Opinion
CV 21-7740-VAP(E)
12-15-2021
WILLIAM SMITH, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Virginia A. Phillips, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
On September 27, 2021, Petitioner, a federal prisoner confined at the United States Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, filed a “Motion for Modifying the Sentence Commencement Date, etc.”, which the Court has construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2241 (“Petition”). On October 25, 2021, Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition, etc.” (“Motion to Dismiss”), accompanied by a Declaration of Yolanda Sanchez (“Sanchez Decl.”) and exhibits. Petitioner did not file any opposition within the allotted time. See Minute Order, filed October 25, 2021.
BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2018, the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 96 months, followed by two years of supervised release, for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Petition, p. 2; Sanchez Decl., ¶ 4(a) & Ex. A, pp. 2-3). Petitioner was granted a total of 69 days of credit for the time periods of January 18, 2017 through March 3, 2017 and April 4, 2017 through April 27, 2017 (Sanchez Decl., ¶ 4(d) & Ex. A, pp. 3-4). Petitioner's projected release date is July 12, 2025 (Sanchez Decl., ¶ 4(c) & Ex. A, p. 1).
The Petition seeks to challenges the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) computation of Petitioner's sentence. Petitioner argues that the BOP improperly calculated Petitioner's sentence by failing to give him full credit for the time he served in state custody (Petition, pp. 2-3). Petitioner seeks an order directing the BOP either to modify Petitioner's sentence to reflect the alleged additional credit or to grant Petitioner equivalent credit (Petition, p. 3). Respondent seeks dismissal of the Petition on the ground that Petitioner has not exhausted his available administrative remedies.
DISCUSSION
“Federal prisoners are required to exhaust their federal administrative remedies prior to bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.” Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.”). The exhaustion requirement “aid[s] judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve[s] the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow[s] the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings.” Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). “It is only when a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies that he becomes entitled to litigate the matter in the district court.” Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (citation omitted).
While petitioners may be required, as a prudential matter, to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2241, exhaustion is not a “jurisdictional prerequisite” under the statute. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d at 1045; Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004); see Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006) (“[S]ection [2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus. However, we require, as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.”) (citation and footnote omitted); accord Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds, Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995).
The BOP has established an administrative remedy process through which inmates may seek review of issues relating to any aspect of their confinement. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a). An inmate must first attempt an informal resolution of the grievance. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. If informal resolution is not satisfactory, the inmate may file a formal written Administrative Remedy Request. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response to this Request, the inmate may appeal to the Regional Director. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. The final level of review is review by the Office of the General Counsel. Id.
Courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 1000 (citation and quotations omitted). However, “this discretion is not unfettered.” Id. at 998; see also Murillo v. Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762 n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly to be disregarded.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). A “key consideration” in exercising such discretion is whether “relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 1000 (citation and quotations omitted). Where administrative exhaustion may allow the agency an opportunity to remedy its mistakes before being haled into court, exhaustion is appropriate. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (discussing exhaustion under former 42 U.S.C. section 1997e(a)).
In the present case, Respondent has submitted undisputed evidence that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his challenge to the BOP's computation of his sentence. See Sanchez Decl., ¶ 6 & Ex. B. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner did not pursue any of his administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court. See id. Petitioner has not offered any evidence to the contrary, nor has Petitioner suggested any justification for excusing the exhaustion requirement.
The Court should not excuse Petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. There is no factual basis herein for finding the administrative remedy process futile or unavailable. All levels of the administrative remedy process remain available to Petitioner for purposes of pursuing his challenge to the BOP's computation of his sentence. At a minimum, administrative exhaustion would provide the BOP with an opportunity to correct any alleged errors in computing Petitioner's sentence and would further develop the record concerning the BOP's alleged failure to award Petitioner full credits for the time previously served in state custody. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d at 1313-14 (affirming district court's refusal, due to lack of administrative exhaustion, to consider habeas petition challenging BOP's failure to accord petitioner credit for time served elsewhere, where there were factual disputes concerning the prior time served and where the failure to exhaust rendered the record inadequate for review); see also McKinney v. Shinn, 2017 WL 2312826, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 2312350 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2017), appeal dism'd, 2017 WL 6764905 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017) (“sentence and credit calculations are particularly the sort of claims that benefit most from the full development of an administrative record”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in the present case improperly would encourage the deliberate bypass of the BOP's administrative scheme. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 1000; see also Peterson v. Langford, 2017 WL 11635411, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) (declining to excuse petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies where petitioner pursued no administrative redress prior to filing suit; “excusing compliance with the administrative review process in this instance would improperly encourage the deliberate bypass of the BOP's administrative review process”) (citation omitted); Godley v. United States, 2014 WL 12042565, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (same). Under the circumstances, the Court should not excuse the exhaustion requirement in this case.
Accordingly, the Petition should be denied and dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
RECOMMENDATION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying and dismissing the Petition without prejudice.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No. notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.