Smith v. Texas Power Light Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Fleming et al. v. Pellum

    116 Tex. 130 (Tex. 1926)   Cited 4 times

    The ruling of the Supreme Court in Stephenson v. Nichols, 286 S.W. 199 (by adoption of the judgment recommended by Commission of Appeals), necessarily determined that evidence on a motion for new trial may be preserved for review on appeal under Art. (2073) 2246, Rev. Stats., 1925, though not embodied in a bill of exceptions filed during the term. This settled the conflict between the like ruling of the appellate court herein and the contrary decision in Smith v. Texas Power Light Co., 206 S.W. 119. (P. 131). 3. — Same — Assignment of Error — Sufficiency of Evidence — Findings of Court.

  2. Grubb v. McAfee

    109 Tex. 527 (Tex. 1919)   Cited 96 times
    In Grubb v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 535, 212 S.W. 464, this court declined to hold that the implied obligation to continue the exploration for, and production of minerals, under a lease similar to that to Underwood, was a condition subsequent, for breach of which the lease might be forfeited.

    Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 396; J.M. Guffey Pet. Co. v. Chaison Townsite Co., 48 Texas Civ. App. 555[ 48 Tex. Civ. App. 555]; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 233 [ 107 Tex. 233]; National Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Tex. 591; Johnson v. Gurley, 52 Tex. 222 [ 52 Tex. 222]; Harris v. Rather, 134 S.W. 755; Wade v. Madison, 206 S.W. 119; cited with approval. (Pp. 531-534.)

  3. Munsey v. Marnet Oil Gas Company

    113 Tex. 212 (Tex. 1923)   Cited 25 times
    In Munsey v. Marnet Oil Gas Co., 113 Tex. 212, 254 S.W. 311, 314, the Supreme Court said: "we find nothing from this court to give support to the theory that one can repudiate his drilling obligations and still hold the estate which is granted for the sole purpose of securing performance of such obligations.

    Appellees did sue for and recover damages, in the sum of $1146.25 (S. 176), as compensation for the value of royalty to which they were entitled on oil which should have been produced on the property during the period of cessation in pumping of the wells. Grubb v. McAfee (Sup.), 212 S.W. 464; McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S.W. 859; Pierce v. Oil Co., 225 S.W. 193; O'Neil v. Sun Co., 123 S.W. 172; Wade v. Madison, 206 S.W. 119; Harris v. Rather, 134 S.W. 755, writ denied; Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Ohio St. 333, 110 N.E. 935; Harris v. Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 131, 48 N.E. 506; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 65, 84 N.E. 50; Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 511, 35 A. 109; id., 198 Pa., 581, 48 A. 483; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226; Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383 [ 79 Tex. 383]; Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101; Witherspoon v. Staley, 138 S.W. 1191; Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, 106 Fed., 764; Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 249, par. 5. The evidence is insufficient to support the finding, that appellant abandoned the mineral estate involved in the suit, and for this reason should be set aside and a new trial granted.

  4. Robinson v. Jacobs

    113 Tex. 231 (Tex. 1923)   Cited 41 times

    Appellant's remedy, if dissatisfied with the operation of the property, was to compel its proper operation by resort to equity or suit for damages, or both. Grubb v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 527; McCallister v. Texas Co., 123 S.W. 172; Pierce v. Oil Co., 225 S.W. 193; O'Neil v. Sun Co., 123 S.W. 172; Wade v. Madison, 206 S.W. 119; Harris v. Rather, 134 S.W. 755; Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Ohio St. 333, 110 N.E. 35; Harris v. Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 131, 48 N.E. 506; Poe v. Ulrey, 33 Ill. 65, 84 N.E. 46; Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa, 511, 35 A. 109; Kleppner v. Lemon, 198 Pa., 581, 48 A. 483; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226; Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383; Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 249; Davis v. Texas Co., 232 S.W. 549, 27 Cyc., 687, 688, with copious citation of authority. If the court should be of the view contrary to that contended for by appellees, then we contend that the testimony was insufficient to raise such an issue as to abandonment as ought to have carried same to the jury, and the trial court committed no error in directing the jury to return a verdict for appellees.

  5. United St. Gas Oil v. Cole Petroleum

    17 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)   Cited 1 times

    Some causes of forfeiture being expressly mentioned, none other can be implied. * * * The remedy for a breach of the implied covenant to reasonably operate the premises is therefore not by way of a forfeiture of the lease in whole or in part, but must be sought in a proper action for a breach of such covenant." Again, the Supreme Court approves the following language used by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, in Wade v. Madison, 206 S.W. 119: "It seems settled, however, that ordinarily breaches of express covenants, much less those that arise only by implication, do not forfeit the right of possession or confer the right of re-entry, in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the contract." In the case of Lane v. Urbahn, 246 S.W. 1070, it was held by this court, through Associate Justice Smith: "The contract expressly provided that if the lessees failed to begin drilling a well on or before February 20, 1920, the lease should terminate, unless the lessee paid the stipulated rental; but in no other contingency was a forfeiture expressly provided for.

  6. Cussen v. Lynch

    245 S.W. 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)   Cited 1 times
    In Cussen v. Lynch, 245 S.W. 932 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1922, no writ), the Court considered a dispute involving the Roman Catholic Church, and concluded that ecclesiastical decisions by church tribunals are binding on the civil courts in cases involving dependent property rights.

    This court recognized the right to bring up the evidence in a statement of facts which was had upon a motion to set aside a verdict. However, we regarded such evidence as not being part of the trial on the main issue, and that as it partook in its nature of a bill of exception, and as a bill of exception, as announced by the Court of Criminal Appeals, was required to be filed during term time, we concluded to follow the holding of that court. Smith v. Texas Power Light Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 119. In the case of St. Louis, etc., Railway Co. v. Vick (Tex. Civ App.) 210 S.W. 247, our position as to the time of filing the statement of facts on the motion was criticized and dissented from.

  7. Linthicum v. Richardson

    245 S.W. 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)   Cited 4 times

    In construing this law, the Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held that bills of exception or statement of facts containing evidence had at the hearing of a motion for a new trial must be filed in term time, and one that is not so filed cannot be considered. Reyes v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 588, 196 S.W. 532. The Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, in Smith v. Texas Power Light Co., 206 S.W. 120, followed the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals, in St. Louis, B. M. R. Co. v. Vick, 210 S.W. 247, refused to follow the opinion in Smith v. Power Light Co., supra, and held exactly the opposite-that article 2073, supra, applies to bills of exception containing testimony taken on a motion for new trial. But we do not believe it necessary for us to decide the question in the disposition of this case, and hence do not further discuss same.

  8. Southern S. S. Co. v. Neeley

    243 S.W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)   Cited 1 times

    "Revised Statutes, article 2073, giving, or appeal from judgment, time beyond the tern in which to prepare and file statement of fact and bills of exceptions, does not apply to testimony taken on motions for new trial for mis conduct of the jury, which must be preserve, by bills of exception or statement of facts file in term time." In support of their contention, counsel for appellee cite the case of Smith v. Texas Power Light Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S. M 120. The opinion in that case was by th Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, speaking through Chief Justice Huff.