Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:99-CV-0657-X
December 13, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 9, 2001, and Defendant Tarrant County, Texas' ("Tarrant County") Response, filed October 23, 2001. Plaintiff did not file a Reply. After having considered the summary judgment evidence, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, it appears to the Court that judgment should be entered in favor of Tarrant County. Because Tarrant County for some reason has not itself moved for summary judgment, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause why judgment should not be entered in favor of defendant within fifteen days from the date this order is filed.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Hilliard T. Smith filed this case on August 16, 1999 claiming that he sustained damages due to jail conditions and inadequate medical care in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By Order signed September 8, 2000, the Court dismissed all claims against former Tarrant County Sheriff David Williams and "Tarrant County Justice Center Medical Staff Manager." Only Defendant Tarrant County, Texas remains. On August 20, 2001, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim after finding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff's sole remaining claim alleges that Tarrant County failed to provide adequate medical care during the period of his pre-trial detention in the Tarrant County Jail. Plaintiff was twice held in pre-trial detention: from May 24, to July 3, 1997; and again starting October 1, 1997 to October 13, 1998. On August 27, 1998, he was convicted on five state felony counts, and on October 13, 1998, he was transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division where he is presently a state prison inmate. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000 for violations of his constitutionally protected rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He wants this $2,000,000 for a case of "athlete's foot."
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees flow from the substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The Fifth Circuit recognizes, however, that "there is no significant distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates concerning basic human needs such as medical care." Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2001). As a result, the Fifth Circuit applies "the same standard for assessing the constitutional claims of both pretrial detainees and state inmates." Id.
In support of his claim, Plaintiff contends that Tarrant County officials either denied or delayed adequate medical care for the treatment of his feet. During the period of his confinement, Plaintiff complained of tinea pedis (or "athlete's foot"). He described his condition as "serious," and alleges that at least one nurse recognized his condition as "severe." Plaintiff argues that Tarrant County medical personnel initially ignored his requests for a medical examination of his feet, and then unreasonably delayed appropriate treatment after his diagnosis. He contends that these failures constitute "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
Athlete's foot is a common skin disease caused by a fungus that grows between the toes. Symptoms include drying skin, itching, scaling, inflammation, and blisters. See Defendant's Appendix [hereinafter "Def. App. at"] at 93-95. "Due to the high number of cases, relative ease of diagnosis, and low toxicity of treatment, most individuals diagnose and treat themselves (with over the counter creams or powders)." Id. at 83.
II. ANALYSIS A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal district courts are "empowered to enter summary judgment sua sponte" Geraghty and Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 923 (5th Cir. 2001), "so long as the losing party has ten days notice to come forward with all of its evidence in opposition to the motion." Love v. Nat'l Medical Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2000).
FED R. CIV. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has met its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that judgment as a matter of law is proper, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish with significant probative evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Kansa Reins. Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp. of Texas, 20 F.3d 1362, 1371 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts establishing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "A dispute about a material fact is `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (citation omitted).
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing constitutional violations by those acting under color of state law. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). In Hare v. City of Corinth, the Fifth Circuit clarified the proper analysis for § 1983 claims that allege episodic failures, by state officials, to provide reasonable medical care to pre-trial detainees. 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996). The en banc court wrote that:
the episodic act or omission of a state jail official does not violate a pre-trial detainee's constitutional right to be secure in his basic human needs, such as medical care and safety, unless the detainee demonstrates that the official acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's needs.Id. at 647. The Supreme Court had previously clarified the deliberate indifference standard in Farmer v. Brennan, explaining that liability requires that the state official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety." 511 U.S. 825, 837. Thus, a plaintiff alleging inadequate medical care must show that the state official violated plaintiff's clearly established rights with subjective, deliberate indifference. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1999).
When the defendant is a local government, as in the case here, the plaintiff must further show that the alleged violation resulted from a local government policy or custom adopted and maintained with objective deliberate indifference. Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 528-29. Because the Court finds that plaintiff's allegations do not meet the very high standard of deliberate indifference as a matter of law, the Court need not address whether the alleged inadequate medical care resulted from a Tarrant County policy or custom.
1. Deliberate Indifference
The Fifth Circuit has stated that the deliberate indifference standard is an "extremely high" one to meet. Domino v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A showing of "mere negligence in failing to supply medical treatment" will not suffice. Gibbs, 254 F.3d at 549; Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[A]lthough inadequate medical treatment may, at a certain point, rise to the level of a constitutional violation, malpractice or negligent care does not."). Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that state officials "refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, the Court expresses some doubt that the pain and discomfort resulting from athlete's foot amounts to a "serious injury" cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Landfair v. Sheahan, 878 F. Supp. 1106, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that athlete's foot does not present any significant risk of serious injury or death). Assuming, however, that athlete's foot is "serious" within the context of the Eighth Amendment, the claim fails because the summary judgment evidence does not show that Tarrant County medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs medical needs. Instead, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that Tarrant County correctional and medical staff offered timely and reasonable medical care to Plaintiff during the period of his confinement.
Indeed, between October 1, 1997 through October 13, 1998, Plaintiff was either examined or treated at least eighteen times by five different physicians. Def. App. at 2-4. Plaintiff first complained of "itching and bleeding" feet on November 5, 1997. Id. at 2. Five days later, Dr. Sam Gianos diagnosed Plaintiff with athlete's foot and prescribed four weeks of a topical anti-fungal cream to be applied twice daily. Id. Plaintiff again complained that his feet were "dry and painful" on December 14, 1997, and was seen eight days later by Dr. Jim Waggoner. Id. at 3. Dr. Waggoner prescribed three medicated soaks for Plaintiff's feet and ordered a regimen of antibiotics, pain medication, and anti-fungal cream for the plaintiff to apply twice daily. Id. Plaintiff received medicated foot soaks on December 24, 25, and 26, 1997. Id.
On January 17, 1998, Plaintiff complained yet again that his "feet [were] infected." Id. He was seen three days later, again by Dr. Waggoner, who ordered another dose of anti-fungal cream. Id. He further ordered that Plaintiff was to return in two weeks for follow-up treatment. Id. On two separate occasions after his January 20 examination, Plaintiff refused to keep his orthopedics clinic appointment. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff was next examined by Dr. Kelly Felps on July 27, 1998, after he had complained of irritated feet on June 29 and July 10, 1998. Id. Dr. Kelly diagnosed Plaintiff with athlete's foot and ordered pain medication and Griseofulvin, a prescription drug used to treat fungus infections. Id. The prescription was subsequently discontinued by Dr. Felps on August 11, 1998, after Plaintiff was discovered "putting [medications] in [his] pocket [and] pretending to take them." Id. Dr. Felps testified that "there is no information to suggest that the lapse of time between his requests and his being examined was detrimental, worsened his condition, slowed potential for recovery or was otherwise medically significant." Id. at 83-84. Dr. Felps further testified that "the medical condition of [Plaintiffs] feet was not serious, his symptoms were not severe and his condition was treatable if he cooperated with the regimen prescribed." Id.
Plaintiff certainly disagrees with the promptness of the examinations and the course of his medical treatment. However, disagreement with medical treatment alone cannot support a claim under § 1983. Gibbs, 254 F.3d at 549. The medical records and testimony produced by Tarrant County set forth in detail the nature and level of care provided to Plaintiff during the period of his detention. The Court finds no evidence that Tarrant County correctional or medical officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any other similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for Plaintiff's medical needs. Based on the abundant medical evidence, no reasonable juror could conclude that Tarrant County medical personnel were deliberately indifferent under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan. Accordingly, this Court finds that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant Tarrant County.