Smith v. Williams

4 Citing cases

  1. Riverbend Land, LLC v. State

    2019 OK Civ. App. 31 (Okla. Civ. App. 2019)

    Having such record notice, OTA contends, Riverbend is presumed to have had notice of the entirety of the deed's provisions and, thus, was on notice of the blocked access areas, or is at least on notice that further inquiry was needed. OTA quotes Smith v. Williams, 1928 OK 333, ¶ 37, 269 P. 1067 (emphasis omitted), in support of its argument. ¶13 The trial court granted summary judgment to OTA finding Riverbend was not a bona fide purchaser for value because it had constructive knowledge of OTA's rights in the subject property.

  2. Riverbend Land, LLC v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority

    443 P.3d 588 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)

    " Having such record notice, OTA contends, Riverbend is presumed to have had notice of the entirety of the deed's provisions and, thus, was on notice of the blocked access areas, or is at least on notice that further inquiry was needed. OTA quotes Smith v. Williams , 1928 OK 333, ¶ 37, 132 Okla. 141, 269 P. 1067 (emphasis omitted), in support of its argument.¶13 The trial court granted summary judgment to OTA finding Riverbend was not a bona fide purchaser for value because it had constructive knowledge of OTA's rights in the subject property.

  3. SABO v. HORVATH

    559 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1976)   Cited 11 times

    Cities Service Oil Co. v. Adair, 273 F.2d 673, 676 (10th Cir. 1959); Stafford v. Ballinger, 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 18 Cal.Rptr. 568, 572 (1962); Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679, 684 (1939); Jenkins v. Bates, 230 Miss. 406, 92 So.2d 655, 657 (1957); Baker v. Koch, 114 Ohio App. 519, 183 N.E.2d 434, 437 (1960); Portman v. Earnhart, 343 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex.Civ.App. 1960); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Sheaner, 297 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex.Civ.App. 1957); Hyson v. Dodge, 198 Va. 792, 96 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1957). 1 R. Patton C. Patton, Patton on Land Title § 69, at 230-33 (2d ed. 1957); Lacey v. Humphres, 196 Ark. 72, 116 S.W.2d 345, 347 (1938); Etchison v. Dail, 182 Ark. 350, 31 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Ark. 1930); Brown v. Copp, 105 Cal.App.2d 1, 232 P.2d 868, 871 (1951); Hawley v. McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 169 A. 192, 194 (1933); Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149, 142 S.E. 690, 692 (1928); Manson v. Berkman, 356 Ill. 20, 190 N.E. 77, 79 (1934); Blumenthal v. Serota, 129 Me. 187, 151 A. 138, 141 (1930); Smith v. Williams, 132 Okl. 141, 269 P. 1067, 1073 (1928); Brown v. Ackerman, 17 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App. 1929). Alaska's recording system utilizes a "grantor-grantee" index.

  4. Steen v. Williams

    12 P.2d 888 (Okla. 1932)

    That the defendants J. A. Steen et al. filed their answer and cross-petition denying and asking for affirmative relief, and various other pleadings were filed, which made the issues in this cause. "That on the 14th day of September, 1928, a temporary injunction was issued by the district court of Carter county, Okla., temporarily restraining and enjoining from enforcing or seeking to enforce the judgment rendered in the case of Ben Williams et al. v. C. R. Smith et al., No. 10748 in the district court of Carter county (which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 132 Okla. 141, 269 P. 1067, on January 17, 1928, and petition for rehearing denied on September 11, 1928). "That on the 18th day of July, 1929, a judgment was rendered by the district court of Carter county in this cause, sustaining the petition of the plaintiff and the cross-petition of Charles R. Smith and William H. Smith, executors of the estate of C.R. Smith, deceased, and the intervening petition of Will H. Smith, administrator of the estate of Mary Stuart Smith, deceased, et al., and allowed an attorney's fee to H.A. Hicks in the sum of $3,375, said sum to be paid out of the compromise perfected between the plaintiff and the executors and heirs of the estate of C.R. Smith, deceased. That all parties except H.A. Hicks were permanently enjoined and restrained from setting up or asserting any right, title, or benefit under said judgment, being cause No. 10748."