Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-1078
11-12-2020
CODY WILLIAM SMITH, Petitioner, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoner Cody William Smith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the petition and deny a certificate of appealability.
II. REPORT
The information contained herein is taken from the Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondents' Answer (ECF No. 10), and the state-court docket sheet for Petitioner's criminal case in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County at CP-65-CR-2222-2018. Respondents attached a copy of that docket sheet to the answer, the current version is available for public review at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx and the Court takes judicial notice of it. --------
Petitioner is incarcerated in the Westmoreland County Prison awaiting his trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. He faces counts of burglary, person not to possess firearms, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and theft of a motor vehicle.
The Commonwealth filed the charges against Petitioner in 2018. His trial was continued several times that year and in 2019 at the defense's request. Petitioner posted bond in June 2019 and was released on bail. A bench warrant was issued after he failed to appear at an August 2019 status conference, and he was detained in September 2019 pending disposition of his charges.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a state habeas petition in October 2019. According to Respondents, he raised claims pertaining to the waiver of his preliminary hearing and the evidence the Commonwealth had to support its charges against him. The prosecution filed a motion to quash that petition. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for December 10, 2019. At the defense's request, the hearing was continued to the next motions list. Petitioner's trial attorney at the time, Emily Smarto, then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel because Petitioner had retained private counsel at another case.
The trial court denied Attorney Smarto's request for leave to withdraw and rescheduled the hearing on Petitioner's state habeas petition for March 17, 2020. The unavoidable delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic required the continuance of that hearing as well as Petitioner's trial.
The trial court held a video hearing on Petitioner's state habeas petition in June 2020. It denied his request for state habeas relief and scheduled his trial for October 5, 2020.
In July 2020, Petitioner commenced this case by filing a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). He raises numerous claims, including that he was arrested without probable cause, that the prosecution has committed misconduct, and that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. As relief, he seeks an order from this Court directing that he be immediately released and that the state charges against him be dismissed.
Respondents filed an Answer (ECF No. 10) on September 22, 2020. They assert that the Court must dismiss the petition because Petitioner did not exhaust his state-court remedies with respect to any of his claims. Petitioner did not file a reply. See LCvR 2241(D)(2) ("the petitioner may file a Reply (also known as 'a Traverse') within 30 days of the date the respondent files its Response.").
The docket sheet for Petitioner's state criminal case indicates that his trial is currently scheduled for December 7, 2020.
B. Discussion
"For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy[.]" Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967)). After a state prisoner has been convicted, sentenced, and has exhausted his remedies in the state courts, he may seek federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001).
While § 2254 applies to post-trial situations, the more general habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides federal courts with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state judgment is rendered, but only in very limited circumstances. "[T]hat jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance 'pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes.'" Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App'x 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Section 2241 provides in relevant part: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless...[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, under this statute, a state criminal defendant has the mechanism in a federal habeas action to challenge the legality of his pre-trial confinement by arguing that he should not be in pre-trial custody in the first place because, for example: (1) his upcoming trial violates his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.1975); or, (2) he is being deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1973); or, (3) the trial court has unconstitutionally denied or revoked bail, see, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981).
Importantly, state pre-trial detainees who seek federal habeas relief must first exhaust their state-court remedies. Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law...as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.") (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-91); Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (no distinction between § 2254 and § 2241 "insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned"). The exhaustion requirement is "grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-49 (1999); Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Exhaustion addresses federalism and comity concerns by affording the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must have "invoke[d] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[,]" in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
It is Petitioner's burden to demonstrate that he exhausted available state remedies. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Ellison v. Rogers, 484 F.3d 658, 660-62 (3d Cir. 2007); Coady, 251 F.3d at 488. Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to any of his claims. He may have raised some of them in his state habeas petition, but he did not appeal the trial court's denial of that petition to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Additionally, it does not appear that Petitioner has filed a motion in state court arguing that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. If he did and it was denied, he did not appeal that decision to the Superior Court.
Where state-court remedies are unexhausted, "principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger abstention will apply when: "(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied, abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised. Id. at 670 n.4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed "very narrowly" and invoked only in "extraordinary circumstances." Id.; Moore, 515 F.2d at 448. See also Brian R. Means, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, § 10.3 Westlaw (database updated July 2020).
Here, there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Petitioner is a defendant in a state criminal prosecution and granting his request for relief would interfere with those proceedings. In addition, the state's criminal case against him undoubtedly implicates the important state interests of enforcement of its criminal laws. Petitioner does have the opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the context of his state criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County and then to the Superior Court. Thus, Petitioner's claims concerning his ongoing criminal proceedings satisfy the requirements of abstention.
Based upon all of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It is recommended that the Court dismiss the petition without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to timely file another habeas petition, under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241 as the circumstances require, following proper exhaustion of available state-court remedies and satisfaction of any other applicable procedural prerequisites.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner under either § 2254 or § 2241. It provides that "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from...the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. § 2253(c)(2). "A district court's order dismissing, without prejudice, a petition for federal habeas relief for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is not a final appealable order, since it explicitly entitles the petitioner to renew habeas proceedings upon completion of review of his claims in the state court system." FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 12:30. See also Gacho v. Butler, 792 F.3d 732, 735-37 (7th Cir. 2015). However, to the extent a certificate of appealability determination is required in this case, Petitioner is not entitled to one because jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether his claims should be dismissed. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the petition (ECF No. 1) without prejudice and deny a certificate of appealability. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: November 12, 2020
/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge