But if the unequal pay claim "arises from an employer's subsequent compensation decisions, regarding an already employed individual, it is governed by the four-year [limitations period]." Id. (citing Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011)); see also Palmer, 215 F. App'x at 824 (finding unequal pay claim subject to two-year limitations period where the plaintiff "did not allege any wrongdoing regarding salary modifications"). In short, if "discriminatory pay raises, cuts, or other modifications involve post-contract formation conduct that was not actionable under [§ 1981 (§ 1983)] until the 1991 amendment, claims based on these discrete acts are subject to the four-year [limitations period]."
On the other hand, to the extent an unequal pay claim arises out of an employer's subsequent compensation decisions, regarding an already employed individual, it is governed by the four-year statute of limitations. Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011); see Palmer, 215 F. App'x at 824 (finding unequal pay claim subject to two-year limitations period where the plaintiff "did not allege any wrongdoing regarding salary modifications"). In short, because discriminatory pay raises, cuts, or other modifications involve post-contract formation conduct that was not actionable under Section 1981 until the 1991 amendment, claims based on these discrete acts are subject to the four-year statute of limitations.
SeeWall v. Trust Co. of Ga. , 946 F.2d 805, 808 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that a "new and distinct relation" was not created where "the change would not have involved the elevation of [the plaintiff] to a management position which could be considered a new contract"); Sitgraves v. Allied-Signal, 953 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "a simple change in position from supervised employee to supervisor is one that alters the contractual relationship sufficiently to fall within the purview of [pre-amendment] section 1981"); Mallory v. Booth Refrig. Supply Co. , 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a promotion from clerk to supervisor was actionable under pre-amendment § 1981 ); Edwards v. Nat'l Vision, Inc., 946 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1170 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) ) ("Courts ... have recognized that promotion decisions cognizable under the pre-1991 statute include ‘promotions from non-supervisory to supervisory positions’ "); Adams v. Office of Att'y Gen., Ala. , No. 2:11-cv-621-WKW, 2013 WL 2155384, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 17, 2013) (applying two-year statute of limitations to promotion that would have involved new supervisory duties, such as assigning cases, doing performance evaluations, and recommending pay raises). Conversely, a promotion will not create "a new and distinct relation" if it involves only "routine increases in salary or responsibility."
Courts, however, have recognized that promotion decisions cognizable under the pre–1991 statute include “promotions from non-supervisory to supervisory positions and advancements from being paid by the hour to being a salaried employee.” Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11–cv–36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4 (S.D.Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (quoting Cross v. Home Depot, 390 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir.2004)). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff states a cause of action under pre–1991 § 1981 when she alleges that she was denied a promotion to a position that would have brought her new duties, a new job title, and a significant increase in salary.