Smith v. Thompson

9 Citing cases

  1. Pearson v. Garrett–evangelical Theological Seminary Inc.

    790 F. Supp. 2d 759 (N.D. Ill. 2011)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that “[b]ecause no other counts remain, a claim for unjust enrichment cannot stand”

    (That act has not been put at issue in this case.) In Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill.App. 165, 1932 WL 2801, at *1 (1932) ( Smith ), the mayor of Chicago organized a fund with the stated purpose of providing immediate relief for sufferers of a flood of the Mississippi River. A man who donated $50 to the fund brought suit, alleging that the mayor diverted some of the funds raised to his private and political purposes.

  2. Pratt v. Security Trust & Savings Bank

    15 Cal.App.2d 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)   Cited 18 times
    In Pratt v. Security Trust Sav. Bank (1936) supra, 15 Cal.App.2d 630, 640, the court held that although a member of the public or a potential beneficiary of a charitable trust has an interest in the charitable use, it is not such a vested interest as would permit his bringing an action for a misuse of the trust fund, because the primary right to enforce a charitable trust resides in the Attorney General.

    [4] It is also generally established, and has been accepted as the law in this state, that the primary right to enforce a charitable trust resides in the attorney-general. ( People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 269]; O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, etc., 213 Cal. 131 [ 2 P.2d 21]; Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235 [ 11 S.W.2d 278, 62 A.L.R. 858]; Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165, 168.) In Dickey v. Volker, supra, page 281, it is said: "An individual member of the public has no vested interest in the property or funds of the trust.

  3. Courtenay C. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found.

    2014 WY 32 (Wyo. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    that “it is the exclusive function of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral to correct abuse in the administration of a public charity by the institution of proper proceedings” [emphasis added] ); and the donor himself has no standing to enforce the terms of his gift when he has not retained a specific right to control the property, such as a right of reverter, after relinquishing physical possession of it. See, e.g., Marin Hospital District v. State Dept. of Health, 92 Cal.App.3d 442, 448, 154 Cal.Rptr. 838 (1979) (fact that charity is bound to use contributions for purposes for which they were given does not confer to donor standing to bring action to enforce terms of gift). As a matter of common law, when a settlor of a trust or a donor of property to a charity fails specifically to provide for a reservation of rights in the trust or gift instrument, “ ‘neither the donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a proceeding to compel the proper execution of the trust, except as relators.’ ” Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill.App. 165, 169 (1932), quoting 2 J. Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7th Ed.1929) § 732a, pp. 1255–56; see Wilbur v. University of Vermont, supra, 129 Vt. at 44, 270 A.2d 889 (breach of trust “creates no right in the donor's heirs to enforce a resulting trust”); Hagaman v. Board of Education, 117 N.J.Super. 446, 454, 285 A.2d 63 (1971) (heirs of settlor generally cannot enforce charitable trust). “There is no such thing as a resulting trust with respect to a charity.... Where the donor has effectually passed out of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a charity, neither he nor those claiming under him have any standing in a court of equity as to its disposition and control.”

  4. Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport

    243 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 60 times
    Rejecting assertion that donor standing exists under § 7 of the UMIFA

    As a matter of common law, when a settlor of a trust or a donor of property to a charity fails specifically to provide for a reservation of rights in the trust or gift instrument, "`neither the donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a proceeding to compel the proper execution of the trust, except as relators.'" Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165, 169 (1932), quoting 2 J. Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7th Ed. 1929) § 732a, pp. 1255-56; see Wilbur v. University of Vermont, supra, 129 Vt. 44 (breach of trust "creates no right in the donor's heirs to enforce a resulting trust"); Hagaman v. Board of Education, 117 N.J. Super. 446, 454, 285 A.2d 63 (1971) (heirs of settlor generally cannot enforce charitable trust). "There is no such thing as a resulting trust with respect to a charity. . . . Where the donor has effectually passed out of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a charity, neither he nor those claiming under him have any standing in a court of equity as to its disposition and control."

