Opinion
Case No. 20 C 50269
2023-07-27
Jonathan L. SMITH (44763-048), Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
Michael J. Denning, Lu Wang Harmening, Jordan William Emmert, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen P.C., Rockford, IL, for Plaintiff. Jana L. Brady, United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, Rockford, IL, for Defendant.
Michael J. Denning, Lu Wang Harmening, Jordan William Emmert, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen P.C., Rockford, IL, for Plaintiff. Jana L. Brady, United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, Rockford, IL, for Defendant. ORDER Philip G. Reinhard, United States District Court Judge
For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion for summary judgment [81] is granted. Judgment is granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. This case is closed.
STATEMENT-OPINION
Plaintiff, Jonathan L. Smith, brings this action against defendant, the United States of America, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2674, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when correctional officer Martha White and case manager Christopher Parrent (jointly, "Officers"), closed the food slot in plaintiff's cell door on his right middle finger while plaintiff was an inmate at United States Penitentiary Thomson. He asserts defendant is liable to him under legal theories of civil battery and negligence. Defendant moves [81] for summary judgment.
The basic facts are not in dispute. The Officers were delivering food trays to the inmates. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts, Dkt # 90, p. 2, par. 6. The food trays are delivered through a food slot in the cell door. The food slot has its own door that opens downward and can be locked with a key. It can be pushed open by an inmate if it is not locked and is large enough for an inmate to get his arm through it. Id., p. 3, par. 11. It is a security and safety issue when an inmate compromises (takes control of) the food slot because the inmate may grab an officer's equipment (handcuffs, keys, pepper spray, rapid rotational baton, and/or radio), assault the officer, or throw bodily fluids or other items at the officer or at inmates in the lower tier. Id., p. 4, par. 18.
Parrent delivered the wrong food tray to plaintiff through the food slot in plaintiff's cell door. Id., p. 2, par. 8. Plaintiff became irritated and notified Parrent of the mistake. Id., p. 3, par. 9. Parrent reopened the food slot and took the wrong food tray back from plaintiff. Id., p. 3, par. 10, 12. White then place the correct food tray on the food slot and plaintiff received it through the food slot. Id., p. 3, par. 13, 14. White then observed plaintiff squat down and move his right arm (elbow first) towards the food slot. Id., p. 4, par. 15. White did not see plaintiff's fingers in the vicinity of the food slot. Id., p. 4, par. 16. White quickly closed the food slot with Parrent's assistance. Id., p. 5, par. 19.
Defendant asserts White closed the food slot to prevent plaintiff from compromising the food slot and that White prevented plaintiff from compromising the food slot by closing it before plaintiff had a chance to breach the vertical plane of the cell door. Defendant's Statement of Facts, Dkt # 83, p. 4, par. 19, 20. "Plaintiff denies that his right middle finger did not breach the vertical plane of the cell door" and denies "that White sincerely believed Plaintiff was attempting to compromise the food slot because White did not issue a rule violation citation to Plaintiff for allegedly attempting to compromise the food slot." Dkt # 90, p. 5, par. 19, 20. Plaintiff claims that his right middle finger was momentarily pinched in the food slot when White closed it, id., p. 5, par. 21, and that White intentionally closed the food slot on his finger. Id., p. 6, par. 24. White and Parrent deny that they intentionally closed the food slot on plaintiff's finger, id., p. 6, par. 25, and say they were unaware plaintiff's finger had been pinched in the food slot. Id., p. 6, par. 22. White testified in her deposition that it is a rule violation to compromise a food slot, but plaintiff was not successful in doing so. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, Dkt # 93, p. 2, par. 4, citing White's Deposition, Dkt # 83, p. 136.
The record contains prison surveillance video which the parties agree accurately shows what occurred. Defendant contends, and plaintiff denies, that the "video footage does not show White or any other officer intentionally injuring [plaintiff]. Dkt # 90, p. 7, par. 27. Defendant asserts that if plaintiff's finger was pinched in the food slot, it was accidental. Dkt # 83, p.4, par. 26. "Plaintiff denies that pinching/catching his finger in the food slot was accidental because White's aggressive demeanor and language toward Plaintiff and other inmates indicates it was done intentionally." Dkt # 90, p. 6, par. 26. Plaintiff asserts that "White and Parrent both exhibited an aggressive demeanor, swore, and yelled at Plaintiff at the time immediately before, during, and after shutting the food slot on Plaintiff's finger." Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt # 91, p. 1, par. 3. Defendant denies the video evidence supports this assertion by plaintiff. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt # 93, p. 2, par. 3. Whether plaintiff's finger was caught in the food slot door when it was closed cannot be seen in the video.
