Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc.

4 Citing cases

  1. Vinson v. Macon-Bibb Cnty.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-cv-00306-TES (M.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2019)

    But if the unequal pay claim "arises from an employer's subsequent compensation decisions, regarding an already employed individual, it is governed by the four-year [limitations period]." Id. (citing Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011)); see also Palmer, 215 F. App'x at 824 (finding unequal pay claim subject to two-year limitations period where the plaintiff "did not allege any wrongdoing regarding salary modifications"). In short, if "discriminatory pay raises, cuts, or other modifications involve post-contract formation conduct that was not actionable under [§ 1981 (§ 1983)] until the 1991 amendment, claims based on these discrete acts are subject to the four-year [limitations period]."

  2. Barr v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.

    CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:17-cv-203 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    On the other hand, to the extent an unequal pay claim arises out of an employer's subsequent compensation decisions, regarding an already employed individual, it is governed by the four-year statute of limitations. Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011); see Palmer, 215 F. App'x at 824 (finding unequal pay claim subject to two-year limitations period where the plaintiff "did not allege any wrongdoing regarding salary modifications"). In short, because discriminatory pay raises, cuts, or other modifications involve post-contract formation conduct that was not actionable under Section 1981 until the 1991 amendment, claims based on these discrete acts are subject to the four-year statute of limitations.

  3. Barclay v. First Nat'l Bank of Talladega

    558 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Ala. 2016)   Cited 5 times
    Holding "[t]hat Barclay's affirmation states that the following is true rather than that the foregoing is true is immaterial" because the statute contains no requirement that "that a declaration conclude with the declarant's affirmation," and that in any event, the statute expressly only requires substantial compliance with its suggested language

    SeeWall v. Trust Co. of Ga. , 946 F.2d 805, 808 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that a "new and distinct relation" was not created where "the change would not have involved the elevation of [the plaintiff] to a management position which could be considered a new contract"); Sitgraves v. Allied-Signal, 953 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "a simple change in position from supervised employee to supervisor is one that alters the contractual relationship sufficiently to fall within the purview of [pre-amendment] section 1981"); Mallory v. Booth Refrig. Supply Co. , 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a promotion from clerk to supervisor was actionable under pre-amendment § 1981 ); Edwards v. Nat'l Vision, Inc., 946 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1170 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) ) ("Courts ... have recognized that promotion decisions cognizable under the pre-1991 statute include ‘promotions from non-supervisory to supervisory positions’ "); Adams v. Office of Att'y Gen., Ala. , No. 2:11-cv-621-WKW, 2013 WL 2155384, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 17, 2013) (applying two-year statute of limitations to promotion that would have involved new supervisory duties, such as assigning cases, doing performance evaluations, and recommending pay raises). Conversely, a promotion will not create "a new and distinct relation" if it involves only "routine increases in salary or responsibility."

  4. Edwards v. Nat'l Vision, Inc.

    946 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Ala. 2013)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that “[b]eing asked to perform additional work is not a materially adverse employment action” for the purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim

    Courts, however, have recognized that promotion decisions cognizable under the pre–1991 statute include “promotions from non-supervisory to supervisory positions and advancements from being paid by the hour to being a salaried employee.” Smith v. Trane U.S., Inc., No. 6:11–cv–36, 2011 WL 4944143, at *4 (S.D.Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (quoting Cross v. Home Depot, 390 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir.2004)). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff states a cause of action under pre–1991 § 1981 when she alleges that she was denied a promotion to a position that would have brought her new duties, a new job title, and a significant increase in salary.