Opinion
1:01CV00013
March 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
George Smith, a salesman once employed by United Refrigeration ("United"), filed suit in state court on November 27, 2000, alleging United violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 55 621-634, when it discharged him at the age of 52. United thereafter filed a notice of removal to federal court on grounds of federal question jurisdiction, bringing the case here. The case is now before the court on Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion will be granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff George Smith was hired on February 21, 1994, as a salesman in United's Winston-Salem office, known within the company as "Branch 36." United is a wholesale distributor of heating, air conditioning and refrigeration parts and equipment. Smith, who holds a two-year degree in refrigeration, was responsible for selling all product lines offered by United, including ice machines and other products manufactured by a company called Manitowoc.
Plaintiff maintains that his responsibilities for Manitowoc product sales made him the "ice specialist" for Branch 36 from 1994 until the time of his termination. In a June 1994 internal memorandum, Smith is identified as the "Manitowoc Products/Refrigeration Specialist, Western Region." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., attachment to Smith Aff., "Hofmann Dep. Ex. 5" at 2.).
Defendant claims that Bradley Cox was the ice specialist for western North Carolina until May 2000, when David Hofmann assumed the job. (Def.'s Reply Ex. R.).
As a salesman, Smith received regular pay raises from United, and his performance evaluations reflected ratings of "Good" or "Very Good." In recognition of Smith's performance, United gave him a $1000 bonus in May 1996. In May 1998, Smith was promoted to "outside sales." Smith was given another bonus in May 1999, for $1150. In early 2000, Smith was given a much smaller bonus of $150.
Plaintiff admits that his sales were down for the year 1999, but maintains that this was because one of his major clients, Foodcraft, lost a very important customer of its own and thus ordered less product from United. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Smith Aff. ¶ 13.) Hofmann agreed with this explanation for Plaintiff's reduced sales, noting that the store's move to a new location that year had also reduced sales. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. T at 20-21.)
On March 13, 2000, a Wednesday, Smith was expecting a visit from his supervisor and United's National Sales Manager, Roger Rist, to discuss the sales plan for the year 2000. That morning, however, Smith received a call from Rist explaining that his plane had been delayed and that he wanted Smith to meet him at the airport instead of the office. Smith, laughing, said he did not want to meet Rist at the airport, because rumor had it that that was how salesmen were usually "let go." Rist reassured Smith he was not going to be fired; Rist just needed to get his sales report. Rist also told Smith that David Hofmann, store manager for Branch 36, would be coming to the meeting with Smith.
Following the Rist phone call, Smith confronted Hofmann and asked him what was going on. Rofmann said he would not be going to the airport with Smith, but admitted that Smith's suspicion was correct and that he was being terminated that day. When Smith asked why, Elofmann said he did not know, but that he had tried to convince United's management to terminate a different employee, Scott Russell, rather than Smith.
The previous week, Russell had been suspended for one week for dereliction of duty and lying to customers.
That afternoon, Smith drove to the airport for his meeting with Rist. When Rist failed to show up, Smith paged him, and Rist eventually called Smith back on his cell phone. Rist told Smith he was being terminated because Branch 36 could not support its current number of employees, and that this was a "business decision." At the time of Smith's termination, Branch 36 had five employees: Smith, in outside sales; Hofmann, the branch manager; counter salesmen Thurman Street and Scott Russell; and Michael Jackson, a driver/warehouseman. Smith was the oldest and most highly paid of the five employees.
Hofmann later affirmed this rationale, testifying in his deposition that this was the reason Rist provided to him. (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Sumrn. J. Ex. T at 38-39.)
Approximately two months after Smith's termination, Hofmann was promoted to ice specialist. This job was outside of the Branch 36 chain of command; although Hofmann continued to work out of the Winston-Salem office, he reported to a regional ice products manager and his compensation was expensed to three different branches in North Carolina, including Branch 36. Hofmann's territory included all of western North Carolina, including the area previously serviced by Smith.
This position came open as a result of the resignation of Bradley Cox, the previous ice specialist. (Def.'s Reply Ex. R.).
The record in this regard is incomplete, but it appears that some overlap existed in United's job descriptions.
Following Hofmann's assumption of the ice specialist job, United promoted Thurman Street to branch manager at Branch 36. In June 2000, United hired Kenneth Lawless to fill the counter sales position previously held by Street.
Although the title of "outside salesman" was eliminated with Smith's discharge, the sales and servicing of Smith's primary accounts were assumed by Street and Hofmann. Smith's remaining duties were left unperformed.