Within two minutes of the incident, plaintiff notified Lt. Jesse Whalen that his finger was injured, and Whalen directed that a medical assessment be performed. Dkt # 90, p. 7, par. 28, 29. Miranda Bergmann, R.N. performed a medical assessment of plaintiff and found he had a very small abrasion with a scant amount of blood that did not require treatment. Id., p. 7, par. 30. Plaintiff continues to experience pain, tingling, and numbness in his right middle finger. Dkt # 91, p. 2, par. 6. Plaintiff asserts his employment opportunities are limited due to ongoing pain in his right middle finger. Id., par. 7. To support this assertion, he cites his deposition testimony, in which he testified that he had to quit a job he had at a casino because he could not do the job because of the condition of his finger. Plaintiff's Deposition, Dkt # 83, p. 25.
On summary judgment, the court gives "the non-moving party, the benefit of conflicting evidence and any favorable inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The substantive law of the dispute determines which facts are material." Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In considering summary judgment, the court does not "weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the facts is most likely to be true." Id. at 742 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A claim under the FTCA must be: (1) against the United States; (2) for money damages; (3) for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death; (4) caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the federal government; (5) while acting within the scope of his or her employment; and, (6) under circumstances where the United States, if a private person would be liable to the plaintiff in accordance with the state law where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
Under applicable Illinois law, to recover damages under a civil battery theory, plaintiff must show "the defendant intentionally caused a harmful or offensive touching of the plaintiff without the plaintiff's consent. An actor 'intends' a result that is either desired or substantially certain to result from his act." Stokes v. John Deere Seeding Group, No. 12-cv-4054-SLD-JEH, 2014 WL 4901765, *12 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
To recover damages based upon a negligence theory, plaintiff must prove that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Quiroz v. Chicago Transit Authority, 463 Ill.Dec. 876, 211 N.E.3d 437, 442 (Ill. 2022). Additionally, because the Illinois Federal Law Enforcement Officer Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 22/10, provides that a federal law enforcement officer is not liable for any act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless the act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct, and because the United States is protected under 745 ILCS 22/10 for actions taken by its correctional officers, McIntosh v. United States, No. 19 C 50322, 2022 WL 1092142, * 8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2022), plaintiff must also prove that White or Parrent or both engaged in willful and wanton conduct.
Under Illinois law, "willful and wanton conduct is regarded as an aggravated form of negligence." Jane Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Directors, 362 Ill.Dec. 484, 973 N.E. 2d 880, 887 (Ill. 2012). To recover damages based on willful and wanton conduct, plaintiff must prove the elements of a negligence claim and also prove either a deliberate intention to harm the plaintiff or a conscious disregard for the plaintiff's welfare. Id.
To survive summary judgment under his civil battery and negligence theories, plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that at least one of the Officers intentionally harmed plaintiff when closing the food slot or acted with conscious disregard for plaintiff's welfare in closing the food slot.
The parties make passing reference to the affirmative defense that reasonable use of force in a correctional setting to gain control of an inmate is a legal justification for a civil battery. However, that affirmative defense does not come into play here because the determinative issue is whether a battery occurred not whether it was justified.
Plaintiff admits White observed plaintiff squat down and move his right arm (elbow first) towards the food slot. Dkt # 90, p. 4, par. 15. He contends White did not believe plaintiff was attempting to compromise the food slot because she did not issue him a rule violation citation for attempting to compromise the food slot. He argues the jury "could reasonably infer that the forceful closing of the food slot door with knowledge that portions of [plaintiff's] right upper extremity were in the vicinity of the food slot door demonstrate an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or, at the very least, an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff's right hand and arm." Dkt # 92, p. 4-5.
Plaintiff admits White did not see plaintiff's fingers in the vicinity of the food slot, Dkt # 90, p. 4, par.16, but also claims White intentionally closed the food slot on plaintiff's finger. Id., p. 6, par. 24. Intention, as noted above, requires acting to obtain either a desired result or a result that is substantially certain to result from the act. Stokes, 2014 WL 4901765 at 12. Plaintiff does not offer an explanation as to how White, without seeing plaintiff's finger near the food slot, formulated a plan to obtain the "desired result" of catching the unseen finger in the closing food slot nor does he explain why White would have realized catching plaintiff's finger in the food slot was substantially certain to result from her action, since she did not see plaintiff's fingers in the vicinity of the food slot. Likewise, having not seen plaintiff's fingers in the vicinity of the food slot, White could not have acted with conscious disregard for the safety of plaintiff's finger.