  5. Holden Hosp. Corp. v. So. Ill. Hosp. Corp.

    22 Ill. 2d 150 (Ill. 1961)   Cited 12 times
    In Holden Hospital Corp. v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 22 Ill.2d 150, 174 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1961), for example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that donors who contributed funds to a hospital's fund-raising campaign did not have standing to intervene in an action brought by the hospital to secure approval of a contract to sell its assets to another hospital.

    The allegation of the intervenors was that they had contributed funds to Holden Hospital Corporation and it does not appear from the record that there is any other ground upon which their standing to take part in this case might be predicated. The Appellate Court has taken the view that the interest of a donor to a trust or a member of the public concerned with its work is insufficient to give standing, ( Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165; People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill. App. 231, Art Institute of Chicago v. Castle, 9 Ill. App.2d 473,) although there is dicta to the contrary in McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill. 425. We agree with the well supported view (Restatement of Trusts, Second, § 391; 2a Bogert on Trusts, secs. 414, 415) that the Attorney General is usually the proper party to represent the public's interest in the trust.

  6. Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center

    281 A.D.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 36 times
    Holding wife of deceased donor of charitable gift to hospital, which gift was subject to numerous restrictions agreed to by hospital, had concurrent standing with attorney general to enforce restrictions

    Therefore, properly read, Associate Alumni held only that, where a donor has retained significant rights to control the charitable gift, it has standing to seek enforcement of the terms of the gift. Significantly, others who have considered Associate Alumni have similarly concluded that it represents an exception to the general rule restricting standing to the Attorney General (see, Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165, 180; Charities, N Y Jur2d § 41 at 236). Thus, contrary to the majority's position, Associate Alumni does not establish donor standing qua donor.

  7. Kolin v. Leitch

    343 Ill. App. 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951)   Cited 7 times

    Saarinen, the sole appellant, conceded that a proceeding to enforce or interfere in a charitable trust must be brought on behalf of the People by the State's Attorney or the Attorney General, and that he could not have filed his own complaint to accomplish this purpose. This court said the authorities are fully in accord on that proposition, citing McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill. 425, People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, Attorney General v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229, and Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165. In Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, the court held that the right of the State, acting through the Attorney General, to interfere in the handling of a public charitable use or to prevent or correct abuses, cannot be denied.

  8. People ex Rel. Courtney v. Wilson

    327 Ill. App. 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that this court has dismissed cases brought by the public's authorized representatives "where it has appeared that the real party in interest is some individual seeking to further a personal cause"

    Saarinen concedes that a proceeding to enforce or interfere in a charitable trust must be brought on behalf of the people by the state's attorney or attorney general and that he could not have filed his own bill of complaint to accomplish that purpose; and the authorities are fully in accord on that proposition. McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill. 425; People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604; Attorney General v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229; Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, vol. 2, Sec. 414; and Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, par. 391 on "Who can enforce charitable trusts." It follows that since the cause was fully and fairly tried upon a record comprising nearly 4,000 pages and innumerable exhibits, and the state's attorney having refused to appeal from the decree entered because of his entire satisfaction therewith, nothing remains in this sole appeal by Saarinen except his request for additional compensation or damages, and the claim of his counsel "that Saarinen's reasonable solicitor's fees should have been charged against the fund," upon the theory that the language of the will produced a dispute as to its meaning.

  9. Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v. Kerner

    27 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940)   Cited 15 times

    Two of the Fiske heirs, Maud Kennicott Reid and Mabel B. Gleason, answered asking distribution of the bequests in question to the heirs and denying that the case was one for application of the cy pres doctrine. The Attorney General, who is a proper party to support a legacy to a public charity ( Attorney General v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229, 236; Smith v. Thompson, 266 Ill. App. 165, 168), answered, as did the Infant Welfare Society of Chicago, asserting that its work was more nearly similar to that of plaintiff than any other charity in Chicago and that the fund should be awarded to it. Upon trial the chancellor held that the doctrine of cy pres was not applicable and decreed that the fund be distributed to the Fiske heirs.