Hofmann's deposition testimony on this point was as follows:
Q: In that capacity [ice products specialist], did you fulfill all the job duties that Mr. Smith had had prior to his termination?
A: No. I did not.
Q: Okay. What job duties were left unattended, if they were, after Mr. Smith left?
A: General sales.
Q: Okay. Nobody covered that? Nobody covered that when Mr. Smith left?
A: I know Mr. Street went out and did some sales, just like I had started to do, and as a branch manager, then he became the branch manager.
Q: He did the sales. In other words, all I'm trying to ask, Mr. Hofmann, is once Mr. Smith was let go, y'all didn't just drop the ball and say, "We're not going to call on those big accounts," did you? I mean, somebody whether it was you or Mr. Street, somebody still called on Mr. Smith's accounts, didn't they?
A: Yes. We did.
Q: Okay. So it wasn't like his job duties were eliminated, just the title was eliminated, and those responsibilities were assigned to you and Mr. Street?
A: That's branch manager. B: Okay. (Def.'s Reply Ex. S at 43-44 (emphasis added.))
II. DISCUSSTON
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and other evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Where the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is proper because a "complete failure of proof" on an essential element renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
B. Analysis
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1). Courts have generally analyzed claims under the ADEA using the same McDonnell-Douglas framework used in Title VII discrimination cases. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1309— 10 (1996). First, the plaintiff must establish the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). The burden then shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions against the plaintiff. See id. At this point, the presumption of discrimination "drops out of the picture," and the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant' s proferred reasons were pretextual and the plaintiff was indeed the victim of intentional discrimination. See id., 530 U.S. at 143, 120 5. Ct. at 2106.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Smith must establish the following elements: 1) that he was a member of the protected class; 2) he was qualified for his job and was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations; 3) despite his qualifications and performance, he was discharged; and 4) following his discharge, he was replaced by a substantially younger individual. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. at 2106; O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313, 116 S.Ct. at 1310.
Although Smith was over the age of 40 at the time of his termination and thus a member of the class of employees protected by the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a), he has failed to establish a prima facie case because he has produced no evidence that he was replaced. See Causev v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998) (prima facie case not satisfied where employee's duties were split between remaining employees). The evidence shows that United eliminated Smith's job; no one was hired or even considered for the position of outside salesman following Smith's termination. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Exs. L, O.) The evidence also demonstrates that some of Smith's duties were parceled out to the remaining employees, as occurred in Causey, supra. The branch manager (first David Hofmann, then Thurman Street) took responsibility for some of the sales accounts; and Hofmann, in his new position as ice specialist, handled sales of Manitowoc products in the same territory that Smith had previously handled. Smith's remaining duties ("general sales") were left unperformed. (Def.'s Reply Ex. S at 43-44.)
Smith has suggested that because Hofmann was promoted to ice specialist, a position which encompassed some of the territory previously worked by Smith, Hofmann "replaced" Smith. However, the evidence is clear that Hofmann was moved to this position to replace Bradley Cox, not Smith. Cox had resigned some months earlier, and the position was vacant until Hofmann assumed it. (Def.'s Reply Ex. R.).
In an effort to proceed despite this shortcoming, Smith has cited authority from outside this circuit for the proposition that the fourth element of a prima facie case may be satisfied by showing "constructive replacement," i.e., that an employee's duties were absorbed by younger employees. See Ritter v. Hill 'N Dale Farm. Inc., 231 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000) (prima facie case met where worker's duties spread amongst four remaining employees, all under 40). However, Smith offers no evidence that the Fourth Circuit has ever adopted such a theory. This court, finding none, is in no position to adopt it here.
Because Smith has failed to establish an essential element of his prima facie case, summary judgment is proper; examination of the remaining elements is unnecessary. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322— 23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
III. CONCLUSION
The court finds that Plaintiff Smith has failed to establish the essential elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA. Consequently, the court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A judgment in accordance with this memorandum opinion shall be filed contemporaneously herewith. case met where worker's duties spread amongst four remaining employees, all under 40). However, Smith offers no evidence that the Fourth Circuit has ever adopted such a theory. This court, finding none, is in no position to adopt it here.
Because Smith has failed to establish an essential element of his prima facie case, summary judgment is proper; examination of the remaining elements is unnecessary. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
III. CONCLUSION
The court finds that Plaintiff Smith has failed to establish the essential elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA. Consequently, the court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A judgment in accordance with this memorandum opinion shall be filed contemporaneously herewith.