The parties agree White saw plaintiff moving his right arm (elbow first) toward the food slot. While acknowledging that compromising the food slot is a security and safety issue, plaintiff contends the closing of the food slot by the Officers was not intended to secure the food slot but intended to injure the plaintiff. As evidence, he asserts they "both exhibited an aggressive demeanor, swore, and yelled at Plaintiff at the time immediately before, during, and after shutting the food slot on Plaintiff's finger" and that White had shown "aggressive demeanor and language toward Plaintiff and other inmates" previously. Defendant denies the Officers were acting aggressively, swearing, or yelling at plaintiff during the incident and contend the surveillance video proves they were not. They argue plaintiff's evidence of White's prior aggressive actions toward inmates is inadmissible hearsay.
Plaintiff's statement of facts cites to his deposition to support the statement that White previously, "demonstrated aggressive behavior toward other inmates, by using offensive language and profanity, partially in response to inmates calling Officer White derogatory names." Dkt # 91, p. 1, par.1. In the cited deposition portions, plaintiff testifies that a few days before the incident, "an incident occurred where she did the same thing to somebody else." Dkt # 83, p. 40. He testified, "I don't remember the guy's name. I just remember hearing guys yelling about it over the tiers saying about what happened to him, and then three days later the same thing happened to me." Id. He further testified, "[S]he had a problem with the guy that lived next to me one day cause people were laughing at her and saying—calling her names and stuff like that, but other than that I never really had any interactions with Officer White." Id., p. 56.
Plaintiff's statement that White "did the same thing to somebody else" is hearsay as offered to prove White previously had closed a food slot on another inmate. The declarants (guys plaintiff heard yelling about it) are not testifying in this proceeding as to what they saw. Plaintiff is testifying as to what he heard them say about what White had done. This is inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802.
Plaintiff's statement that White had a problem with the guy who lived next to him because people were laughing and calling White names is not admissible because it is irrelevant. It does not have any tendency to make it more or less probable that White intentionally closed the food slot or acted with conscious disregard for plaintiff's welfare when doing so. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Plaintiff has not explained what the problem was or how a problem with someone else bears on the interaction between White and plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the Officers both exhibited aggressive demeanor, swore, and yelled at plaintiff immediately before, during, and after shutting the food slot on plaintiff's finger. He argues this shows intent to harm or conscious disregard for his welfare in their closing of the food slot. Defendant argues that the surveillance video blatantly contradicts plaintiff's account. However, the video is not determinative one way or the other. It is true that the physical demeanor of the Officers as shown in the video does not show any aggressive behavior prior to closing the food slot. However, the video is silent. It is impossible to know what the Officers were saying to plaintiff throughout the giving the wrong tray, taking the wrong tray back, delivering the correct tray, closing the food slot, moving on to deliver another inmate's food tray sequence of events. The video does not clearly refute plaintiff's statement that the Officers were yelling and swearing at him throughout. Plaintiff's account must be accepted on summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues that the fact he was not issued a rule violation citation for attempting to compromise the food slot is evidence from which it can be inferred White was not trying to prevent plaintiff from compromising the food slot. In his statement of facts, plaintiff cites to White's deposition to support this argument. In the portion of White's deposition plaintiff cites (Dkt # 83, p. 136-37) (Dep. P. 48-49), plaintiff's counsel asks White: "[B]ecause he didn't actually compromise it and get his arm through, is that why he didn't receive a rule violation for compromising the slot?" White responded: "Yes, he didn't successfully compromise the food slot." Plaintiff's counsel then asked: "It's my understanding that the officers involved in any particular rule violation-type scenario have some discretion as to whether or not to issue a violation to an inmate?" White responded: "That's correct."
Plaintiff has not cited to anything in the record suggesting that a correctional officer is mandated to issue a rule violation citation when an inmate attempts to compromise a food slot but fails to do so. The only cited evidence suggests that a failed attempt to compromise a food slot would not be a cause to issue a rule violation and that even when a rule is violated, the officer has discretion whether or no to issue a rule violation citation. Accordingly, plaintiff's argument that his not being issued a rule violation citation is evidence White did not believe he was attempting to compromise the food slot is not supported by any evidence. It is merely speculation. Plaintiff "is not entitled to the benefit of inferences that are supported only by speculation or conjecture." Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016).
Thus, the only evidence to support plaintiff's claim is that the Officers were yelling and swearing at him before, during, and after they delivered the wrong food tray, removed the wrong food tray, delivered the correct food tray, and moved on; that White saw plaintiff's right arm (elbow first) moving toward the food slot; and that the Officers then forcefully closed the food slot. Plaintiff has not cited any cases in which the necessary intent is inferred from similar facts. While plaintiff is entitled to any favorable inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the evidence, Runkel, 51 F.4th at 741, this evidence is not enough to reasonably infer the Officers intended to cause a harmful touching of plaintiff, or that a harmful touching was substantially certain to result from closing the food slot, or that they closed the food slot in conscious disregard of plaintiff's welfare.
Because the foregoing resolves the motion, the court need not address defendant's de minimus injury argument.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment [81] is granted. Judgment is granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.