Opinion
C.A. No. 96C-08-127-JOH.
Submitted: March 30, 2000.
Decided: April 5, 2000.
Somers S. Price, Jr., Esq.; Potter, Anderson Corroon, LLP, P.O. Box 951, Wilmington, DE 19899.
Daniel L. McKenty, Esq.; McCullough, McKenty Kafader, P.A., P.O. Box 397, Wilmington, DE 19899-0397.
Counsel:
Plaintiffs Marueen and Thoms E. Smith have moved for new trial in light of the jury's verdict on March 8, 2000 finding that the negligence of Linda Williams was a proximate cause of injury to Mrs. Smith but awarding zero damages to her. Mrs. Smith was the primary injured plaintiff in this automobile accident.
Contrary to my normal practice, I find it unnecessary to go into a detailed discussion of the injuries claimed in this accident. The judges of this Court, as required, give great deference to jury verdicts, specially recognizing a jury's unique and vital role in the civil justice system. There are, however, occasions when a court cannot give that deference. Such deference is not due when a jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence or reflects that it did not follow the applicable law. This is one of those rare cases.
First, this is not a low impact case. It was a significant impact case causing extensive damage to Mrs. Smith's vehicle and prompting the steering wheel air bag to deploy. Mrs. Smith received objective injuries from that deployment. There were other objective signs of injury, although to some degree some of that injury may have pre-existed the accident and the jury needs to be given some latitude in sorting out what may have preexisted this particular accident versus what was caused by this accident. While not expressly conceding it, the defendant, Linda Williams, did make it clear enough that the real issue in the case was the amount of damages that Mrs. Smith was entitled to, not that she was entitled to no damages. In this particular case, the Supreme Court's holding in Maier v. Santucci represents the more applicable law. That is, a zero verdict with the evidence in this case is inadequate and unacceptable as a matter of law.
Del.Supr., 697 A.2d 747 (1997).
While not specifically requested, the Court did sua sponte consider whether additur may be an appropriate remedy in this case, short of a new trial. Considering the limitations on additur, that is not the appropriate remedy in this case.
Carney v. Preston, Del.Super., 683 A.2d 47, 56 (1996).
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial of plaintiffs Maureen and Thomas E. Smith is GRANTED. A scheduling conference will be held on April 17, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. for purposes of setting a new trial date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOH/bsr Original to Prothonotary