wn.2d 469, 471, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966). Addressing the third Tyee factor, the question becomes under what circumstances should Washington courts refuse to hear the matter because of due process concerns?

Compare Brown v. Washoe Housing Authority, 625 F. Supp. 595, 598 n. 3 (D.Utah 1985) (suggesting that the statute and due process considerations are not coterminous except when the case falls within one of the specific jurisdictional categories indicated in the statute); with American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1983) (implying that the reach of jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute is coextensive with the reach of jurisdiction under the due process clause). Because this case falls within the statute's categories, cf. Mack Financial Corp. v. Nev. Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (Utah 1974); Smith v. York Food Machinery Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 504 P.2d 782 (1972), this court does not need to decide whether jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute is coterminous with due process in all instances. The constitutional due process analysis clearly applies to a case within the statute's specified categories. It is Honda R D's position that it has no contacts with Utah and that jurisdiction is not proper.

Where the defendant's contacts with the forum are limited, both the Washington courts and the Ninth Circuit have employed a three part analysis in determining whether due process permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction: 1) the defendant purposely availed him or herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum; 2) the claim arises out of or results from the contact with the forum; and 3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977); Smith v. York Food Machinery Company, 81 Wn.2d 719, 504 P.2d 782, 784 (1972). This analysis is grounded in the constitutional requirements that the defendant have such "minimum contacts" with the forum state that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

The Court of Appeals comment in Omstead that a foreign defendant's burdens of litigating in Washington are eased somewhat by the fees provision, see Omstead, at 271, was merely an observation made in the course of balancing equities to determine the question of jurisdiction. See also Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 725, 504 P.2d 782 (1972) (making the same observation, for the same purpose). The court in Omstead had no occasion to interpret or apply RCW 4.28.185(5).