Affirmed. See Smith v. Whidden, 87 So.2d 42, 44 (Fla. 1956); Daniel v. Rogers, 72 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1954); Potock v. Turek, 227 So.2d 724 (Fla.3d DCA 1969), cert. dismissed, 238 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1970); 55 Fla. Jur.2d Trial § 104 (1984).
This being so, there was no obligation to charge the jury on this claim. See Smith v. Whidden, 87 So.2d 42, 44 (Fla. 1956); C.A. Davis, Inc. v. City of Miami, 400 So.2d 536, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review dismissed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1981); City of Miami v. Fletcher, 167 So.2d 638, 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Third, we see no error in excluding evidence of a separate oral agreement between the parties that the defendant was to receive a $75,000 salary as bank president.
Affirmed. See Smith v. Whidden, 87 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Bessett v. Hackett, 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953); Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932); Fruehauf Corp. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 336 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Menard v. O'Malley, 327 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). BASKIN, Judge (dissenting).
It does not appear that the measure of damages for lost support and services was intended to be changed by the new law. It would seem, therefore, that prior case law dealing with loss of support and services would still be applicable under the new statutes. In Smith v. Whidden, 87 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956), the court stated: ". . .
The defendants further assert that Dr. Lassiter's testimony as to the "value" of a deceased wife to a husband was not "competent evidence" to go to the jury on the issue of damages in a wrongful death case. There appears to be no case in Florida which is directly applicable; however, the cases of Lithgow v. Hamilton, Fla. 1954, 69 So.2d 776, and Smith v. Whidden, Fla. 1956, 87 So.2d 42, did establish that "persons" who qualify as experts in the employment service field may testify as to the proper value of the services of which the husband is deprived. In the case sub judice, Mr. Robert M. Douglas, the office manager of the Florida State Employment Service in West Palm Beach, testified as to the number of persons necessary to replace the deceased mother and their prospective salaries.
The causes of action were for false imprisonment, unlawful detention, unauthorized search, and assault and battery. The appellant has preserved a number of points for review, some of which we will dispose of in reliance upon the following authorities: Esch v. Forster, 123 Fla. 905, 168 So. 299; Welch v. Gray Moss Bondholders Corporation, 128 Fla. 722, 175 So. 529; Winn Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 1936, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214; Smith v. Whidden, Fla. 1956, 87 So.2d 42; Garrison v. Hertz Corporation, Fla.App. 1961, 129 So.2d 452; David Properties, Inc. v. Selk, Fla.App. 1963, 151 So.2d 334; Hart Properties, Inc. v. Slack, Fla. 1963, 159 So.2d 236; Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, Fla. App. 1964, 167 So.2d 731. A more difficult question is presented in determining the propriety of the trial court's action upon receipt of the jury's verdicts.