Opinion
03-23-00818-CV
02-27-2024
Do Not Publish
FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-22-005427, THE HONORABLE DON R. BURGESS, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Appellant Trent Alvon Smith, appearing pro se, seeks to appeal the trial court's order setting aside a default judgment that had previously been granted in Smith's favor.
This Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from final judgments and certain interlocutory orders as permitted by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) (explaining "general rule, with mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment"). When a trial court sets aside its prior judgment or order and grants a new trial, the case is effectively reinstated on the court's active docket. See North Burnet Gun Store, LLC v. Tack, 604 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. App-Austin 2020, no pet.; see Tex. R. App. P. 21.9(b) ("Granting a new trial restores the case to its position before the former trial . . . ."). Therefore, when a default judgment is set aside, there is no final judgment from which an appeal can be taken, see Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 846 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. 1993) (noting that when trial court set aside award of damages and ordered a new trial, "there was no longer a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken"), and there is no statutory authority permitting an interlocutory appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment, see Texas Dep 't of Protective & Reg. Servs. v. Mastin, No. 03-01-00158-CV, 2002 Tex.App. LEXIS 4460, at *7-8 (Tex. App-Austin June 21, 2002, no pet.) (op.) (noting that order granting motion for new trial is interlocutory and not appealable).
On February 6, 2024, the Clerk of this Court notified Smith that it appears that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter and requested that he file a response explaining how this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. Although Smith has responded to our inquiry, he has failed to explain how we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.
Because no final judgment has been signed and because an order setting aside a default judgment is a non-appealable interlocutory order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Smith's appeal. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3 (a).
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction